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1 Introduction
1.1 Statistical Mechanics—A Trailer
Statistical mechanics (SM) is the study of the connection between micro-
physics and macro-physics.1 Thermodynamics (TD) correctly describes a
large class of phenomena we observe in macroscopic systems. The aim of
statistical mechanics is to account for this behaviour in terms of the dynam-
ical laws governing the microscopic constituents of macroscopic systems and
probabilistic assumptions.2
This project can be divided into two sub-projects, equilibrium SM and
non-equilibrium SM.This distinction is best illustrated with an example.
Consider a gas initially confined to the left half of a box (see Figure 1.1):
[Insert Figure 1.1 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 1.1 Initial state of a gas, wholly confined to the left compartment of a box separated
by a barrier.
This gas is in equilibrium as all natural processes of change have come to
an end and the observable state of the system is constant in time, meaning
that all macroscopic parameters such as local temperature and local pressure
assume constant values. Now we remove the barrier separating the two halves
of the box. As a result, the gas is no longer in equilibrium and it quickly
disperses (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3):
[Insert Figures 1.2 and 1.3 (appended at the end of the document).]
1Throughout this chapter I use ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ as shorthands for ‘microscopic’ and
‘macroscopic’ respectively.
2There is a widespread agreement on the broad aim of SM; see for instance Ehrenfest &
Ehrenfest (1912, 1), Khinchin (1949, 7), Dougherty (1993, 843), Sklar (1993, 3), Lebowitz
(1999, 346), Goldstein (2001, 40), Ridderbos (2002, 66) and Uffink (2007, 923).
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Figures 1.2 and 1.3: When the barrier is removed the gas is no longer in equilibrium and
disperses.
This process of dispersion continues until the gas homogeneously fills the
entire box, at which point the system will have reached a new equilibrium
state (see Figure 1.4):
[Insert Figure 1.4 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 1.4: Gas occupies new equilibrium state.
From an SM point of view, equilibrium needs to be characterised in micro-
physical terms. What conditions does the motion of the molecules have to
satisfy to ensure that the macroscopic parameters remain constant as long
as the system is not subjected to perturbations from the outside (such as
the removal of barriers)? And how can the values of macroscopic parameters
like pressure and temperature be calculated on the basis of such a micro-
physical description? Equilibrium SM provides answers to these and related
questions.
Non-equilibrium SM deals with systems out of equilibrium. How does a
system approach equilibrium when left to itself in a non-equilibrium state
and why does it do so to begin with? What is it about molecules and their
motions that leads them to spread out and assume a new equilibrium state
when the shutter is removed? And crucially, what accounts for the fact that
the reverse process won’t happen? The gas diffuses and spreads evenly over
the entire box; but it won’t, at some later point, spontaneously move back
to where it started. And in this the gas is no exception. We see ice cubes
melting, coffee getting cold when left alone, and milk mix with tea; but we
never observe the opposite happening. Ice cubes don’t suddenly emerge from
lukewarm water, cold coffee doesn’t spontaneously heat up, and white tea
doesn’t un-mix, leaving a spoonful of milk at the top of a cup otherwise
filled with black tea. Change in the world is unidirectional : systems, when
left alone, move towards equilibrium but not away from it. Let us introduce
a term of art and refer to processes of this kind as ‘irreversible’. The fact
5
that many processes in the world are irreversible is enshrined in the so-called
Second Law of thermodynamics, which, roughly, states that transitions from
equilibrium to non-equilibrium states cannot occur in isolated systems. What
explains this regularity? It is the aim of non-equilibrium SM to give a precise
characterisation of irreversibility and to provide a microphysical explanation
of why processes in the world are in fact irreversible.3
The issue of irreversibility is particularly perplexing because (as we will
see) the laws of micro physics have no asymmetry of this kind built into them.
If a system can evolve from state A into state B, the inverse evolution, from
state B to state A, is not ruled out by any law governing the microscopic
constituents of matter. For instance, there is nothing in the laws governing
the motion of molecules that prevents them from gathering again in the left
half of the box after having uniformly filled the box for some time. But how is
it possible that irreversible behaviour emerges in systems whose components
are governed by laws which are not irreversible? One of the central problems
of non-equilibrium SM is to reconcile the asymmetric behavior of irreversible
thermodynamic processes with the underlying symmetric dynamics.
1.2 Aspirations and Limitations
This chapter presents a survey of recent work on the foundations of SM from
a systematic perspective. To borrow a metaphor of Gilbert Ryle’s, it tries to
map out the logical geography of the field, place the different positions and
contributions on this map, and indicate where the lines are blurred and blank
spots occur. Classical positions, approaches, and questions are discussed only
if they have a bearing on current foundational debates; the presentation of
the material does not follow the actual course of the history of SM, nor does
it aim at historical accuracy when stating arguments and positions.4
Such a project faces an immediate difficulty. Foundational debates in
many other fields can take as their point of departure a generally accepted
formalism and a clear understanding of what the theory is. Not so in SM.
Unlike quantum mechanics and relativity theory, say, SM has not yet found a
3Different meanings are attached to the term ‘irreversible’ in different contexts, and
even within thermodynamics itself (see Denbigh 1989a and Uffink 2001, Section 3). I am
not concerned with these in what follows and always use the term in the sense introduced
here.
4Those interested in the long and intricate history of SM are referred to Brush (1976),
Sklar (1993, Ch. 2), von Plato (1994) and Uffink (2007).
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generally accepted theoretical framework, let alone a canonical formulation.
What we find in SM is a plethora of different approaches and schools, each
with its own programme and mathematical apparatus, none of which has a
legitimate claim to be more fundamental than its competitors.
For this reason a review of foundational work in SM cannot simply begin
with a concise statement of the theory’s formalism and its basic principles,
and then move on to the different interpretational problems that arise. What,
then, is the appropriate way to proceed? An encyclopaedic list of the different
schools and their programme would do little to enhance our understanding of
the workings of SM. Now it might seem that an answer to this question can
be found in the observation that across the different approaches equilibrium
theory is better understood than non-equilibrium theory, which might suggest
that a review should begin with a presentation and discussion of equilibrium,
and then move on to examining non-equilibrium.
Although not uncongenial, this approach has two serious drawbacks.
First, it has the disadvantage that the discussion of specific positions (for
instance the ergodic approach) will be spread out over different sections, and
as a result it becomes difficult to assess these positions as consistent bodies of
theory. Second, it creates the wrong and potentially misleading impression
that equilibrium theory can (or even should be) thought of as an autonomous
discipline. By disconnecting the treatment of equilibrium from a discussion
of non-equilibrium we lose sight of the question of how and in what way the
equilibrium state constitutes the final point towards which the dynamical
evolution of a system converges.
In what follows I take my lead from the fact that all these different
schools (or at any rate those that I discuss) use (slight variants) of either of
two theoretical frameworks, one of which can be associated with Boltzmann
(1877) and the other with Gibbs (1902), and can thereby classify different
approaches as either ‘Boltzmannian’ or ‘Gibbsian’. The reliance on a shared
formalism (even if the understanding of the formalism varies radically) pro-
vides the necessary point of reference to compare these accounts and assess
their respective merits and drawbacks. This is so because the problems that I
mentioned in Subsection 1.1 can be given a precise formulation only within a
particular mathematical framework. Moreover it turns out that these frame-
works give rise to markedly different characterisations both of equilibrium
and of non-equilibrium, and accordingly the problems that beset accounts
formulated within either framework are peculiar to one framework and often
do not have a counterpart in the other. And last but not least, the scope of
7
an approach essentially depends on the framework in which it is formulated,
and, as we shall see, there are significant differences between two (I return
to this issue in the conclusion).
Needless to say, omissions are unavoidable in an chapter-size review. I
hope that any adversity caused by these omissions is somewhat alleviated by
the fact that I clearly indicate at what point they occur and how the omitted
positions or issues fit into the overall picture; I also provide ample references
for those who wish to pursue the avenues I bypass.
The most notable omission concerns the macro theory at stake, ther-
modynamics. The precise formulation of the theory, and in particular the
Second Law, raises important questions. These are beyond the scope of this
review; Appendix B provides a brief statement of the theory and flags the
most important problems that attach to it.
What is the relevant microphysical theory? A natural response would
be to turn to quantum theory, which is generally regarded as the currently
best description of micro entities. The actual debate has followed a different
path. With some rare exceptions, foundational debates in SM have been, and
still are, couched in terms of classical mechanics (which I briefly review in
Appendix A). I adopt this point of view and confine the discussion to classical
statistical mechanics. This, however, is not meant to suggest that the decision
to discuss foundational issues in a classical rather than a quantum setting
is unproblematic. On the contrary, many problems that occupy centre stage
in the debate over the foundations of SM are intimately linked to aspects of
classical mechanics and it seems legitimate to ask whether, and, if so, how,
these problems surface in quantum statistical mechanics. (For a review of
foundational issues in quantum SM see Emch (2007)).
2 The Boltzmann Approach
Over the years Boltzmann developed a multitude of different approaches to
SM. However, contemporary Boltzmannians (references will be given below),
take the account introduced in Boltzmann (1877) and streamlined by Ehren-
fest & Ehrenfest (1912) as their starting point. For this reason I concentrate
on this approach, and refer the reader to Klein (1973), Brush (1976), Sklar
(1993), von Plato (1994), Cercignani (1998) and Uffink (2004, 2007) for a
discussion of Boltzmann’s other approaches and their tangled history, and
to de Regt (1996), Blackmore (1999) and Visser (1999) for discussions of
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Boltzmann’s philosophical and methodological presuppositions at different
times.
2.1 The Framework
Consider a system consisting of n particles with three degrees of freedom,5
which is confined to a container of finite volume V and has total energy E.6
The system’s fine-grained micro-state is given by a point in its 6n dimensional
phase space Γγ.
7 In what follows we assume that the system’s dynamics is
governed by Hamilton’s equations of motion,8 and that the system is isolated
from its environment.9 Hence, the system’s fine-grained micro-state x lies
within a finite sub-region Γγ, a of Γγ, the so-called ‘accessible region’ of Γγ.
This region is determined by the constraints that the motion of the particles is
confined to volume V and that the system has constant energy E—in fact, the
latter implies that Γγ, a entirely lies within a 6n−1 dimensional hypersurface
ΓE , the so-called ‘energy hypersurface’, which is defined by the condition
H(x) = E, where H is the Hamiltonian of the system and E the system’s
total energy. The phase space is endowed with a Lebesgue measure µ
L
, which
induces a measure µ
L, E
on the energy hypersurface via Equation (46) in the
Appendix. Intuitively, these measures associate a ‘volume’ with subsets of
Γγ and ΓE; to indicate that this ‘volume’ is not the the familiar volume in
three dimensional physical space it is often referred to as ‘hypervolume’.
Hamilton’s equations define a measure preserving flow φt on Γγ , meaning
that φt : Γγ → Γγ is a one-to-one mapping and µL(R) = µL(φt(R)) for
5The generalisation of what follows to systems consisting of objects with any finite
number of degrees of freedom is straightforward.
6The version of the Boltzmann framework introduced in this subsection is the one
favoured by Lebowitz (1993a, 1993b, 1999), Goldstein (2001), and Goldstein & Lebowitz
(2004). As we shall see in the next subsection, some authors give different definitions of
some of the central concepts, most notably the Boltzmann entropy.
7The choice of the somewhat gawky notation ‘Γγ ’ will be justified in the next subsection.
8For brief review of classical mechanics see Appendix A. From a technical point of view
the requirement that the system be Hamiltonian is restrictive because the Boltzmannian
machinery, in particular the combinatorial argument introduced in the next subsection,
can be used also in some cases of non-Hamiltonian systems (for instance the Baker’s gas
and the Kac ring). However, as long as one believes that classical mechanics is the true
theory of particle motion (which is what we do in classical SM), these other systems are
not relevant from a foundational point of view.
9This assumption is not uncontroversial; in particular, it is rejected by those who
advocate an interventionist approach to SM; for a discussion see Subsection 3.5.2.
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all times t and all regions R ⊆ Γγ, from which it follows that µL, E(RE) =
µ
L, E
(φt(RE)) for all regions RE ⊆ ΓE.
Let Mi, i = 1, ..., m, be the system’s macro-states. These are charac-
terised by the values of macroscopic variables such as local pressure, local
temperature, and volume.10 It is one of the basic posits of the Boltzmann
approach that a system’s macro-state supervenes on its fine-grained micro-
state, meaning that a change in the macro-state must be accompanied by a
change in the fine-grained micro-state (i.e. it is not possible, say, that the
pressure of a system changes while its fine-grained micro-state remains the
same). Hence, to every given fine-grained micro-state x ∈ ΓE there corre-
sponds exactly one macro-state. Let us refer to this macro-state as M(x).11
This determination relation is not one-to-one; in fact many different x ∈ ΓE
can correspond to the same macro-state (this will be illustrated in detail in
the next subsection). It is therefore natural to define
ΓMi := {x ∈ ΓE |Mi = M(x)}, i = 1, ..., m, (1)
the subset of ΓE consisting of all fine-grained micro-states that correspond to
macro-state Mi. The proposition that a system with energy E is in macro-
state Mi and the proposition that the system’s fine-grained micro-state lies
within ΓMi always have the same truth value; for this reason, Mi and ΓMi
alike are sometimes referred to as ‘macro-states’. However, at some points in
what follows it is important to keep the two separate and so I do not follow
this convention; I reserve the term ‘macro-state’ for the Mi’s and refer to the
ΓMi’s as ‘macro-regions’.
The ΓMi don’t overlap because macro-states supervene on micro-states:
ΓMi ∩ ΓMj = ⊘ for all i 6= j and i, j = 1, ....m. For a complete set of
macro-states the ΓMi also jointly cover the accessible region of the energy
hypersurface: ΓM1 ∪ ... ∪ ΓMm = Γγ,a (where ‘∪’, ‘∩’ and ‘⊘’ denote set
theoretic union, intersection and the empty set respectively). In this case
the ΓMi form a partition of Γγ, a.
12
10Whether index i ranges over a set of finite, countably infinite, or uncountably infinite
cardinality depends both on the system and on how macro-states are defined. In what
follows I assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there is a finite number m of macro-states.
11This is not to claim that all macroscopic properties of a gas supervene on its mechani-
cal configuration; some (e.g. colour and smell) do not. Rather, it is an exclusion principle:
if a property does not supervene on the system’s mechanical configuration then it does
not fall within the scope of SM.
12Formally, {α1, ..., αk}, where αi ⊆ A for all i, is a partition of A iff α1 ∪ ... ∪ αk = A
10
The Boltzmann entropy of a macro-state Mi is defined as
13
S
B
(Mi) = kB log[µL, E(ΓMi)], (2)
where k
B
is the so-called Boltzmann constant. For later discussions, in par-
ticular for what Boltzmannians have to say about non-equilibrium and reduc-
tionism, a small ‘cosmetic’ amendment is needed. The Boltzmann entropy
as introduced in Equation (2) is a property of a macro-state. Since a system
is in exactly one macro-state at a time, the Boltzmann entropy can equally
be regarded as a property of a system itself. Let M(x(t)) be the system’s
macro-state at time t (i.e. M(x(t)) is the Mi in which the system’s state x
happens to be at time t), then the system’s Boltzmann entropy at time t is
defined as
S
B
(t) := S
B
[M(x(t))]. (3)
By definition, the equilibrium state is the macro-state for which the Boltz-
mann entropy is maximal. Let us denote that state by Meq (and, without
loss of generality, choose the labelling of macro-states such that Meq = Mm).
Justifying this definition is one of the main challenges for the Boltzmannian
approach, and I return to this issue below in Subsection 2.7.
We now need to explain the approach to equilibrium. As phrased in the
introduction, this would amount to providing a mechanical explanation of the
Second Law of thermodynamics. It is generally accepted that this would be
aiming too high; the best we can hope for within SM is to get a justification
of a ‘probabilistic version’ of the Second Law, which I call ‘Boltzmann’s Law’
(BL) (Callender 1999; Earman 2006, 401-403):
Boltzmann’s Law: Consider an arbitrary instant of time t = t1
and assume that the Boltzmann entropy of the system at that
time, S
B
(t1), is far below its maximum value. It is then highly
probable that at any later time t2 > t1 we have SB(t2) ≥ SB(t1).14
and αi ∩ αj = ⊘ for all i 6= j and i, j = 1, ..., k.
13Goldstein (2001, 43), Goldstein and Lebowitz (2004, 57), Lebowitz (1993a, 34; 1993b,
5; 1999, 348).
14BL is sometimes referred to as the ‘statistical H-Theorem’ or the ‘statistical interpre-
tation of the H-theorem’ because in earlier approaches to SM Boltzmann introduced a
quantity H , which is basically equal to −S
B
, and aimed to prove that under suitable as-
sumptions it decreased monotonically. For discussions of this approach see the references
cited at the beginning of this subsection.
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Unlike the Second Law, which is a universal law (in that it does not allow
for exceptions), BL only makes claims about what is very likely to happen.
Whether it is legitimate to replace the Second Law by BL will be discussed
in Subsection 2.8. Even if this question is answered in the affirmative, what
we expect from SM is an argument for the conclusion that BL, which so far
is just a conjecture, holds true in the relevant systems, and, if it does, an
explanation of why this is so. In order to address this question, we need
to introduce probabilities into the theory to elucidate the locution ‘highly
probable’.
There are two different ways of introducing probabilities into the Boltz-
mannian framework. The first assigns probabilities directly to the system’s
macro-states; the second assigns probabilities to the system’s micro-state
being in particular subsets of the macro-region corresponding to the sys-
tem’s current macro-state.15 For want of better terms I refer to these as
‘macro-probabilities’ and ‘micro-probabilities’ respectively. Although im-
plicit in the literature, the distinction between macro-probabilities and micro-
probabilities has never been articulated, and it rarely, if ever, receives any
attention. This distinction plays a central roˆle in the discussion both of BL
and the interpretation of SM probabilities, and it is therefore important to
give precise definitions.
Macro-Probabilities: A way of introducing probabilities into the theory,
invented by Boltzmann (1877) and advocated since then by (among others)
those working within the ergodic programme (see Subsection 2.4), is to assign
probabilities to the macro-statesMi of the system. This is done by introduc-
ing the postulate that the probability of a macro-state Mi is proportional to
the measure of its corresponding macro-region:
p(Mi) := c µL, E(ΓMi), (4)
where c is a normalisation constant. I refer to this as the ‘Proportionality
Postulate’ (PP). From this postulate and Equation (2) it follows immediately
that the most likely macro-state is the macro-state with the highest Boltz-
mann entropy and the one that occupies the largest part of the (accessible)
phase space.
From this point of view it seems natural to understand the approach to
equilibrium as the evolution from an unlikely macro-state to a more likely
15This is not to say that the these two kinds of probabilities are incompatible; in fact
they could be used in conjunction. However, this is not what happens in the literature.
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macro-state and finally to the most likely macro-state. If the system evolves
from less to more likely macro-states most of the time then we have justified
BL. Whether we have any reasons to believe that this is indeed the case will
be discussed in Unit 2.3.2.
Micro-Probabilities: A different approach assigns probabilities to sets of
micro-states (rather than to macro-states) on the basis of the so-called sta-
tistical postulate (SP).16
Statistical Postulate: Let M be the macro-state of a system at
time t. Then the probability at t that the fine-grained micro-state
of the system lies in a subset A of ΓM is
µ
L, E
(A)/µ
L, E
(ΓM). (5)
With this assumption the truth of BL depends on the dynamics of the system,
because now BL states that the overwhelming majority of fine-grained micro-
states in any ΓMi (except the equilibrium macro-region) are such that they
evolve under the dynamics of the system towards some other region ΓMj
of higher entropy. Hence, the truth of BL depends on the features of the
dynamics. The question is whether the systems we are interested in have
this property. I come back to this issue in Subsection 2.6.
2.2 The Combinatorial Argument
An important element in most presentations of the Boltzmann approach is
what is now know as the ‘combinatorial argument’. However, depending on
how one understands the approach, this argument is put to different uses—a
fact that is unfortunately hardly ever made explicit in the literature on the
topic. I will first present the argument and then explain what these different
uses are.
Consider the same system of n identical particles as above, but now focus
on the 6 dimensional phase space of one of these particles, the so-called
µ-space Γµ, rather than the (6n dimensional) phase space Γγ of the entire
16It is not clear where this postulate originates. It has recently—with some qualifica-
tions, as we shall see—been advocated by Albert (2000), and also Bricmont (1996) uses
arguments based on probabilities introduced in this way; see also Earman (2006, 405),
where this postulate is discussed, but not endorsed. Principles very similar to this one
have also been suggested by various writers within the Gibbsian tradition; see Section 3.
13
system.17 A point in Γµ denotes the particle’s fine-grained micro-state. It
necessarily lies within a finite sub-region Γµ, a of Γµ, the accessible region
of Γµ. This region is determined by the constraints that the motion of the
particles is confined to volume V and that the system as a whole has constant
energy E. Now we choose a partition ω of Γµ, a; that is, we divide Γµ, a into
a finite number l of disjoint cells ωj , which jointly cover the accessible region
of the phase space. The introduction of a partition on a phase space is also
referred to as ‘coarse-graining’. The cells are taken to be rectangular with
respect to the position and momentum coordinates and of equal volume δω
(this is illustrated in Figure 2).
[Insert Figure 2 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 2: Partitioning (or coarse-graining) of the phase space.
The so-called coarse-grained micro-state of a particle is given by specify-
ing in which cell ωj its fine-grained micro-state lies.
18
The micro-state of the entire system is a specification of the micro-state
of every particle in the system, and hence the fine-grained micro-state of
the system is determined by n labelled points in Γµ.
19 The so-called coarse-
grained micro-state is a specification of which particle’s state lies in which
cell of the partition ω of Γµ, a; for this reason the coarse-grained micro-state
17The use of the symbol µ both in ‘µ-space’ and to refer to the measure on the phase
space is somewhat unfortunate as they have nothing to do with each other. However, as
this terminology is widely used I stick to it. The distinction between µ-space and γ-space
goes back to Ehrenfest & Ehrenfest (1912); it is a pragmatic and not a mathematical
distinction in that it indicates how we use these spaces (namely to describe a single
particle’s or an entire system’s state). From a mathematical point of view both µ-space
and γ-space are classical phase spaces (usually denoted by Γ). This explains choice of the
the seemingly unwieldy symbols Γµ and Γγ .
18There is a question about what cell a fine-grained micro-state belongs to if it lies
exactly on the boundary between two cells. One could resolve this problem by adopting
suitable conventions. However, it turns out later on that sets of measure zero (such as
boundaries) can be disregarded and so there is no need to settle this issue.
19The points are labelled in the sense that it is specified which point represents the state
of which particle.
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of a system is also referred to as an ‘arrangement’.
The crucial observation now is that a number of arrangements correspond
to the same macro-state because a system’s macro-properties are determined
solely by the number of particles in each cell, while it is irrelevant exactly
which particle is in which cell. For instance, whether particle number 5
and particle number 7 are in cells ω1 and ω2 respectively, or vice versa,
makes no difference to the macro-properties of the system as a whole because
these do not depend on which particle is in which cell. Hence, all we need
in order to determine a system’s macro-properties is a specification of how
many particles there are in each cell of the coarse-grained µ-space. Such a
specification is called a ‘distribution’. Symbolically we can write it as a tuple
D = (n1, . . . , nl), meaning the distribution comprising n1 particles in cell
ω1, etc. The nj are referred to as ‘occupation numbers’ and they satisfy the
condition
∑l
j=1 nj = n.
For what follows it is convenient to label the different distributions with
a discrete index i (which is not a problem since for any given partition ω and
particle number n there are only a finite number of distributions) and denote
the ith tuple by Di. The beginning of such labelling could be, for instance,
D1 = (n, 0, ...., 0), D2 = (n− 1, 1, 0, ..., 0), D3 = (n− 2, 1, 1, 0, ..., 0), etc.
How many arrangements are compatible with a given distribution D?
Some elementary combinatorial considerations show that
G(D) :=
n!
n1! . . . nl!
(6)
arrangements are compatible with a given distribution D (where ‘!’ denotes
factorials, i.e. k! := k(k − 1) ... 1, for any natural number k and 0! :=
1). For this reason a distribution conveys much less information than an
arrangement.
Each distribution corresponds to well-defined region of Γγ, which can be
seen as follows. A partition of Γγ is introduced in exactly the same way
as above. In fact, the choice of a partition of Γµ induces a partition of Γγ
because Γγ is just the Cartesian product of n copies of Γµ. The coarse-grained
state of the system is then given by specifying in which cell of the partition
its fine-grained state lies. This is illustrated in Figure 3 for the fictitious case
of a two particle system, where each particle’s µ-space is one dimensional
and endowed with a partition consisting of four cells ω1, ..., ω4. (This case
is fictitious because in classical mechanics there is no Γµ with less than two
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dimensions. I consider this example for ease of illustration; the main idea
carries over to higher dimensional spaces without difficulties.)
[Insert Figure 3 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 3: Specification of coarse-grained state of a system.
This illustration shows that each distribution D corresponds to a particular
part of Γγ, a; and it also shows the important fact that parts correspond-
ing to different distributions do not overlap. In Figure 3, the hatched areas
(which differ by which particle is in which cell) correspond to the distribu-
tion (1, 0, 0, 1) and the dotted area (where both particles are in the same
cell) correspond to (0, 2, 0, 0). Furthermore, we see that the hatched area is
twice as large as the dotted area, which illustrates an important fact about
distributions to which we now turn.
From the above it becomes clear that each point x in Γγ, a corresponds
to exactly one distribution; call this distribution D(x). The converse of this,
of course, fails since in general many points in Γγ, a correspond to the same
distribution Di. These states together form the set ΓDi :
ΓDi := {x ∈ Γγ |D(x) = Di}. (7)
From equations (6) and (7), together with the assumption that all cells
have the same size δω (in the 6 dimensional µ-space), it follows that
µ
L
(ΓDi) = G(Di) (δω)
n, (8)
Next we want to know the distribution D for which G(D), and with it
µ
L
(ΓDi), assume their maximum. To solve this problem we make two crucial
sets of assumptions, one concerning the energy of the system and one con-
cerning the system’s size (their implications will be discussed in Subsection
2.7).
First, we assume that the energy of a particle only depends on which cell
ωj it is in, but not on the states of the other particles; that is, we neglect
the contribution to the energy of the system that stems from interactions
between the particles. We then also assume that the energy Ej of a particle
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whose fine-grained state lies in cell ωj only depends on the index j, i.e. on
the cell in which the state is, and not on its exact location within the cell.
This can be achieved, for instance, by taking Ej to be the average energy
in ωj. Under these assumptions, the total energy of the system is given by∑l
j=1 njEj .
Second, we assume that the system as a whole is large, and that there are
many particles in each individual cell: (nj ≫ 1 for all j). These assumptions
allows us to use Stirling’s formula to approximate factorials:
n! ≈
√
2πn
(
n
e
)n
(9)
Now we have to maximise G(D) under the ‘boundary conditions’ that
the number n of particles is constant (n =
∑
j nj) and that the total energy
E of the system is constant (E =
∑
j njEj). Under these assumptions one
can then prove (using Stirling’s approximation and the Lagrange multiplier
method) that G(D) reaches its maximum for
nj = α exp(−βEj), (10)
which is the (discrete) Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, where α and β are
constants depending on the nature of the system (Ehrenfest & Ehrenfest
1912, 30; Tolman 1938, Ch. 4).
Before we turn to a discussion of the significance of these calculations,
something needs to be said about observable quantities. It is obvious from
what has been said so far that observable quantities are averages of the form
〈f〉 :=
n∑
j=1
njfωj , (11)
where f is a function of position and momentum of a particle, and fωj is
the value of the function in cell ωj (where, as in the case of the energy, it
is assumed that the values of f depend only on the cell ωj but not of the
particle’s location within the cell; i.e. it is assumed that f does not fluctuate
on a scale of δω). In particular one can calculate the pressure of a gas in
equilibrium in this way.20
20In practice this is not straightforward. To derive the desired results, one first has to
express the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution in differential form, transform it to position
and momentum coordinates and take a suitable continuum limit. For details see, for
instance, Tolman (1938, Ch. 4).
17
What is the relevance of these considerations for the Boltzmann ap-
proach? The answer to this question is not immediately obvious. Intuitively
one would like to associate the ΓDi with the system’s macro-macro regions
ΓMi. However, such an association is undercut by the fact that the ΓDi are 6n
dimensional objects, while the ΓMi, as defined by Equation (1), are subsets
of the 6n− 1 dimensional energy hypersurface ΓE .
Two responses to this problem are possible. The first is to replace the
definition of a macro-region given in the previous subsection by one that
associates macro-states with 6n dimensional rather than 6n− 1 dimensional
parts of Γγ, which amounts to replacing Equation (1) by Γ
′
Mi
:= {x ∈
Γγ |Mi = M(x)} for all i = 1, ..., m. Macro-states thus defined can then
be identified with the regions of Γγ corresponding to a given distribution:
Γ′Mi = ΓDi for all i = 1, ..., m, where m now is the number of different
distributions.
This requires various adjustments in the apparatus developed in Subsec-
tion 2.1, most notably in the definition of the Boltzmann entropy. Taking
the lead from the idea that the Boltzmann entropy is the logarithm of the
hypervolume of the part of the phase space associated with a macro-state we
have
S ′
B
(Mi) := kB log[µL(Γ
′
Mi
)], (12)
and with Equation (8) we get
S ′
B
(Mi) = kB log[G(Di)] + kBn log(δω). (13)
Since the last term is just an additive constant it can be dropped (provided
we keep the partition fixed), because ultimately we are interested in en-
tropy differences rather than in absolute values. We then obtain S ′
B
(Mi) =
k
B
log[G(Di)], which is the definition of the Boltzmann entropy we find in
Albert (2000, 50).
In passing it is worth mentioning that S ′
B
can be expressed in alternative
ways. If we plug Equation (6) into Equation (13) and take into account
the above assumption that all nj are large (which allows us to use Stirling’s
approximation) we obtain (Tolman 1938, Ch. 4):
S ′
B
(Mi) ≈ −kB
∑
j
nj lognj + c(n, δω), (14)
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where the nj are the occupation numbers of distribution Di and c(n, δω) is a
constant depending on n and δω. Introducing the quotients pj := nj/n and
plugging them into the above formula we find
S ′
B
(Mi) ≈ −n kB
∑
j
pj log pj + c˜(n, δω), (15)
where, again, c˜(n, δω) is a constant depending on n and δω.21 The quotients
pi are often said to be the probability of finding a randomly chosen particle
in cell ωi. This is correct, but is important not to confuse this probability,
which is simply a finite relative frequency, with the probabilities that occur
in BL. In fact, the two have nothing to do with each other.
What are the pros and the cons of this first response? The obvious
advantage is that it provides an explicit construction of the macro-regions
Γ′Mi, and that this construction gives rise to a definition of the Boltzmann
entropy which allows for easy calculation of its values.
The downside of this ‘6n dimensional approach’ is that the macro-regions
Γ′Mi almost entirely consist of micro-states which the system never visits
(remember that the motion of the system’s micro-state is confined to the
6n − 1 dimensional energy hypersurface). This is a problem because it is
not clear what relevance considerations based on the hypervolume of certain
parts of the phase space have if we know that the system’s actual micro-
state only ever visits a subset of these parts which is of measure zero. Most
notably, of what relevance is the observation that the equilibrium macro-
region has the largest (6n dimensional) hypervolume if the system can only
ever access a subset of measure zero of this macro-region? Unless there is a
relation between the 6n−1 dimensional hypervolume of relevant parts of the
energy hypersurface and the 6n dimensional hypervolume of the parts of Γγ
in which they lie, considerations based on the 6n dimensional hypervolume
are inconsequential.22
The second response to the above problem leaves the definition of macro-
regions as subsets of the 6n − 1 dimensional energy hypersurface unaltered
21This expression for the Boltzmann entropy is particularly useful because, as we shall
see in Subsection 3.6.1,
∑
j pj log pj is a good measure for the ‘flatness’ of the distribution
pj .
22Moreover, the ‘6n dimensional approach’ renders the ‘orthodox’ account of SM proba-
bility, the time average interpretation (see Subsection 2.4), impossible. This interpretation
is based on the assumption that the system is ergodic on the union of the macro-regions,
which is impossible if macro regions are 6n dimensional.
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and endeavours to ‘translate’ the results of the combinatorial argument back
into the original framework (as presented in Subsection 2.1). This, as we
shall see, is possible, but only at the cost of introducing a further hypothesis
postulating a relation between the values of the 6n and the 6n−1 dimensional
hypervolumes of relevant parts of Γγ.
The most important achievement of the combinatorial argument is the
construction of the ΓDi, the regions in phase space occupied by micro-states
with the same macro-properties. Given that the original framework does not
provide a recipe of how to construct the macro-regions, we want to make use
of the ΓDi to define the ΓMi. A straightforward way to obtain the ΓMi from
the ΓDi is intersect the ΓDi withΓE :
23
ΓMi := ΓDi ∩ ΓE . (16)
How can we calculate the Boltzmann entropy of the macro-states corre-
sponding to macro-regions thus defined? The problem is that in order to
calculate the Boltzmann entropy of these states we need the 6n − 1 dimen-
sional hypervolume of the ΓMi, but what we are given (via Equation (8))
is the the 6n dimensional hypervolume of the ΓDi, and there is no way to
compute the former on the basis of the latter.
The way out of this impasse is to introduce a new postulate, namely
that the 6n − 1 dimensional hypervolume of the ΓMi is proportional to 6n
dimensional hypervolume of the ΓDi: µL, E(ΓMi) = kvµL(ΓDi), where kv is a
proportionality constant. It is plausible to assume that this postulate is at
least approximately correct because the energy hypersurface of characteristic
SM systems is smooth and does not oscillate on the scale of δω. Given this,
we have
S
B
(Mi) = S
′
B
(Mi) + kB log(kv); (17)
23This construction implicitly assumes that there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween distributions and macro-states. This assumption is too simplistic in at least two
ways. First, ΓDi ∩ ΓE may be empty for some i. Second, characteristically several distri-
butions correspond to the same macro-state in that the macroscopic parameters defining
the macro-state assume the same values for all of them. These problems can easily be
overcome. The first can be solved by simply deleting empty Mi from the list of macro-
regions; the second can be overcome by intersecting ΓE not with each individual ΓDi , but
instead with the union of all ΓDi that correspond to the same macro-state. Since this
would not alter any of the considerations to follow, I disregard this issue henceforth.
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that is, S
B
and S ′
B
differ only by an additive constant, and so Equation (13)
as well as Equations (14) and (15) can be used to determine the values of
S
B
.
In what follows I assume that this ‘proportionality assumption’ holds
water and that the Boltzmann entropy of a macro-state can be calculated
using Equation (17).
2.3 Problems and Tasks
In this subsection I point out what the issues are that the Boltzmannian
needs to address in order to develop the approach introduced so-far into a
full-fledged account of SM. Needless to say, these issues are not independent
of each other and the response to one bears on the responses to others.
2.3.1 Issue 1: The Connection with Dynamics
The Boltzmannian account as developed so far does not make reference to
dynamical properties of the system other than the conservation of energy,
which is a consequence of Hamilton’s equations of motion. But not every
dynamical system—not even if it consists of a large number of particles—
behaves thermodynamically in that the Boltzmann entropy increases most
of the time.24 For such behaviour to take place it must be the case that a
system, which is initially prepared in any low entropy state, eventually moves
towards the region of Γγ associated with equilibrium. This is illustrated in
Figure 4 (which is adapted from Penrose 1989, 401 and 407).
[Insert Figure 4 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 4: Trajectory from a low entropy state to a region associated with equilibrium.
But this need not be so. If, for instance, the initial low entropy macro-region
24Lavis (2005, 254-61) criticises the standard preoccupation with ‘local’ entropy increase
as misplaced and suggests that what SM should aim to explain is so-called thermodynamic-
like behaviour, namely that the Boltzmann entropy be close to its maximum most of the
time.
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is separated from the equilibrium region by an invariant surface, then no
approach to equilibrium takes place. Hence, the question is: of what kind
the dynamics has to be for the system to behave thermodynamically.
A common response begins by pointing out that equilibrium is not only
associated with the largest part of Γγ ; in fact, the equilibrium macro-region is
enormously larger than any other macro-region (Ehrenfest & Ehrenfest 1912,
30). Numerical considerations show that the ratio ΓMeq/ΓM , where M is a
typical non-equilibrium distribution, is of the magnitude of 10n (Goldstein
2001, 43; Penrose 1989, 403). If we now assume that the system’s state drifts
around more or less ‘randomly’ on Γγ, a then, because ΓMeq is vastly larger
than any other macro region, sooner or later the system will reach equilibrium
and stay there for at least a very long time. The qualification ‘more or less
randomly’ is essential. If the motion is too regular, it is possible that the
system successfully avoids equilibrium positions. But if the state wanders
around on the energy hypersurface randomly, then, the idea is, it simply
cannot avoid moving into the region associated with equilibrium sooner or
later.
Plausible as it may seem, this argument has at best heuristic value. What
does it mean for a system to drift around randomly? In particular in the con-
text of Hamiltonian mechanics, a deterministic theory, the notion of drifting
around randomly is in need of explanation: what conditions does a classical
system have to satisfy in order to possess ‘random properties’ sufficient to
warrant the approach to equilibrium?
2.3.2 Issue 2: Introducing and Interpreting Probabilities
There are several different (albeit interrelated) issues that must be addressed
in order to understand the origin and meaning of probabilities in SM, and all
of them are intimately connected to issue 1. The first of these is the problem
of interpretation.
The interpretation of SM probabilities. How are SM probabilities to be un-
derstood? Approaches to probability can be divided into two broad groups.25
First, epistemic approaches take probabilities to be measures for degrees of
belief. Those who subscribe to an objective epistemic theory take proba-
25What follows is only the briefest of sketches. Those options that have been seriously
pursued within SM will be discussed in more detail below. For an in-depth discussion of
all these approaches see, for instance, Howson (1995), Gillies (2000), Galavotti (2005) and
Mellor (2005).
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bilities to be degrees of rational belief, whereby ‘rational’ is understood to
imply that given the same evidence all rational agents have the same degree
of belief in any proposition. This is denied by those who hold a subjective
epistemic theory, regarding probabilities as subjective degrees of belief that
can differ between persons even if they are presented with the same body
of evidence.26 Second, ontic approaches take probabilities to be part of the
‘furniture of the world’. On the frequency approach, probabilities are long
run frequencies of certain events. On the propensity theory, probabilities are
tendencies or dispositions inherent in objects or situations. The Humean best
systems approach—introduced in Lewis (1986)—views probability as defined
by the probabilistic laws that are part of that set of laws which strike the
best balance between simplicity, strength and fit.27 To which of these groups
do the probabilities introduced in the Boltzmannian scheme belong?
We have introduced two different kinds of probabilities (micro and macro),
which, prima facie, need not be interpreted in the same way. But before
delving into the issue of interpretation, we need to discuss whether these
probabilities can, as they should, explain Boltzmann’s law. In fact, serious
problems arise for both kinds of probabilities.
Macro-Probabilities. Boltzmann suggested that macro-probabilities ex-
plain the approach to equilibrium: if the system is initially prepared in an
improbable macro-state (i.e. one far away from equilibrium), it will from
then on evolve towards more likely states until it reaches, at equilibrium, the
most likely state (1877, 165). This happens because Boltzmann takes it as a
given that the system ‘always evolves from an improbable to a more probable
state’ (ibid., 166).
This assumption is unwarranted. Equation (4) assigns unconditional
probabilities to macro-states, and as such they do not imply anything about
the succession of states, let alone that ones of low probability are followed
by ones of higher probability. As an example consider a brassed die; the
probability to get a ‘six’ is 0.25 and all other numbers of spots have proba-
bility 0.15. Can we then infer that after, say, a ‘three’ we have to get a ‘six’
because the six is the most likely event? Of course not; in fact, we are much
more likely not to get a ‘six’ (the probability for non-six is 0.75, while the
26‘Subjective probability’ is often used as a synonym for ‘epistemic probability’. This is
misleading because not all epistemic probabilities are also subjective. Jaynes’s approach
to probabilities, to which I turn below, is a case in point.
27Sometimes ontic probabilities are referred to as ‘objective probabilities’. This is mis-
leading because epistemic probabilities can be objective as well.
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one for six is 0.25). A further (yet related) problem is that BL makes a state-
ment about a conditional probability, namely the probability of the system’s
macro-state at t2 being such that SB(t2) > SB(t1), given that the system’s
macro-state at the earlier time t1 was such that its Boltzmann entropy was
S
B
(t1). The probabilities of PP (see Equation (4)) are not of this kind, and
they cannot be turned into probabilities of this kind by using the elementary
definition of conditional probabilities, p(B|A) = p(B&A)/p(A), for reasons
pointed out by Frigg (2007a). For this reason non-equilibrium SM cannot be
based on the PP, no matter how the probabilities in it are interpreted.
However, PP does play a roˆle in equilibrium SM. It posits that the equi-
librium state is the most likely of all states and hence that the system is most
likely to be in equilibrium. This squares well with an intuitive understand-
ing of equilibrium as the state that the system reaches after a (usually short)
transient phase, after which it stays there (remember the spreading gas in
the introduction). Granting that, what notion of probability is at work in
PP? And why, if at all, is this postulate true? That is, what facts about the
system make it the case that the equilibrium state is indeed the most likely
state? These are the questions that Boltzmannian equilibrium SM has to
answer, and I will turn to these in Subsection 2.4.
Micro-Probabilities. The conditional probabilities needed to explain BL
can be calculated on the basis of SP (see Equation (5)).28 Let M be the
macro-state of a system at time t. For every point x ∈ ΓM there is a matter of
fact (determined by the Hamiltonian of the system) about whether x evolves
into a region of higher or lower entropy or stays at the same level of entropy.
Call ΓM+, ΓM−, and ΓM0 the sets of those points of ΓM that evolve towards
a region of higher, lower, or same entropy respectively (hence ΓM = ΓM+ ∪
ΓM
−
∪ΓM0). The probability for the system’s entropy to either stay the same
or increase as time evolves is µ(ΓM+ ∪ ΓM0)/µ(ΓM). Hence, it is a necessary
and sufficient condition for BL to be true that µ(ΓM+ ∪ ΓM0)≫ µ(ΓM−) for
all micro-states M except the equilibrium state itself (for which, trivially,
µ(ΓM+) = 0). BL then translates into the statement that the overwhelming
majority of micro-states in every macro-region ΓM except ΓMeq evolve under
the dynamics of the system towards regions of higher entropy.
This proposal is seriously flawed. It turns out that if the system, in
28To keep things simple I assume that there corresponds only one macro-state to a given
entropy value. If this is not the case the exactly same calculations can be made using the
union of the macro-regions of all macro-states with the same entropy.
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macro-state M , is very likely to evolve towards a macro-state of higher en-
tropy in the future (which we want to be the case), then, because of the time
reversal invariance of the underlying dynamics, the system is also very likely
to have evolved into the current macro-stateM from another macro-stateM ′
of higher entropy than M (see Appendix A for a discussion of time reversal
invariance). So whenever the system is very likely to have a high entropy
future it is also very likely to have a high entropy past; see Albert (2000,
Ch. 4) for a discussion of this point. This stands in stark contradiction
with both common sense experience and BL itself. If we have a lukewarm
cup of coffee on the desk, SP makes the radically wrong retrodiction that
is overwhelmingly likely that 5 minutes ago the coffee was cold (and the air
in the room warmer), but then fluctuated away from equilibrium to become
lukewarm and five minutes from now will be cold again. However, in fact
the coffee was hot five minutes ago, cooled down a bit and will have further
cooled down five minutes from now.
This point is usually attributed to the Ehrenfests. It is indeed true that
the Ehrenfests (1912, 32-34) discuss transitions between different entropy
levels and state that higher-lower-higher transitions of the kind that I just
mentioned are overwhelmingly likely. However, they base their statement on
calculations about a probabilistic model, their famous urn-model, and hence
it is not clear what bearing, if any, their considerations have on deterministic
dynamical systems; in fact, some of the claims they make are not in general
true in conservative deterministic systems.
Nor is it true that the objection to the proposal follows directly from the
time reversal invariance of the underlying dynamics on the simple grounds
that everything that can happen in one direction of time can also happen
in the other direction. However, one can indeed prove that the statement
made in the last paragraph about entropic behaviour is true in conservative
deterministic dynamical systems, if SP is assumed (Frigg 2007b). Hence
there is a serious problem, because the micro-dynamics and (SP) lead us to
expect the system to behave in a way that is entirely different from how the
system actually behaves and from what the laws of thermodynamics lead
us to expect. The upshot is that the dynamics at the micro-level and SP
by itself do not underwrite the asymmetrical behaviour that we find at the
macro level, and which is captured by BL. Hence the question is: where
then does the irreversibility at the macro level come from, if not from the
dynamical laws governing the micro constituents of a system? I turn to a
discussion of this question in Subsection 2.5.
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2.3.3 Issue 3: Loschmidt’s Reversibility Objection
As we observed in the introduction, the world is rife with irreversible pro-
cesses; that is, processes that happen in one temporal direction but not in
the other. This asymmetry is built into the Second Law of thermodynam-
ics.. As Loschmidt pointed out in controversy with Boltzmann (in the 1870s),
this does not sit well with the fact that classical mechanics is time-reversal
invariant. The argument goes as follows:29
Premise 1 : It follows from the time reversal invariance of classical me-
chanics that if a transition from state x
i
to state x
f
(‘i’ for ‘initial’ and ‘f ’
for ‘final’) in time span ∆ is possible (in the sense that there is a Hamil-
tonian that generates it), then the transition from state Rx
f
to state Rx
i
in time span ∆ is possible as well, where R reverses the momentum of the
instantaneous state of the system (see Appendix A for details).
Premise 2 : Consider a system in macro-stateM with Boltzmann entropy
S
B
(M). Let RM be the reversed macro-state, i.e. the one with macro-
region ΓRM := {x ∈ Γ|Rx ∈ ΓM} (basically we obtain RM by reversing
the momenta of all particles at all points in ΓM). Then we have SB(M) =
S
B
(RM); that is, the Boltzmann entropy is invariant under R.
Now consider a system that assumes macro-statesMi andMf , at ti and tf
respectively, where Si := SB(Mi) < SB(Mf) =: Sf and ti < tf . Furthermore
assume that the system’s fine grained state is x
i
∈ ΓMi at ti and is xf ∈ ΓMf
at t
f
, and that the transition from x
i
to x
f
during the interval ∆ := t
f
− t
i
is allowed by the underlying dynamics. Now, by Premise 1 the system is
time reversal invariant and hence the transition from Rx
f
to Rx
i
during
∆ is possible as well. Because, by Premise 2, S
B
is invariant under R, we
have to conclude that the transition from Sf to Si is possible as well. This
contradicts the Second Law of thermodynamics which says that high to low
entropy transitions cannot occur. So we are in the awkward position that
a transition that is ruled out by the macro theory is allowed by the micro
theory which is supposed to account for why the macro laws are the way they
are.
29The following is a more detailed version of the presentation of the argument in Ehren-
fest & Ehrenfest (1907, 311).
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2.3.4 Issue 4: Zermelo’s Recurrence Objection
Poincare´’s recurrence theorem says, roughly speaking, that for the systems
at stake in SM, almost every initial condition will, after some finite time (the
Poincare´ recurrence time), return to a state that is arbitrarily close to its
initial state (see Appendix A for details). As Zermelo pointed out in 1896,
this has the unwelcome consequence that entropy cannot keep increasing all
the time; sooner or later there will be a period of time during which the
entropy of the system decreases. For instance, if we consider again the initial
example of the gas (Figure 1), it follows from Poincare´’s recurrence theorem
that there is a future instant of time at which the gas returns by itself to the
left half of the container. This stands in contradiction to the second law.
A first attempt to dismiss this objection points to the fact that the time
needed for this to happen in a realistic system is several times the age of
the universe. In fact Boltzmann himself estimated that the time needed for
a recurrence to occur for a system consisting of a cubic centimeter of air
was about 1010
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seconds (Uffink 2007, 984). Hence, we never observe such a
recurrence, which renders the objection irrelevant.
This response misses the point. The objection is not concerned with
whether we ever experience a decrease of entropy; the objection points to the
fact that there is an in-principle incompatibility between the Second Law and
the behaviour of classical mechanical systems. This is, of course, compatible
with saying that there need not be any conflict with actual experience.
Another response is to let the number of particles in the system tend
towards infinity (which is the basic idea of the so-called thermodynamic limit;
see Subsection 3.3.2). In this case the Poincare´ recurrence time becomes
infinite as well. However, actual systems are not infinite and whether such
limiting behaviour explains the behaviour of actual systems is at least an
open question.
2.3.5 Issue 5: The Justification of Coarse-Graining
The introduction of a finite partition on the system’s µ-space is crucial to
the combinatorial argument. Only with respect to such a partition can the
notion of a distribution be introduced and thereby the Maxwell-Boltzmann
equilibrium distribution be derived. Hence the use of a partition is essential.
However, there is nothing in classical mechanics itself that either suggests or
even justifies the introduction of a partition. How, then, can coarse-graining
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be justified?
This question is further aggravated by the fact that the success of the
combinatorial argument crucially depends on the choice of the right partition.
The Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is derived under the assumption that
n is large and ni ≫ 1, i = 1, ..., l. This assumption is false if we choose too
fine a partition (for instance one for which l ≥ n), in which case most ni are
small.
There are also restrictions on what kinds of partitions one can choose. It
turns out that the combinatorial argument only works if one partitions phase
space. Boltzmann first develops the argument by partitioning the particles’
energy levels and shows that in this case the argument fails to reproduce the
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution (1877, 168-190). The argument yields the
correct result only if the phase space is partitioned along the position and
momentum axes into cells of equal size.30 But why is the method sensitive to
such choices and what distinguishes ‘good’ from ‘bad’ partitions (other than
the ability to reproduce the correct distribution law)?
2.3.6 Issue 6: Limitations of the Formalism
When deriving the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution in Subsection 2.2, we
made the assumption that the energy of a particle depends only on its coarse-
grained micro-state, i.e. on the cell in which its fine-grained micro-state
comes to lie, which (trivially) implies that a particle’s energy does not depend
on the other particles’ states. This assumption occupies centre stage in the
combinatorial argument because the derivation of the Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution depends on it. However, this is true only if there is no interaction
between the particles; wherever there is an interaction potential between
the particles of a system the argument is inapplicable. Hence, the only
system satisfying the assumptions of the argument is the ideal gas (which,
by definition, consists of non-interacting particles).
This restriction is severe. Although some real gases approximately behave
like ideal gases under certain circumstances (basically: if the density is low),
most systems of interest in statistical mechanics cannot be regarded as ideal
gases. The behaviour both of solids and liquids (and even of dense gases)
essentially depends on the interaction between the micro-constituents of the
30Strictly speaking this requirement is a bit too stringent. One can choose a different
(but constant) cell size along each axis and still get the right results (Boltzmann 1877,
190).
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system, and a theory that is forced to idealise these interactions away (should
this be possible at all) is bound to miss out on what is essential to how real
systems behave.31
A further limitation is that the argument assumes that all the particles of
the system have the same phase space, which essentially amounts to assuming
that we are dealing with a system of identical objects. A paradigm example
for such a system is a monoatomic gas (e.g. helium). But many systems are
not of that kind; most solids, for instance, contain constituents of different
types.
Finally, the formalism remains silent about what happens when systems
interact with their environments. In practice many systems are not com-
pletely isolated and one would like the formalism to cover at least selected
kinds of interactions.
Hence, the question is whether the approach can be generalised so that
it applies to the cases that, as it stands, are not within its scope.
2.3.7 Issue 7: Reductionism
There is a consensus that the principal aim of SM is to account for the
thermodynamic behaviour of a macroscopic system in terms of the dynamical
laws governing its micro constituents; and it is a measure of the success of SM
how much of TD it is able to reproduce (see Subsection 1.1). In philosophical
parlance, the aim of SM is to reduce TD to mechanics plus probabilistic
assumptions.
What does such a reduction involve? How do the micro and the macro
level have to relate to one another in order for it to be the case that the former
reduces to the latter? The term ‘reduction’ has been used in many different
senses and there is no consensus over what exactly it involves to reduce one
domain to another. So we need to specify what exactly is asserted when SM
is claimed to reduce TD and to discuss to what extent this assertion is true.
A particular problem for reductionism is that idealisations play a con-
stitutive roˆle in SM (Sklar 2000, 740). Depending on which approach we
favour, we work with, for example: non-interacting particles or hard spheres
in a box instead of ‘realistic’ interactions; or systems of infinite volume and
an infinite number of particles; or vanishing densities; or processes that take
infinitely long. These idealisations are more than the ‘usual’ inexactness that
31A discussion of this point can be found, for instance, in Schro¨dinger (1952, Ch. 1).
29
is unavoidable when applying a general theory to the messy world; they are
essential to SM since the desired results usually cannot be derived without
them. What is the status of results that only hold in highly idealised systems
(and often are know to fail in more realistic systems) and what roˆle can they
play in a reduction of TD to SM?
2.3.8 Plan
Subsection 2.4 presents and discusses the ‘orthodox’ response to Issues 1
and 2, which is based on ergodic theory and the use of macro-probabilities.
In Subsections 2.5 and I discuss the currently most influential alternative
answer to these issues, which invokes the so-called Past Hypothesis and uses
micro-probabilities. Issues 3 and 4 are addressed in Unit 2.6.3. In Subsection
2.7 I deal with Issues 5 and 6, and Issue 7 is discussed in Subsection 2.8.
2.4 The Ergodicity Programme
The best-known response to Issues 1 and 2, if macro probabilites are con-
sidered, is based on the notion of ergodicity. For this reason this subsection
begins with an introduction to ergodic theory, then details how ergodicity is
supposed to address the problems at stake, and finally explains what diffi-
culties this approach faces.
2.4.1 Ergodic Theory
Modern ergodic theory is developed within the setting of dynamical systems
theory.32 A dynamical system is a triplet (X, λ, φt), where X is a state space
endowed with a normalised measure λ (i.e. λ(X) = 1) and φt : X → X,
where t is a real number, is a one-parameter family of measure preserving
automorphisms (i.e. λ(φt(A)) = λ(A) for all measurable A ⊆ X and for all t);
the parameter t is interpreted as time. The Hamiltonian systems considered
so far are dynamical systems in this sense if the following associations are
made: X is the accessible part of the energy hypersurface; λ is the standard
measure on the energy hypersurface, renormalised so that the measure of the
accessible part is one; φt is the Hamiltonian flow.
32The presentation of ergodic theory in this subection follows by and large Arnold and
Avez (1968) and Cornfeld et al. (1982). For accounts of the long and intertwined history
of ergodic theory see Sklar (1993, Chs. 2 and 5) and von Plato (1991, 1994, Ch. 3).
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Now let f(x) be any complex-valued and Lebesgue-integrable function
defined on X. Its space mean f¯ (sometimes also ‘phase space average’ or
simply ‘phase average’) is defined as
f¯ :=
∫
X
f(x)dλ, (18)
and its time mean f ∗ (sometimes also ‘time average’) at x0 ∈ X is defined
as
f ∗(x0) = lim
τ→∞
(1/τ)
∫ t0+τ
t0
f [φt(x0)]dt. (19)
The question is whether the time mean exists; the Birkhoff theorem asserts
that it does:
Birkhoff Theorem. Let (X, λ, φt) be a dynamical system and f
a complex-valued, λ-integrable function on X. Then the time
average f ∗(x0)
(i) exists almost everywhere (i.e. everywhere except, perhaps, on
a set of measure zero);
(ii) is invariant (i.e. does not depend on the initial time t0):
f ∗(x0) = f
∗(φt(x0)) for all t;
(iii) is integrable:
∫
X f
∗(x0)dλ =
∫
X f(x)dλ.
We can now state the central definition:
Ergodicity. A dynamical system is ergodic iff for every complex-
valued, λ-integrable function f on X we have f ∗(x0) = f¯ almost
everywhere; that is, everywhere except, perhaps, on a set of mea-
sure zero.
Two consequences of ergodicity are worth emphasising. First, if a system
is ergodic, then for almost all trajectories, the fraction of time a trajectory
spends in a region R equals the fraction of the area of X that is occupied by
R. This can easily be seen by considering f(x) = χ
R
(x), where χ
R
(x) is the
characteristic function of the region R: χ
R
(x) = 1 if x ∈ R and χ
R
(x) = 0
otherwise. We then have f¯ = λ(R) = f ∗(x), meaning that the fraction of
time the system spends in R equals λ(R), which is the fraction of the area
of X that is occupied by R.
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Second, almost all trajectories (i.e. trajectories through almost all initial
conditions) come arbitrarily close to any point on the energy hypersurface
infinitely many times; or to put it another way, almost all trajectories pass
through every subset of X that has positive measure infinitely many times.
This follows from the fact that the time mean equals the space mean, which
implies that the time mean cannot depend on the initial condition x0. Hence
a system can be ergodic only if its trajectory may access all parts of the
energy hypersurface.
The latter point is also closely related to the decomposition theorem. We
first define:
Decomposability. A system is decomposable (sometimes also ‘met-
rically decomposable’ or ‘metrically intransitive’) iff there exist
two regions X1 and X2 of non-zero measure such thatX1∩X2 = ∅
and X1∪X2 = X, which are invariant under the dynamics of the
system: φt(X1) ⊆ X1 and φt(X2) ⊆ X2 for all t. A system that
is not decomposable is indecomposable (‘metrically indecompos-
able’ or ‘metrically transitive’).
Then we have:
Decomposition Theorem. A dynamical system is ergodic if and
only if it is indecomposable; i.e. if every invariant measurable set
has either measure zero or one.
The ergodic measure is unique, up to a continuity requirement, in the
sense that there is only one measure invariant under the dynamics. We first
define:
Absolute Continuity. A measure λ′ is absolutely continuous with
respect to λ iff for any measurable region A ⊆ X: if λ(A) = 0
then λ′(A) = 0.
We then have:
Uniqueness Theorem. Assume that (X, λ, φt) is ergodic and λ is
normalised. Let λ′ be another measure on X which is normalised,
invariant under φt, and absolutely continuous with respect to λ.
Then λ = λ′.
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For what follows it will also be important to introduce the notion of
mixing.
Mixing. A system is mixing33 if and only if for all measurable
subsets A and B of X: limt→∞ µ(φtB ∩ A) = µ(A)µ(B).
The meaning of this concept can be visualised as follows. Think of the
phase space as a glass of water to which a shot of scotch has been added.
The volume of the cocktail X (scotch + water) is µ(X) and the volume of
scotch is µ(B); hence the concentration of scotch in X is µ(B)/µ(X). Now
stir. Mathematically, the time evolution operator φt represents the stirring,
meaning that φt(B) is the region occupied by the scotch after time t. The
cocktail is mixed, if the concentration of scotch equals µ(B)/µ(X) not only
with respect to the entire ‘glass’ X, but with respect to any arbitrary (but
non-zero measure) region A in that volume; that is, it is mixed if µ(φt(B) ∩
A)/µ(A) = µ(B)/µ(X) for any finite volume A. This condition reduces
to µ(φt(B) ∩ A)/µ(A) = µ(B) for any region B because, by assumption,
µ(X) = 1. If we now assume that mixing is achieved only for t → ∞ we
obtain the above condition.
One can then prove the following two theorems.
Implication Theorem. Every dynamical system that is mixing is
also ergodic, but not vice versa.
Convergence Theorem. Let (X, λ, φt) be a dynamical system and
let ρ be a measure on X that is absolutely continuous with λ (but
otherwise arbitrary). Define ρt(A) := ρ(φt(A)) for all measurable
A ⊆ X. Let f(x) be a bounded measurable function on X. If the
system is mixing, then ρt → λ as t→∞ in the sense that for all
such f :
lim
t→∞
∫
f(x)dρt =
∫
f(x)dλ. (20)
33Strictly speaking this property is called ‘strong mixing’ since there is a similar con-
dition called ‘weak mixing’. The differences between these need not occupy us here. For
details see Arnold and Avez (1968, Ch. 2).
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2.4.2 Promises
Assuming that the system in question is ergodic seems to provide us with
neat responses to Issues 1 and 2, if macro-probabilities are considered.
Thus, let us ask the question of how are we to understand statements
about the probability of a macro-state? That is, how are we to interpret
the probabilities introduced in Equation (4)? A natural suggestion is that
probabilities should be understood as time averages. More specifically, the
suggestion is that the probability of a macro-state M is the fraction of time
that the system’s state spends in ΓM (the so-called sojourn time):
p(M) =
1
τ
∫ t0+τ
t0
χ
ΓM
[φt(x)]dt, (21)
where χ
ΓM
is the characteristic function (as defined above) and [t0, t0 + τ ] is
some suitable interval of time.
This definition faces some prima facie problems. First, what is the suit-
able interval of time? Second, does this time average exist? Third, as defined
in Equation (21), p(M) exhibits an awkward dependence on the initial con-
dition x. These difficulties can be overcome by assuming that the system is
ergodic. In this case the relevant time interval is infinity; the existence ques-
tion is resolved by Birkhoff’s theorem, which states that the infinite time
limit exists almost everywhere; and the awkward dependence on the ini-
tial condition vanishes because in an ergodic system the infinite time means
equals the space means for almost all initial conditions, and hence a fortiori
the time mean, does not depend on the initial condition x (for almost all x).
This puts the time average interpretation of SM probabilities on a solid
foundation and at the same time also offers a response to the problem of
the mechanical foundation of the PP. The combinatorial considerations in
the last subsection have shown that the equilibrium state occupies by far
the largest part of Γγ. Combining this with the fact that the time a system
spends in a given region of Γγ is proportional to its measure provides a
faultless mechanical justification of PP.34
In sum, if the system is ergodic, we seem to have a neat mechanical
explanation of the system’s behaviour as well as a clear interpretation of the
34For a further discussion of ergodicity and issues in the interpretation of probability
in the Boltzmann approach see von Plato (1981, 1982, 1988, 1989), Gutmann (1999), van
Lith (2003), Emch (2005).
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probabilities that occur in the PP.
2.4.3 Problems
The Ergodic programme faces serious difficulties. To begin with, it turns
out to be extremely difficult to prove that the systems of interest really are
ergodic. Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, not even a system of n
elastic hard balls moving in a cubic box with hard reflecting walls has been
proven to be ergodic for arbitrary n; it has been proven to be ergodic only
for n ≤ 4. Moreover, hard ball systems are highly idealised (molecules do
not behave like hard balls) and it is still an open question whether systems
with more realistic interaction potentials (e.g. Lenard-Jones potentials) are
ergodic.35
What is worse than the absence of proofs that the systems of interest are
ergodic is that there are systems that show the appropriate behaviour and
yet are known not to be ergodic. For instance, in a solid the molecules oscil-
late around fixed positions in a lattice, and as a result the phase point of the
system can only access a small part of the energy hypersurface (Uffink 2007,
1017). Bricmont (2001) investigates the Kac Ring Model (Kac 1959) and a
system of n uncoupled anharmonic oscillators of identical mass, and points
out that both systems exhibit thermodynamic behaviour— and yet they fail
to be ergodic. And most notably, a system of non-interacting point particles
is known not be ergodic; yet ironically it is exactly this system on which
the combinatorial argument is based (Uffink 1996b, 381). Hence, ergodicity
is not necessary for thermodynamic behaviour.36 But, as Earman & Redei
(1996, 70) and van Lith (2001a, 585) point out, if ergodicity is not necessary
for thermodynamic behaviour, then ergodicity cannot provide a satisfactory
explanation for this behaviour. Either there must be properties other than
ergodicity that explain thermodynamic behaviour in cases in which the sys-
tem is not ergodic, or there must be an altogether different explanation for
35For further discussions of this issue see Sklar (1993, Ch. 5), Earman & Redei (1996,
Sec. 4), Uffink (2007, Sec. 6), Emch & Liu (2002, Chs. 7-9), and Berkovitz et al. (2006,
Sec. 4).
36It has been argued that ergodicity is not sufficient either because there are systems
that are ergodic but don’t show an approach to equilibrium, for instance two hard spheres
in a box (Sklar 1973, 209). This is, of course, correct. But this problem is easily fixed
by adding the qualifying clause that if we consider a system of interest in the context of
SM—i.e. one consisting of something like 1023 particles—then if the system is ergodic it
shows SM behaviour.
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the approach to equilibrium even for systems which are ergodic.37
But even if a system turns out to be ergodic, further problems arise. All
results and definitions of ergodic theory come with the qualification ‘almost
everywhere’: the Birkhoff theorem ensures that f ∗ exists almost everywhere
and a dynamical system is said to be ergodic iff for every complex-valued,
Lebesgue-integrable function f the time mean equals the space mean almost
everywhere. This qualification is usually understood as suggesting that sets
of measure zero can be neglected or ignored. This, however, is neither trivial
nor evidently true. What justifies the neglect of these sets? This has become
known as the ‘measure zero problem’. The idea seems to be that points
falling in a set of measure zero are ‘sparse’ and this is why they can be
neglected. This view receives a further boost from an application of the
Statistical Postulate, which assigns probability zero to events associated with
such sets. Hence, so goes the conclusion, what has measure zero simply
doesn’t happen.38
This is problematic for various reasons. First, sets of measure zero can be
rather ‘big’; for instance, the rational numbers have measure zero within the
real numbers. Moreover, a set of measure zero need not be (or even appear)
negligible if sets are compared with respect to properties other than their
measures. For instance, we can judge the ‘size’ of a set by its cardinality
or Baire category rather than by its measure, which leads us to different
conclusions about the set’s size (Sklar 1993, 182-188).
Furthermore it is a mistake to assume that an event with measure zero
cannot occur. In fact, having measure zero and being impossible are distinct
notions. Whether or not the system at some point was in one of the special
initial conditions for which the space and time mean fail to be equal is a
factual question that cannot be settled by appeal to measures; pointing out
that such points are scarce in the sense of measure theory does not do much,
because it does not imply that they are scarce in the world as well.39 All we
can do is find out what was the case, and if the system indeed was in one
of these initial conditions then considerations based on this equality break
down. The fact that SM works in so many cases suggests that they indeed
37The term ‘explanation’ here is used in a non-technical sense; for a discussion of how
the use of ergodicity ties in with certain influential philosophical views about explanation
see Sklar (1973) and Quay (1978).
38This piece of ‘received wisdom’ is clearly explained but not endorsed in Sklar (2000a,
265-6).
39Sklar (1973, 210-211) makes a very similar point when discussing the Gibbs approach.
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are scarce, but this is a matter of fact about the world and not a corollary
of measure theory.40 Hence, an explanation of SM behaviour would have to
consist of the observation that the system is ergodic and that it additionally
started in an initial condition which is such that space and time means are
equal.
For these reasons a time average interpretation of macro-probabilities is
problematic. However, alternative interpretations do not fare better. Fre-
quentism is ruled out by the fact that the relevant events in SM do not satisfy
the requirement of von Mises’ theory (van Lith 2001, 587), and a propensity
interpretation (Popper 1959) fails because the existence of propensities is ul-
timately incompatible with a deterministic underlying micro theory (Clark
2001).41
A peculiar way around the problem of interpreting probabilities is to
avoid probabilities altogether. This is the strategy pursued, among others,
by Goldstein (2001), Lebowitz (1993b), Goldstein & Lebowitz (2004) and
Zangh`ı (2005) in their presentation of the Boltzmannian account. The lead-
ing idea of this approach is that equilibrium states are ‘typical’ while non-
equilibrium states are ‘atypical’, and that the approach to equilibrium can be
understood as a transition from atypical to typical states. For a discussion
of this approach to SM see Frigg (2007b).
2.5 The Past Hypothesis
2.5.1 The Past Hypothesis Introduced
Let us now turn to Issues 2 and 3, and base our discussion on micro-probabilities.
The two problems we have to solve are (a) that high to low entropy tran-
sitions are allowed by the dynamics (by the reversibility objection) and (b)
that most trajectories compatible with a given non-equilibrium state are ones
that have evolved into that state from a state of higher entropy (which is a
consequence of SP and the time reversal invariance of the micro dynamics).
There is a common and now widely accepted solution to these problems
which relies on the fact that a system’s actual behaviour is determined by
its dynamical laws and its initial condition. Hence there need not be a
contradiction between time reversal invariant laws and the fact that high
40For a further discussion of this issue see Friedman (1976).
41For a further discussion of this issue see Butterfield (1987) and Clark (1987; 1989;
1995).
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to low entropy transitions do not (or only very rarely) occur in our world.
All we have to do is to assume that the relevant systems in our world have
initial conditions which are such that the system’s history is indeed one that
is characterised by low to high entropy transitions. That initial conditions
of this kind are scarce is irrelevant; all that matters is that the system de
facto started off in one of them. If this is the case, we find the irreversible
behaviour that we expect. However, this behaviour is now a consequence not
only of the laws governing the system, but also of its special initial condition.
The question is at what point in time the relevant low entropy initial
condition is assumed to hold. A natural answer would be that the beginning
of an experiment is the relevant instant; we prepare the gas such that it sits
in the left half of the container before we open the shutter and this is the low
entropy initial condition that we need. The problem with this answer is that
the original problem recurs if we draw an entropy curve for the system we
find that the low entropy state at the beginning of the experiment evolved
another high entropy state. The problem is obvious by now: whichever point
in time we chose to be the point for the low entropy initial condition to hold,
it follows that the overwhelming majority of trajectories compatible with
this state are such that their entropy was higher in the past. An infinite
regress looms large. This regress can be undercut by assuming that there is
an instant that simply has no past, in which case it simply does not make
sense to say that the system has evolved into that state from another state.
In other words, we have to assume that the low entropy condition holds at
the beginning of the universe.
At this point modern cosmology enters the scene: proponents of Boltz-
mannian SM take cosmology to inform us that the universe was created in
the big bang a long but finite time ago and that it then was in a low entropy
state. Hence, modern cosmology seems to provide us with exactly what we
were looking for. This is a remarkable coincidence, so remarkable that Price
sees in it ‘the most important achievement of late-twentieth-century physics’
(2004, 228). The posit that the universe has come into existence in a low
entropy state is now (following Albert 2000) commonly referred to as the
‘Past Hypothesis’ (PH); let us call the state that it posits the ‘Past State’.
In Albert’s formulation PH is the claim
‘[...] that the world first came into being in whatever particular
low-entropy highly condensed big-bang sort of macrocondition it
is that the normal inferential procedures of cosmology will even-
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tually present to us’ (2000, 96).
This idea can be traced back to Boltzmann (see Uffink 2007, 990) and has
since been advocated, among others, by Feynman (1965, Ch. 5), Penrose
(1989, Ch. 7; 2006, Ch. 27), Price (1996, 2004, 2006), Lebowitz (1993a,
1993b, 1999), Albert (2000), Goldstein (2001), Callender (2004a, 2004b),
and Wald (2006).
There is a remarkable consensus on the formulation and content of PH;
different authors diverge in what status they attribute to it. For Feynman,
Goldstein, and Penrose PH, seems to have the status of a law, which we
simply add to the laws we already have. Whether such a position is plausible
depends on one’s philosophical commitments as regards laws of nature. A
discussion of this issue would take us too far afield; surveys of the philosoph-
ical controversies surrounding the concept of a law of nature can be found
in, among others, Armstrong (1983), Earman (1984) and Cartwright and
Alexandrova (2006). Albert regards PH as something like a Kantian regula-
tive principle in that its truth has to be assumed in order to make knowledge
of the past possible at all. On the other hand, Callender, Price, and Wald
agree that PH is not a law, but just a contingent matter of fact; but they
have conflicting opinions about whether this fact is in need of explanation.42
Thus for Price (1996, 2004) the crucial question in the foundation of SM is
not so much why entropy increases, but rather why it ever got to be so low
in the first place. Hence, what really needs to be explained is why the uni-
verse shortly after the big bang was in the low entropy state that PH posits.
Callender (1998, 2004a, 2004b) argues that this quest is wrong. PH simply
specifies initial conditions of a process because initial conditions, irrespective
of whether they are special or not, are not the kind of thing that is in need of
explanation. Similar concerns have also been raised by Sklar (1993, 309-318).
2.5.2 Problems and Criticisms
PH has recently come under attack. Earman (2006) argues that what at first
glance looks like a great discovery—that modern cosmology posits exactly
the kind of Past State that the Boltzmannian account requires—turns out
42Notice that this view has the consequence that the Second Law of thermodynamics,
or rather its ‘statistical cousin’, Boltzmann’s Law, becomes a de facto regularity and is
thus deprived it of its status as a law properly speaking.
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to be ‘not even false’ (400). Earman first investigates a particular Friedman-
Robertson-Walker model of cosmology suggested by Hawking and Page and
shows that in this model probabilities are typically ill-defined or meaningless,
and he then argues that this result is not an artefact of the idealisations of the
models and would crop up equally in more realistic models (417-418). Hence,
for the cosmologies described in general relativity there is no well-defined
sense in which the Boltzmann entropy has a low value. And worse, even if
quantum gravity or some other yet to be discovered theory came to rescue
and made it possible to give a well-defined expression for the Boltzmann
entropy at the beginning of the universe, this would be of little help because
the dynamics of the cosmological models does not warrant the claim that
there will be monotonic increase in entropy (418-420). For these two reasons,
Earman concludes, the past hypothesis is untenable.
Whatever the eventual verdict of Earman’s critique of PH, there is a
further problem is that the Boltzmann entropy is a global quantity charac-
terising the macro-state of an entire system, in this case the entire universe.
The fact that this quantity is low does not imply that the entropy of a partic-
ular small subsystem of interest is also low. And what is worse, just because
the overall entropy of the universe increases it need not be the case that the
entropy in a small subsystem also increases. A decrease in the entropy in
one part of the universe may be balanced by an increase in entropy in some
other part of the universe and hence is compatible with an increase in the
overall entropy. Hence, SM cannot explain the behaviour of small systems
like gases in laboratories. Winsberg (2004a, 499-504) addresses this problem
and argues that the only way to avoid it is to make a further conjecture
about the theory (he calls it ‘Principle 3’), which in effect rules out local
‘entropic misbehaviour’. However, as he points out, this principle is clearly
false and hence there is no way for the Boltzmannian to rule out behaviour
of this kind.
it is not the time to notice that a radical shift has occurred at the begin-
ning of this subsection. We started with a pledge to explain the behaviour of
homely systems like a vessel full of gas and ended up talking about the Big
Bang and the universe as a whole. At least to some, this looks like using a
sledgehammer to crack nuts, and not a very wise move because most of the
problems that it faces are caused by the move to the cosmological scale. The
natural reaction to this is to downsize again and talk about laboratory scale
systems. This is what happens in the so-called ‘branch systems approach’,
which is inspired by Reichenbach’s (1956) discussion of the direction of time,
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and is fully articulated in Davies (1974) and discussed in Sklar (1993, 318-
332).
The leading idea is that the isolated systems relevant to SM have neither
been in existence forever, nor continue to exist forever after the thermody-
namic processes took place. Rather, they separate off from the environment
at some point (they ‘branch’) then exist as energetically isolated systems for
a while and then usually merge again with the environment. Such systems
are referred to as ‘branch systems’. For instance, the system consisting of a
glass and an ice cube comes into existence when someone puts the ice cube
into the water, and it ceases to exist when someone pours it into the sink. So
the question becomes why a branch system like the water with the ice cube
behaves in the way it does. An explanation can be given along the lines of
the past hypothesis, with the essential difference that the initial low entropy
state has to be postulated not for the beginning of the universe but only for
the state of the system immediately after the branching. Since the system,
by stipulation, did not exist before that moment, there is also no question of
whether the system has evolved into the current state from a higher entropy
state. This way of looking at things is in line with how working physicists
think about these matters for the simple reason that low entropy states are
routinely prepared in laboratories—hence Lebowitz’s (1993b, 11) remark that
the origin of low entropy initial states is no problem in laboratory situations.
Albert dismisses this idea as ‘sheer madness’ (2000, 89) for three reasons.
First, it is impossible to specify the precise moment at which a particular
system comes into being; that is, we cannot specify the precise branching
point. Second, there is no unambiguous way to individuate the system. Why
does the system in question consist of the glass with ice, rather than the glass
with ice and the table on which the glass stands, or the glass and ice and the
table and the person watching it, or ... And this matters because what we
regard as a relevant low entropy state depends on what we take the system
to be. Third, it is questionable whether we have any reason to assume, or
whether it is even consistent to claim, that SP holds for the initial state of
the branch system.43
The first and the second criticism do not seem to be successful. Why
should the system’s behaviour have anything to do with our inability to de-
43As we shall see in the next subsection, it is necessary to assume that SP holds for the
initial state. Proponents of the past hypothesis and of the branch systems approach differ
in what they regard as the beginning.
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cide at what instant the system becomes energetically isolated? So Albert’s
complaint must be that there is no matter of the fact about when a system
becomes isolated. If this was true, it would indeed be a problem. But there
does not seem to be a reason why this should be so. If we grant that there
is such a thing as being isolated from one’s environment (an assumption not
challenged in the first criticism), then there does not seem to be a reason to
claim that becoming isolated at some point in time should be more problem-
atic than the lights going off at some point in time, or the game beginning
at some point in time, or any other event happening at some instant. The
second criticism does not cut any ice either (see Winsberg 2004b, 715). Being
energetically isolated from the rest of the universe is an objective feature of
certain things and not others. The glass and its contents are isolated from
the rest of the universe and this is what makes them a branch system; the
table, the observer, the room, the house, etc. are not, and this is why they
are not branch systems. There is nothing subjective or arbitrary about this
division. One can, of course, question whether systems ever really are iso-
lated (we come to this in Subsection 3.5.2). But this is a different point. If
one goes down that road, then there simply are no branch systems; but then
there is no individuation problem either.
The third criticism leads us into deep waters. Why would we want to deny
that SP applies to the branch system at the instance of its creation? Although
Albert does not dwell on this point, his reasoning seems to be something like
the following (see Winsberg 2004b, 715-717). Take the universe at some
particular time. Now things happen: someone opens the freezer, takes an
ice cube and puts it into a glass of lukewarm water. These are physical
processes governed by the laws of mechanics; after all, at the micro level all
that happens is that swarms of particles move around in some specific way.
But then the micro-state of the glass with ice is determined by the laws of
mechanics and the micro-condition at the earlier point of time and we can’t
simply ‘reset’ the glass’ state and postulate that it is now such that SP, or
any other condition for that matter, holds. In brief, the glass’ state at some
point is dictated by the laws of the theory and is not subject to stipulations
of any kind.
Whether or not one finds this criticism convincing depends on one’s philo-
sophical commitments as regards the nature of laws. The above argument
assumes that laws are universal and valid all the time; it assumes that not
only the behaviour of the water and the ice, but also of the table, the room,
the fridge and, last but not least, the person putting the ice into the water
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and everything else in the universe are governed by the laws of mechanics.
If one shares this view, then Albert’s third criticism is valid. However, this
view of laws is not uncontroversial. It has been argued that the domain of
applicability of laws is restricted: we are making a mistake if we assume them
to be universal. To someone of the latter persuasion the above argument has
no force at all against branch systems. This conflict surfaces again when we
discuss the interventionist approach to SM in Subsection 3.5.2 and for this
reason I postpone till then a more detailed discussion of the issue of the scope
of laws.
2.6 Micro-Probabilities Revisited
As we have seen above, SP gives us wrong retrodictions and this needs to be
fixed. PH, as introduced in the last subsection, seems to provide us with the
means to reformulate SP so that this problem no longer arises (Unit 2.6.1).
Once we have a rule that assigns correct probabilities to past states, we come
back to the question of how to interpret these probabilities (2.6.2) and then
address the reversibility and recurrence objections (Unit 2.6.3).
2.6.1 Conditionalising on PH
PH, if true, ensures that the system indeed starts in the desired low entropy
state. But, as we have seen in Unit 2.3.2, our probabilistic machinery tells us
that this is overwhelmingly unlikely. Albert (2000, Ch. 4) argues that this is
unacceptable since it just cannot be that the actual past is overwhelmingly
unlikely for this would lead us to believe wrong things about the past.44 The
source of this problem is that we have (tacitly) assumed that SP is valid at
all times. Hence this assumption must be renounced and a postulate other
than SP must be true at some times.
Albert (2000, 94-96) suggests the following remedy: SP is valid only for
the Past State (the state of universe just after the Big Bang); for all later
44In fact, Albert (2000, Chs. 4 and 6) even sees this as a fundamental problem threat-
ening the very notion of having knowledge of the past. Leeds (2003) takes the opposite
stance and points out that this conclusion is not inevitable since it depends on the view
that we explain an event by its having a high probability to occur. Explaining the past,
then, involves showing that the actual past has high probability. However, if we deny that
we are in the business of explaining the past on the basis of the present and the future,
then this problem looks far less dramatic. For a further discussion of Albert’s view on
past knowledge and intervention see Frisch (2005) and Parker (2005).
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states the correct probability distribution is the one that is uniform (with
respect to the Lebesgue measure) over the set of those conditions that are
compatible with the current macro-state and the fact that the original macro-
state of the system (at the very beginning) was the Past State. In brief, the
suggestion is that we conditionalise on the Past Hypothesis and the current
macro-state.
More precisely, let MP be the macro-state of the system just after the big
bang (the Past State) and assume (without loss of generality) that this state
obtains at time t = 0; let Mt be the system’s macro-state at time t and let
Γt := ΓMt be the parts of Γγ, a that corresponds to Mt. Then we have:
Past Hypothesis Statistical Postulate (PHSP): SP is valid for the
Past State. For all times t > 0, the probability at t that the
fine-grained micro-state of the system lies in a subset A of Γt is
µ
L, t
(A) :=
µ
L
(A ∩Rt)
µ
L
(Rt)
(22)
whenever Rt 6= 0, where Rt := Γt ∩ φt(ΓP ) and φt(ΓP ), as above,
is the image of ΓP under the dynamics of the system after time t
has elapsed.
This is illustrated in Figure 5. Now, by construction, those fine-grained
micro-states in Γt which have a high entropy past have probability zero,
which is what we needed.
[Insert Figure 5 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 5: Illustration of the past hypothesis statistical postulate.
However, PHSP needs to be further qualified. There might be a ‘conspiracy’
in the system to the effect that states with a low entropy past and ones with
a low entropy future are clumped together. Let Γt, f be the subregions of Γt
occupied by states with a low entropy future. If it now happens that these lie
close to those states compatible with PH, then PHSP— wrongly—predicts
that a low entropy future is very likely despite the fact that the fraction of Γt
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occupied by Γt, f is tiny and that SP—correctly—predicts that a low entropy
future is very unlikely (see Figure 6).
[Insert Figure 6 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 6: Illustration of a conspiracy involving clumping together of low entropy past and
low entropy future states.
This problem can be avoided by requiring that Γt, f is scattered in tiny clusters
all over Γt (see Albert 2000, 67, 81-85) so that the fraction of Γt, f that comes
to lie in Rt is exactly the same as the fraction of Γt taken up by Γt, f , i.e.
µ
L
(Γt, f)/µL(Γt) = µL(Γt, f ∩ Rt)/µL(Rt) (see Figure 7).
[Insert Figure 7 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 7: Scattering condition as solution to the conspiracy problem.
Let us call this the ‘scattering condition’. If this condition falls in place, then
the predictions of PHSP and SP coincide and the problem is solved.
In sum, replacing SP by PHSP and requiring that the scattering condition
holds for all times t is sufficient to get both predictions and retrodictions
right.
The remaining question is, of course, whether the scattering condition
holds. Albert simply claims that it is plausible to assume that it holds,
but he does so without presenting, or even mentioning, a proof. Since this
condition concerns mathematical facts about the system, we need a proof, or
a least a plausibility argument, that it holds. Such a proof is not easy to get
because the truth of this condition depends on the dynamics of the system.
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2.6.2 Interpreting Micro-Probabilities
How are we to interpret the probabilities defined by PHSP? Frequentism,
time averages and the propensity interpretation are unworkable for the same
reasons as in the context of macro-probabilities. Loewer (2001, 2004) sug-
gested that the way out of the impasse is to interpret PHSP probabilities
as Humean chances in Lewis’ (1994) sense. Consider all deductive systems
that make true assertions about what happens in the world and also specify
probabilities of certain events. The best system is the one that strikes the
best balance between simplicity, strength and fit, where the fit of a system
is measured by how likely the system regards it that things go the way they
actually do. Lewis then proposes as an analysis of the concept of a law
of nature that laws are the regularities of the best system and chances are
whatever the system asserts them to be. Loewer suggests that the package
of classical mechanics, PH and PHSP is a putative best system of the world
and that therefore the chances that occur in this system can be understood
as chances in Lewis’ sense.
Frigg (2006, 2007a) argues that this suggestion faces serious difficulties.
First, Lewis’ notion of fit is modeled on the frequentist notion of a sequence
and cannot be carried over to a theory with continuous time. Second, even
when discretising time in order to be able to calculate fit, it turns out that
Loewer’s putative best system is not the best system because there are dis-
tributions over the initial conditions that lead to a better fit of the system
than the distribution posited in PHSP. The details of these arguments sug-
gest that PHSP probabilities are best understood as epistemic probabilities
of some sort.
2.6.3 Loschmidt’s and Zermelo’s Objections
We now return to Loschmidt’s and Zermelo’s objections and discuss in what
way the micro probability approach can address them.
Reversal Objection: Consider the same scenario as in Unit 2.3.3. Denote
by Γif the subset of ΓMi consisting of all points that evolve into ΓMf during
the interval ∆, and likewise let Γfi be set of all points in ΓMf that evolve
into ΓMi during ∆. We then have Γfi = R(φ∆(Γif )), where φ∆ is the time
evolution of the system during time span ∆. Therefore µ(Γfi)/µ(ΓMf ) =
µ(R(φ∆(Γif)))/µ(ΓMf ) = µ(Γif)/µ(ΓMf ), because µ(RA) = µ(A) for all sets
A. By assumption µ(ΓMf ) > µ(ΓMi) (because Mf has higher entropy than
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Mi), hence µ(Γif)/µ(ΓMf ) < µ(Γif)/µ(ΓMi). Assuming that conditionalising
on PH would not upset these proportions, it follows that the system is more
likely to evolve from low to high entropy than it is to evolve from high to low
entropy. Now take Mi and Mf to be, respectively, the state of a gas confined
to the left half of container and the state of the gas spread out evenly over
the entire available space. In this case µ(ΓMf )/µ(ΓMi) ≈ 10n (n being the
number of particles in the system), and hence the system is 10n times more
likely to evolve from low to high entropy than vice versa. This is what BL
asserts.45
Recurrence Objection: Roughly speaking, the recurrence objection (see
Subsection 2.3.4) states that entropy cannot always increase because every
mechanical system returns arbitrarily close to its initial state after some finite
time (Poincare´’s Recurrence Theorem). The common response (Callender
1999, 370; Bricmont 1996, Sec. 4) to the recurrence objection has a somewhat
empiricist flavour and points out that, according to the Past Hypothesis, the
universe is still today in a low entropy state far away from equilibrium and
recurrence will therefore presumably not occur within all relevant observation
times. This, of course, is compatible with there being periods of decreasing
entropy at some later point in the history of the universe. Hence, we should
not view BL as valid at all times.
2.7 Limitations
There are serious questions about the use of coarse graining, i.e. partitions,
in the combinatorial argument (issue 5) and the scope of the theory (issue
6). I now discuss these problems one at a time.
How can coarse-graining be justified? The standard answer is an appeal
to knowledge: we can never observe the precise value of a physical quantity
because measuring instruments invariably have a finite resolution (just as
do human observation capabilities); all we can assert is that the result lies
within a certain range. This, so the argument goes, should be accounted for
in what we assert about the system’s state and the most natural way to do
this is to choose a partition whose cell size reflects what we can reasonably
hope to know about the system.
This argument is problematic because the appeal to observation intro-
duces a kind of subjectivity into the theory that does not belong there. Sys-
45See Bricmont (1996, Sec. 3) for a more detailed discussion.
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tems approach equilibrium irrespective of what we happen to know about
them. Hence, so the objection concludes, any reference to incomplete knowl-
edge is out of place.46
Another line of argument is that there exists an objective separation
of relevant scales—in that context referred to as ‘micro’ and ‘macro’47—and
that this justifies coarse-graining.48 The distinction between the two scales is
considered objective in much the same way as, say, the distinction between
dark and bright: it may not be clear where exactly to draw the line, but
there is no question that there is a distinction between dark and bright.
From a technical point of view, the separation of scales means that a macro
description is bound to use a finite partition (whose cell size depends on
where exactly one draws the line between the micro and macro scales). This
justifies Boltzmannian coarse-graining.
The question is whether there really is an objective micro-macro distinc-
tion of this kind. At least within the context of classical mechanics this is not
evidently the case. In quantum mechanics Planck’s constant gives a natural
limit to how confined a state can be in both position and momentum, but
classical mechanics by itself does not provide any such limit. So the burden
of proof seems to be on the side of those who wish to uphold that there is an
objective separation between micro and macro scales.
And this is not yet the end of the difficulties . Even if the above arguments
were successful, they would remain silent about the questions surrounding
the choice of the ‘right’ partition. Nothing in either the appeal to the limits of
observation or the existence of an objective separation of scales explains why
coarse-graining energy is ‘bad’ while coarse-graining position and momentum
is ‘good’.
These problems are not easily overcome. In fact, they seem so serious that
they lead Penrose to think that ‘entropy has the status of a “convenience”,
in present day theory, rather than being “fundamental”’(2006, 692) and that
46Many authors have criticised approaches to SM that invoke limited knowledge as
deficient. Since these criticisms have mainly been put forward against Gibbsian approaches
to SM, I will come back to this point in more detail below.
47Notice that this use of the terms ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ does not line up with how
these terms have been used above, where both fine-grained and coarse-grained states were
situated at the ‘micro’ level (see Subsection 2.1).
48This point of view is often alluded to by physicists but rarely explained, let alone
defended. It also seems to be what Goldstein has in mind when he advises us to ‘partition
the 1-particle phase space (the q, p-space) into macroscopically small but microscopically
large cells ∆α’ (2001, 42).
it only would acquire a ‘more fundamental status’ in the light of advances in
quantum theory, in particular quantum gravity, as only quantum mechanics
provides the means to compartmentalise phase space (ibid.).
In the light of these difficulties the safe strategy seems to be to renounce
commitment to coarse-graining by downgrading it to the status of a mere
expedient, which, though instrumentally useful, is ultimately superfluous.
For this strategy to be successful the results of the theory would have to be
robust in the limit δω → 0.
But this is not the case. The terms on the right hand side of Equation (13)
diverge in the limit δω → 0. And this is not simply a ‘technical accident’ that
one can get straight given enough mathematical ingenuity. On the contrary,
the divergence of the Boltzmann entropy is indicative of the fact that the
whole argument is intimately tied to there being finitely many cells which
serve as the starting point for a combinatorial argument. Using combinatorics
simply does not make sense when dealing with a continuum; so it is only
natural that the argument breaks down in the continuum limit.
Let us now turn to the limitations of the formalism, which are intimately
connected to the Boltzmannian conception of equilibrium. The equilibrium
macro-state, by definition, is the one for which S
B
is maximal. Per se this
is just a definition and its physical relevance needs to be shown. This is
done in two steps. First, we use the combinatorial argument to explicitly
construct the macro-regions as those parts of the energy hypersurface that
correspond to a certain distribution, and then show that the largest macro-
region is the one that corresponds to the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution.
But why is this the equilibrium distribution of a physical system? This is
so, and this is the second step, because (a) predictions made on the basis
of this distribution bear out in experiments, and (b) Maxwell showed in
1860 that this distribution can be derived from symmetry considerations
that are entirely independent of the use of a partition (see Uffink (2007, 943-
948) for a discussion of Maxwell’s argument). This provides the sought-after
justification of the proposed definition of equilibrium.
The problem is that this justification is based on the assumption that
there is no interaction between the particles in the system and that therefore
the total energy of the system is the sum of the ‘individual’ particle ener-
gies. While not a bad characterisation of the situation in dilute gases, this
assumption is radically false when we consider systems with non-negligible
interactions such as liquids, solids, or gravitating systems. Hence, the above
justification for regarding the macro-state for which S
B
is maximal as the
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equilibrium state is restricted to dilute gases, and it is not clear whether the
equilibrium macro-state can be defined in the same way in systems that are
not of this kind.
There is a heuristic argument for the conclusion that this is problem-
atic. Consider a system of gravitating particles. These particles attract each
other and hence have the tendency to clump together. So if it happens that
a large amount of these are distributed evenly over a bounded space, then
they will move together and eventually form a lump. However, the phase
volume corresponding to a lump is much smaller than the one corresponding
to the original spread out state, and hence it has lower Boltzmann entropy.49
So we have here a system that evolves from a high to a low entropy state.
This problem is usually ‘solved’ by declaring that things are different in a
gravitating system and that we should, in such cases, regard the spread out
state as one of low entropy and the lump as one of high entropy. Whether
or not this ad hoc move is convincing may well be a matter of contention.
But even if it is, it is of no avail to the Boltzmannian. Even if one redefines
entropy such that the lump has high and the spread out state low entropy,
it is still a fact that the phase volume corresponding to the spread out state
is substantially larger than the one corresponding to the lump, and Boltz-
mannian explanations of thermodynamic behaviour typically make essential
use of the fact that the equilibrium macro-region is the largest of all macro
regions.
Hence macro-states need to be defined differently in the context of in-
teracting systems. Goldstein & Lebowitz (2004, 60-63) discuss the problem
of defining macro-states for particles interacting with a two-body potential
φ(qi − qj), where qi and qj are the position coordinates of two particles,
and they develop a formalism for calculating the Boltzmann entropy for sys-
tems consisting of a large number of such particles. However, the formalism
yields analytical results only for the special case of a system of hard balls.
Numerical considerations also provide results for (two-dimensional) particles
interacting with a cutoff Lennard-Jones potential, i.e. a potential that has
the Lennard-Jones form for |qi − qj | ≤ rc and is zero for all |qi − qj | > rc,
where rc is a cutoff distance (Garrido, Goldstein & Lebowitz 2004, 2).
49A possible reply to this is that the loss in volume in configuration space is compensated
by an increase in volume in momentum space. Whether this argument is in general correct
is an open question; there at least seem to be scenarios in which it is not, namely ones in
which all particles end up moving around with almost the same velocity and hence only
occupy a small volume of momentum space.
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These results are interesting, but they do not yet provide the sought-after
generalisation of the Boltzmann approach to more realistic systems. Hard
ball systems are like ideal gases in that the interaction of the particles do
not contribute to the energy of the system; the only difference between the
two is that hard balls are extended while the ‘atoms’ of an ideal gas are
point particles. Similarly, the cutoff Lennard-Jones potential also represents
only a small departure from the idea of the ideal gas as the cutoff distance
ensures that no long range interactions contribute to the energy of the sys-
tem. However, typical realistic interactions such as gravity and electrostatic
attraction/repulsion are long range interactions. Hence, it is still an open
question whether the Boltzmann formalism can be extended to systems with
realistic interactions.
2.8 Reductionism
Over the past decades, the issue of reductionism has attracted the attention
of many philosophers and a vast body of literature on the topic has grown;
Kim (1998) presents a brief survey; for a detailed discussion of the different
positions see Hooker (1981) and Batterman (2002, 2003); Dupre´ (1993) ex-
pounds a radically sceptical perspective on reduction. This enthusiasm did
not resonate with those writing on the foundations of SM and the philosoph-
ical debates over the nature (and even desirability) of reduction had rather
little impact on work done on the foundations of SM (this is true for both
the Boltzmannian and Gibbsian traditions). This is not the place to make
up for this lack of interaction between two communities, but it should be
pointed out that it might be beneficial to both those interested in reduction
as well as those working on the foundations of SM to investigate whether,
and if so how, philosophical accounts of reduction relate to SM and what
consequences certain philosophical perspectives on reduction would have on
how we think about the aims and problems of SM.
One can only speculate about what the reasons for this mutual disinterest
are. A plausible explanation seems to be that reductionism has not been per-
ceived as problematic by those working on SM and hence there did not seem
to be a need to turn to the philosophical literature. A look at how reduc-
tionism is dealt with in the literature on SM confirms this suspicion: by and
large there is agreement that the aim of SM is to derive, fully and rigorously,
the laws of TD from the underlying micro theory. This has a familiar ring to
it for those who know the philosophical debates over reductionism. In fact,
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it is precisely what Nagel (1961, Ch. 11) declared to be the aim of reduction.
So one can say that the Nagelian model of reduction is the (usually unques-
tioned and unacknowledged) ‘background philosophy’ of SM. This sets the
agenda. I will first introduce Nagel’s account of reduction, discuss some of
its problems, mention a possible ramification, and then examine how well the
achievements of SM square with this conception of reduction. At the end I
will mention some further issues in connection with reduction.
The core idea of Nagel’s theory of reduction is that a theory T1 reduces
a theory T2 (or T2 is reduced to T1) only if the laws of T2 are derivable
from those of T1; T1 is then referred to as the ‘reducing theory’ and T2
as the ‘reduced theory’. In the case of a so-called homogeneous reduction
both theories contain the same descriptive terms and use them with (at
least approximately) the same meaning. The derivation of Kepler’s laws of
planetary motion and Galileo’s law of free fall from Newton’s mechanics are
proposed as paradigm cases of reductions of this kind. Things get more
involved in the case of so-called ‘heterogeneous’ reductions, when the two
theories do not share the same descriptive vocabulary. The reduction of TD
belongs to this category because both TD and SM contain concepts that do
not form part of the other theory (e.g. temperature is a TD concept that
does not appear in the core of SM, while trajectories and phase functions are
foreign to TD), and others are used with very different meanings (entropy
is defined in totally dissimilar ways in TD and in SM). In this case so-
called ‘bridge laws’ need to be introduced, which connect the vocabulary
of both theories. More specifically, Nagel requires that for every concept
C of T2 that does not appear in T1 there be a bridge law connecting C
to concepts of T1 (this is the so-called ‘requirement of connectability’). The
standard example of a bridge law is the equipartition relation 〈E〉 = 3/2k
B
T ,
connecting temperature T with the mean kinetic energy 〈E〉.
Bridge laws carry with them a host of interpretative problems. What
status do they have? Are they linguistic conventions? Or are they factual
statements? If so, of what sort? Are they statements of constant conjunction
(correlation) or do they express nomic necessities or even identities? And
depending on which option one chooses the question arises of how a bridge law
is established. Is it a factual discovery? By which methods is it established?
Moreover, in what sense has T1 reduced T2 if the reduction can only be
carried out with the aid of bridge laws which, by definition, do not belong to
T1? Much of the philosophical discussions on Nagelian reduction has centred
around these issues.
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Another problem is that strict derivability often is too stringent a require-
ment because only approximate versions of the T2-laws can be obtained. For
instance, it is not possible to derive strict universal laws from a statistical
theory. To make room for a certain mismatch between the two theories,
Schaffner (1976) introduced the idea that concepts of T2 often need to be
modified before they can be reduced to T1. More specifically, Schaffner holds
that T1 reduces T2 only if there is a corrected version T
∗
2 of T2 such that T
∗
2
is derivable from T1 given that (1) the primitive terms of T
∗
2 are associated
via bridge laws with various terms of T1, (2) T
∗
2 corrects T2 in the sense that
T ∗2 makes more accurate predictions than T2 and (3) T
∗
2 and T2 are strongly
analogous.
With this notion of reduction in place we can now ask whether Boltz-
mannian SM reduces TD in this sense. This problem is usually narrowed
down to the question of whether the Second Law of TD can be deduced from
SM. This is of course an important question, but it is by no means the only
one; I come back to other issues below. From what has been said so far it is
obvious that the Second Law cannot be derived from SM. The time reversal
invariance of the dynamics and Poincare´ recurrence imply that the Boltz-
mann entropy does not increase monotonically at all times. In fact, when
an SM system has reached equilibrium it fluctuates away from equilibrium
every now and then. Hence, a strict Nagelian reduction of TD to SM is not
possible. However, following Schaffner, this is anyway too much to ask for;
what we should look for is a corrected version TD* of TD, which satisfies
the above-mentioned conditions and which can be reduced to SM. Callender
(2001, 542-45) argues that this is precisely what we should do because trying
to derive the exact Second Law would amount to ‘taking thermodynamics
too seriously’; in fact, what we need to derive from SM is an ‘analogue’ of
the Second Law.50 One such analogue is BL, although there may be other
candidates.
The same move helps us to reduce thermodynamic irreversibility. Cal-
lender (1999, 359, 364-67) argues that it is a mistake to try to deduce strict
irreversibility from SM. All we need is an explanation of how phenomena that
are irreversible on an appropriate time scale emerge from SM, where what
is appropriate is dictated by the conditions of observation. In other words,
50The same problem crops up when reducing the notions of equilibrium (Callender 2001,
545-547) and the distinction between intensive and extensive TD variables (Yi 2003, 1031-
2) to SM: a reduction can only take place if we first present a suitably revised version of
TD.
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what we need to recover from SM is the phenomena supporting TD, not a
strict reading of the TD laws.
Given this, the suggestion is that S
B
can plausibly be regarded as the
SM counterpart of the entropy of TD*. This is a plausible suggestion, but
it seems that more needs to be said by way of justification. Associating S
B
with the entropy of TD* effectively amounts to introducing a bridge law that
defines the TD* entropy in terms of the logarithm of the phase volume of
macro regions. This brings back all the above questions about the nature
of bridge laws. What justifies the association of TD* entropy with its SM
counterpart? Of what kind is this association? The discussion of the relation
between the two entropies is usually limited to pointing out that the values of
the two coincide in relevant situations. This certainly is an important point,
but it does not answer the deeper questions about the relationship between
the two concepts.
Although the second law occupies centre stage in TD, it is not the only
law that needs to be reduced; in particular, we need to account for how the
First Law of TD reduces to SM. And in this context a further problem crops
up (Sklar 1999, 194). To explain how systems of very different kinds can
transfer energy to one another, we need to assume that these systems have
temperatures. This, in turn, implies that temperature can be realised in
radically different ways; in other words, temperature is multiply realisable.
How can that be? How do the various ‘realisers’ of temperature relate to one
another? What exactly makes them realisers of this concept and why can we
give them a uniform treatment in the theory?51
Similar problems also appear when we reduce more ‘local’ laws and prop-
erties to SM. For instance, the relation between pressure, volume and tem-
perature of an ideal gas is given by the equation pV = nk
B
T , the so called
‘ideal gas law’. In order to derive this law we need to make associations,
for instance between pressure and mechanical properties like mass and mo-
mentum transfer, that have the character of bridge laws. How are these
justified? Sklar (1993, 349-350) points out how complex even this seemingly
straightforward case is.
And then there are those TD concepts that SM apparently remains silent
about. Most importantly the concept of a quasi-static transformation (or
process), which lies at the heart of TD. The laws of TD only apply to equi-
51For a further discussion of temperature see Sklar (1993, 351-354), Uffink (1996, 383-
386) and Yi (2003, 1032-1036).
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librium situations and therefore changes in a system have to be effected in a
way that never pushes the system out of equilibrium , i.e. by so-called quasi-
static transformations (see Uffink (2001) for discussion of this concept). But
what does it mean in SM to perform a quasi-static transformation on a sys-
tem?52
Furthermore, one of the alleged payoffs of a successful reduction is expla-
nation, i.e. the reduction is supposed to explain the reduced theory. Does
SM explain TD and if so in what sense? This question is clearly stated
by Sklar (1993, 148-154; 2000, 740) Callender (1999, 372-373) and Hellman
(1999, 210), but it still awaits an in-depth discussion.
3 The Gibbs Approach
At the beginning of the Gibbs approach stands a radical rupture with the
Boltzmann programme. The object of study for the Boltzmannians is an in-
dividual system, consisting of a large but finite number of micro constituents.
By contrast, within the Gibbs framework the object of study is a so-called
ensemble, an uncountably infinite collection of independent systems that are
all governed by the same Hamiltonian but distributed over different states.
Gibbs introduces the concept as follows:
We may imagine a great number of systems of the same nature,
but differing in the configurations and velocities which they have
at a given instant, and differing not only infinitesimally, but it
may be so as to embrace every conceivable combination of con-
figuration and velocities. And here we may set the problem, not
to follow a particular system through its succession of configu-
rations, but to determine how the whole number of systems will
be distributed among the various conceivable configurations and
velocities at any required time, when the distribution has been
given for some one time. (Gibbs 1902, v)
Ensembles are fictions, or ‘mental copies of the one system under considera-
tion’ (Schro¨dinger 1952, 3); they do not interact with each other, each system
has its own dynamics, and they are not located in space and time.
52Thanks to Wolfgang Pietsch for drawing my attention to this point.
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Ensembles should not be confused with collections of micro-objects such
as the molecules of a gas. The ensemble corresponding to a gas made up of n
molecules, say, consists of an infinite number of copies of the entire gas; the
phase space of each system in the ensemble is the 6n-dimensional γ-space of
the gas as a whole.
3.1 The Gibbs Formalism
Consider an ensemble of systems. The instantaneous state of one system of
the ensemble is specified by one point in its γ-space, also referred to as the
system’s micro-state.53 The state of the ensemble is therefore specified by
an everywhere positive density function ρ(q, p, t) on the system’s γ-space.54
The time evolution of the ensemble is then associated with changes in the
density function in time.
Within the Gibbs formalism ρ(q, p, t) is regarded as a probability density,
reflecting the probability of finding the state of a system chosen at random
from the entire ensemble in region R ⊆ Γ55 at time t:
p
t
(R) =
∫
R
ρ(q, p, t)dΓ (23)
For this reason the distribution has to be normalised:
∫
Γ
ρ(q, p, t) dΓ = 1. (24)
Now consider a real valued function f : Γ× t → R. The phase average
(some times also ‘ensemble average’) of this function is given by:
f¯(t) =
∫
Γ
f(q, p, t)ρ(q, p, t) dΓ. (25)
Phase averages occupy centre stage in the Gibbs formalism because it is these
that, according to the formalism, we observe in experiments. More specif-
53To be more precise, the system’s fine-grained micro-state. However, within the Gibbs
approach coarse-graining enters the stage only much later (in Subsection 3.5) and so the
difference between coarse-grained and fine-grained micro-states need not be emphasised
at this point.
54That is, ρ(q, p, t) ≥ 0 for all (q, p) ∈ Γγ and all instants of time t.
55The µ-space of a system does not play any roˆle in the Gibbs formalism. For this reason
I from now on drop the subscript ‘γ’ and only write ‘Γ’ instead of ‘Γγ ’ when referring to
a system’s γ-space.
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ically, the Gibbs formalism postulates that to every experimentally observ-
able quantity F (t) (with the exception of absolute temperature and entropy)
there corresponds a phase function f(q, p, t) such that Equation (25) yields
the value that we should expect to find in an experiment: F (t) = f¯(t).
Using the principles of Hamiltonian mechanics one can then prove that
the total derivative of the density function equals zero,
dρ
dt
= 0, (26)
which is commonly referred to as ‘Liouville’s theorem’ in this context. Intu-
itively, this theorem says that ρ moves in phase space like an incompressible
fluid. With Equation (44) in the Appendix it follows that the time evolution
of ρ is given by Liouville’s equation:
∂ρ
∂t
= −{ρ,H}, (27)
where { · , · } is the Poisson bracket and H the Hamiltonian governing the
system’s dynamics. By definition, a distribution is stationary iff ∂ρ/∂t = 0
for all t.
Given that observable quantities are associated with phase averages and
that equilibrium is defined in terms of the constancy of the macroscopic
parameters characterising the system, it is natural to regard the stationarity
of the distribution as defining equilibrium because a stationary distribution
yields constant averages.56 For this reason Gibbs refers to stationarity as the
‘condition of statistical equilibrium’.
Among all stationary distributions57 those satisfying a further require-
ment, the Gibbsian maximum entropy principle, play a special roˆle. The
fine-grained Gibbs entropy (sometimes also ‘ensemble entropy’) is defined as
S
G
(ρ) := −k
B
∫
Γ
ρ log(ρ)dΓ. (28)
The Gibbsian maximum entropy principle then requires that S
G
(ρ) be max-
imal, given the constraints that are imposed on the system.
56Provided that the observable f itself is not explicitly time dependent, in which case
one would not require equilibrium expectation values to be constant.
57As Gibbs notes, every distribution that can be written as a function of the Hamiltonian
is stationary.
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The last clause is essential because different constraints single out dif-
ferent distributions. A common choice is to keep both the energy and the
particle number in the system fixed: E=const and n=const (while also as-
suming that the spatial extension of the system is finite). One can prove that
under these circumstances S
G
(ρ) is maximal for what is called the ‘micro-
canonical distribution’ (or ‘microcanonical ensemble’), the distribution which
is uniform on the energy hypersurface H(q, p) = E and zero elsewhere:
ρ(q, p) = C δ[E −H(q, p)], (29)
where C is some suitable normalisation constant and δ is Dirac’s delta func-
tion.58
If we choose to hold the number of particles constant while allowing for
energy fluctuations around a given mean value we obtain the so-called canon-
ical distribution; if we also allow the particle number to fluctuate around a
given mean value we find the so-called grand-canonical distribution (for de-
tails see, for instance, Tolman 1938, Chs. 3 and 4).
Consider now a system out of equilibrium, characterised by a density ρ(t).
This density is not stationary and its entropy is not maximal. Given the laws
of TD we would expect this density to approach the equilibrium density as
time evolves (e.g. in the case of a system with constant energy and con-
stant particle number we would expect ρ(t) to approach the microcanonical
distribution), which would also be reflected in an increase in entropy.
This expectation is frustrated. Using Liouville’s equation one can prove
that ρ(t) does not approach the microcanonical distribution (I will come back
to this point below); and what seems worse, the entropy does not increase at
all. In fact, it is straightforward to see that SG is a constant of the motion
(Zeh 2001, 48-9); that is, dSG(ρ(t))/dt = 0, and hence SG(ρ(t)) = SG(ρ(0))
for all times t.
This precludes an explanation of the approach to equilibrium along the
lines explored so far. Hence the main challenge for Gibbsian non-equilibrium
theory is either to get SG moving somehow, or to explain why this is not
necessary after all.
58This distribution is sometimes referred to as the ‘super microcanonical distribution’
while the term ‘microcanonical distribution’ is used to refer to a slightly different distri-
bution, namely one that is constant on a thin but finite ‘sheet’ around the accessible parts
of the energy hypersurfce and zero elsewhere. It turns out that the latter distribution is
mathematically more manageable.
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3.2 Problems and Tasks
In this subsection I list the issues that need to be addressed in the Gibbs
programme and make some remarks about how they differ from the prob-
lems that arise in the Boltzmann framework. Again, these issues are not
independent of each other and the response to one bears on the responses to
the others.
3.2.1 Issue 1: Ensembles and Systems
The most obvious problem concerns the use of ensembles. The probability
distribution in the Gibbs approach is defined over an ensemble, the formalism
provides ensemble averages, and equilibrium is regarded as a property of an
ensemble. But what we are really interested in is the behaviour of a single
system. What can the properties of an ensemble, a fictional entity consisting
of infinitely many copies of a system, tell us about the one real system that we
investigate? And how are we to reconcile the fact that the Gibbs formalism
treats equilibrium as a property of an ensemble with physical common sense
and thermodynamics, both of which regard an individual system as the bearer
of this property?
These difficulties raise the question of whether the commitment to en-
sembles could be renounced. Are ensembles really an irreducible part of the
Gibbsian scheme or are they just an expedient, or even a pedagogical ploy,
of no fundamental significance? If so, how can the theory be reformulated
without appeal to ensembles?
These questions are of fundamental significance, not least because it is the
use of ensembles that frees the Gibbs approach from some of the most pressing
problems of the Boltzmann approach, namely the reversal and the recurrence
objections. These arise exactly because we are focussing on what happens in
an individual system; in an ensemble recurrence and reverse behaviour are
no problem because it can be accepted that some systems in the ensemble
will behave non-thermodynamically, provided that their contribution to the
properties of the ensemble as a whole is taken into account when calculating
ensemble averages. So some systems behaving strangely is no objection as
this does not imply that the ensemble as a whole behaves in a strange way
too.
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3.2.2 Issue 2: The Connection with Dynamics and the Interpre-
tation of Probability
The microcanonical distribution has been derived from the Gibbsian maxi-
mum entropy principle and the requirement that the equilibrium distribution
be stationary. Neither of these requirements make reference to the dynamics
of the system. However, as in the case of the combinatorial argument, it
seems odd that equilibrium conditions can be specified without any appeal
to the dynamics of the systems involved. That equilibrium can be charac-
terised by a microcanonical distribution must, or so it seems, have something
to do with facts about the system in question. Understanding the connection
between the properties of a system and the Gibbsian probability distribution
is complicated by the fact that the distribution is one pertaining to an en-
semble rather than an individual system. What, if anything, in the dynamics
gives rise to, or justifies, the use of the microcanonical distribution? And if
there is no such justification, what is the reason for this?
Closely related to the question of how the probability distribution relates
to the system’s dynamics is the problem of interpreting these probabilities.
The options are the same as in Unit 2.3.2 and need not be repeated here.
What is worth emphasising is that, as we shall see, different interpretations
of probability lead to very different justifications of the maximum entropy
requirement and its connection to the dynamics of the system; in fact, in non-
equilibrium theory they lead to very different formalisms. Thus, this is a case
where philosophical commitments shape scientific research programmes.
3.2.3 Issue 3: Why does Gibbs phase averaging work?
The Gibbs formalism posits that what we observe in actual experiments
are phase averages. Practically speaking this method works just fine. But
why does it work? Why do averages over an ensemble coincide with the
values found in measurements performed on an actual physical system in
equilibrium? There is no obvious connection between the two and if Gibbsian
phase averaging is to be more than a black-box technique then we have to
explain what the connection between phase averages and measurement values
is.
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3.2.4 Issue 4: The Approach to Equilibrium
Phase averaging only applies to equilibrium systems and even if we have a
satisfactory explanation of why this procedure works, we are still left with
the question of why and how the system reaches equilibrium at all if, as it
often happens, it starts off far from equilibrium.
Gibbsian non-equilibrium theory faces two serious problems. The first is
that, as we have seen above, the Gibbs entropy is constant. This precludes a
characterisation of the approach to equilibrium in terms of increasing Gibbs
entropy. Hence, either such a characterisation has to be given up (at the cost
of being fundamentally at odds with thermodynamics), or the formalism has
to be modified in a way that makes room for entropy increase.
The second problem is the characterisation of equilibrium in terms of a
stationary distribution. The Hamiltonian equations of motion, which govern
the system, preclude an evolution from a non-stationary to a stationary dis-
tribution: if, at some point in time, the distribution is non-stationary, then
it will remain non-stationary for all times and, conversely, if it is stationary
at some time, then it must have been stationary all along (van Lith 2001a,
591-2). Hence, if a system is governed by Hamilton’s equation, then a char-
acterisation of equilibrium in terms of stationary distributions contradicts
the fact that an approach to equilibrium takes place in systems that are not
initially in equilibrium.
Clearly, this is a reductio of a characterisation of equilibrium in terms
of stationary distributions. The reasoning that led to this characterisation
was that an equilibrium state is one that remains unchanged through time,
which, at the mechanical level, amounts to postulating an unchanging, i.e.
stationary, distribution. This was too quick. Thermodynamic equilibrium is
defined as a state in which all macro-parameters describing the system are
constant. So all that is needed for equilibrium is that the distribution be such
that mean values of the functions associated with thermodynamic quantities
are constant in time (Sklar 1978, 191). This is a much weaker requirement
because it can be met by distributions that are not stationary. Hence we
have to come to a more ‘liberal’ characterisation of equilibrium; the question
is what this characterisation is.59
59Leeds (1989, 328-30) also challenges as too strong the assumption that a physical
system in an equilibrium state has a precise probability distribution associated with it.
Although this may well be true, this seems to be just another instance of the time-honoured
problem of how a precise mathematical description is matched up with a piece of physical
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3.2.5 Issue 5: Reductionism
Both the Boltzmannian and the Gibbsian approach to SM eventually aim to
account for the TD behaviour of the systems under investigation. Hence the
questions for the Gibbs approach are exactly the same as the ones mentioned
in Unit 2.3.7, and the starting point will also be Nagel’s model of reduction
(introduced in Subsection 2.8).
3.2.6 Plan
As mentioned above, the methods devised to justify the use of the micro-
canonical distribution and the legitimacy of phase averaging, as well as at-
tempts to formulate a coherent non-equilibrium theory are radically different
depending on whether probabilities are understood ontically or epistemi-
cally. For this reason it is best to discuss these two families of approaches
separately. Subsection 3.3 presents arguments justifying Gibbs phase aver-
aging on the basis of an ontic understanding of the probabilities involved.
What this understanding might be is discussed in Subsection 3.4. I turn to
this question only after a discussion of different justifications of phase av-
eraging because although an ontic understanding of probabilities is clearly
assumed, most writers in this tradition do not discuss this assumption ex-
plicitly and one can only speculate about what interpretation of probability
they might endorse. Subsection 3.5 is concerned with different approaches
to non-equilibrium that are based on this interpretation of probabilities. In
Subsection 3.6 I discuss the epistemic approach to the Gibbs formalism. I
close this Section with a discussion of reductionism in the Gibbs approach
(Subsection 3.7).
3.3 Why Does Gibbs Phase Averaging Work?
Why do phase averages coincide with values measured in actual physical
systems? There are two families of answers to this question, one based on
ergodic theory (using ideas we have seen in the Boltzmann Section), the other
building on the notion of a thermodynamic limit. For reasons of space we
will treat this second approach much more briefly.
reality that is not intrinsically mathematical. This issue is beyond the scope of this review.
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3.3.1 Time Averages and Ergodicity
Common wisdom justifies the use of phase averages as follows.60 The Gibbs
formalism associates physical quantities with functions on the system’s phase
space. Making an experiment to measure one of these quantities takes some
time. So what measurement devices register is not the instantaneous value
of the function in question, but rather its time average over the duration of
the measurement; hence it is time averages that are empirically accessible.
Then, so the argument continues, although measurements take an amount of
time that is short by human standards, it is long compared to microscopic
time scales on which typical molecular processes take place (sometimes also
referred to as ‘microscopic relaxation time’). For this reason the actually
measured value is approximately equal to the infinite time average of the
measured function. This by itself is not yet a solution to the initial problem
because the Gibbs formalism does not provide us with time averages and
calculating these would require an integration of the equations of motion,
which is unfeasible. This difficulty can be circumvented by assuming that
the system is ergodic. In this case time averages equal phase averages, and
the latter can easily be obtained from the formalism. Hence we have found
the sought-after connection: the Gibbs formalism provides phase averages
which, by ergodicity, are equal to infinite time averages, and these are, to a
good approximation, equal to the finite time averages obtained from mea-
surements.
This argument is problematic for at least two reasons (Malament & Zabell
1980, 342-343; Sklar 1973, 211). First, from the fact that measurements
take some time it does not follow that what is actually measured are time
averages. Why do measurements produce time averages and in what way
does this depend on how much time measurements take?
Second, even if we take it for granted that measurements do produce finite
time averages, then equating these with infinite time averages is problematic.
Even if the duration of the measurement is very long (which is often not the
case as actual measurement may not that take much time), finite and infinite
averages may assume very different values. And the infinity is crucial: if we
replace infinite time averages by finite ones (no matter how long the relevant
period is taken to be), then the ergodic theorem does not hold any more and
60This view is discussed but not endorsed, for instance, in Malament & Zabell (1980,
342), Bricmont (1996, 145-6), Earman & Redei (1996, 67-69), and van Lith (2001a, 581-
583).
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the explanation is false.
Besides, there is another problem once we try to apply the Gibbs for-
malism to non-equilibrium situations. It is a simple fact that we do observe
how systems approach equilibrium, i.e. how macroscopic parameter values
change, and this would be impossible if the values we observed were infinite
time averages.
These criticisms seem decisive and call for a different strategy in address-
ing Issue 3. Malament & Zabell (1980) respond to this challenge by suggest-
ing a new way of explaining the success of equilibrium theory, at least for the
microcanonical ensemble. Their method still invokes ergodicity but avoids
altogether appeal to time averages and only invokes the uniqueness of the
measure (see Subection 2.4). Their explanation is based on two Assumptions
(ibid., 343).
Assumption 1. The phase function f associated with a macroscopic pa-
rameter of the system exhibits small dispersion with respect to the micro-
canonical measure; that is, the set of points on the energy hypersurface ΓE
at which f assumes values that differ significantly from its phase average
has vanishingly small microcanonical measure. Formally, for any ‘reasonably
small’ ε > 0 we have
λ
( {
x ∈ ΓE : | f(x)−
∫
ΓE
f dλ | ≥ ε
})
≈ 0, (30)
where λ is the microcanonical measure (i.e. the measure that is constant on
the accessible part of the energy hypersurface and normalised).
Assumption 2. At any given time, the microcanonical measure represents
the probability of finding the system in a particular subset of the phase
space: p(A) = λ(A), where A is a measurable but otherwise arbitrary subset
of ΓE. These two assumptions jointly imply that, at any given time, it is
overwhelmingly likely that the system’s micro-state is one for which the value
of f coincides with, or is very close to, the phase average.
The question is how these assumptions can be justified. In the case of
Assumption 1 Malament & Zabell refer to a research programme that orig-
inated with the work of Khinchin. The central insight of this programme
is that phase functions which are associated with macroscopic parameters
satisfy strong symmetry requirements and as a consequence turn out to have
small dispersion on the energy surface for systems with a large number of
constituents. This is just what is needed to justify Assumption 1. This pro-
gramme will be discussed in the next subsection; let us assume for now that
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it provides a satisfactory justification of Assumption 1.
To justify Assumption 2 Malament & Zabell introduce a new postulate:
the equilibrium probability measure p( · ) of finding a system’s state in a
particular subset of ΓE must be absolutely continuous with respect to the
microcanonical measure λ (see Subsection 2.4). Let us refer to this as the
‘Absolute Continuity Postulate’ (ACP).61
Now consider the dynamical system (X, φ, λ), where X is ΓE , φ is the flow
on ΓE induced by the equations of motion governing the system, and λ is
the microcanonical measure on ΓE . Given this, one can present the following
argument in support of Assumption 2 (ibid. 345):
(P1) (X, φ, λ) is ergodic.
(P2) p( · ) is invariant in time because this is the defining feature of
equilibrium probabilities.
(P3) by ACP, p( · ) is absolutely continuous with λ.
(P4) According to the uniqueness theorem (see Subsection 2.4.1), λ is
the only measure invariant in time.
Conclusion: p( · ) = λ.
Hence the microcanonical measure is singled out as the one and only correct
measure for the probability of finding a system’s micro-state in a certain part
of phase space.
The new and crucial assumption is ACP and the question is how this prin-
ciple can be justified. What reason is there to restrict the class of measures
that we take into consideration as acceptable equilibrium measures to those
that are absolutely continuous with respect to the microcanonical measure?
Malament & Zabell respond to this problem by introducing yet another prin-
ciple, the ‘displacement principle’ (DP). This principle posits that if of two
measurable sets in ΓE one is but a small displacement of the other, then
it is plausible to believe that the probability of finding the system’s micro-
state in one set should be close to that of finding it in the other (ibid., 346).
61I formulate ACP in terms of λ because this simplifies the argument to follow. Mala-
ment & Zabell require that p( · ) be absolutely continuous with µE , the Lebesgue measure
µ on Γ restricted to ΓE . However, on ΓE the restricted Lebesgue measure and the micro-
canonical measure only differ by a constant: λ = c µE , where c := 1/µE(ΓE) and hence
whenever a measure is absolutely continuous with µE it is also with λ and vice versa.
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This principle is interesting because one can show that it is equivalent to the
claim that probability distributions are absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure, and hence the microcanonical measure, on ΓE (ibid.,
348-9).62
To sum up, the advantages of this method over the ‘standard account’ are
that it does not appeal to measurement, that it takes into account that SM
systems are ‘large’ (via Assumption 1), and that it does not make reference to
time averages at all. In fact, ergodicity is used only to justify the uniqueness
of the microcanonical measure.
The remaining question is what reasons there are to believe in DP. Mala-
ment & Zabell offer little by way of justification: they just make some elusive
appeal to the ‘method by which the system is prepared or brought to equi-
librium’ (ibid., 347.) So it is not clear how one gets from some notion of
state preparation to DP. But even if it was clear, why should the success of
equilibrium SM depend on the system being prepared in a particular way?
This seems to add an anthropocentric element to SM which, at least if one
is not a proponent of the ontic approach (referred to in Subsection 2.3.2),
seems to be foreign to it.
The argument in support of Assumption 2 makes two further problematic
assumptions. First, it assumes equilibrium to be defined in terms of a sta-
tionary distribution, which, as we have seen above, is problematic because it
undercuts a dynamical explanation of the approach to equilibrium (variants
of this criticism can be found in Sklar (1978) and Leeds (1989)).
Second, it is based on the premise that the system in question is ergodic.
As we have seen above, many systems that are successfully dealt with by
the formalism of SM are not ergodic and hence the uniqueness theorem, on
which the argument in support of Assumption 2 is based, does not apply.
To circumvent this difficulty Vranas (1998) has suggested replacing ergod-
icity with what he calls ε-ergodicity. The leading idea behind this move is to
challenge the commonly held belief that even if a system is just a ‘little bit’
non-ergodic, then the uniqueness theorem fails completely (Earman & Redei
1996, 71). Vranas points out that there is a middle ground between hold-
ing and failing completely and then argues that this middle ground actually
provides us with everything we need.
62As Leeds (1989, 327) points out, Malament & Zabell’s proof is for Rn and they do
not indicate how the proof could be modified to apply to the energy hypersurface, where
translations can take one off the surface.
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Two measures λ1 and λ2 are ε-close iff for every measurable set A: |λ1(A)−
λ2(A)| ≤ ε, where ε is a small but finite number. The starting point of
Vranas’ argument is the observation that we do not need p( · ) = λ: to justify
Gibbsian phase averaging along the lines suggested by Malament & Zabell
all we need is that p( · ) and λ are ε-close, as we cannot tell the difference
between a probability measure that is exactly equal to λ and one that is
just a little bit different from it. Hence we should replace Assumption 2 by
Assumption 2’, that statement that p( · ) and λ are ε-close. The question
now is: how do we justify Assumption 2’?
If a system is non-ergodic then its phase space X is decomposable; that
is, there exist two sets, A ⊆ X and B := X \ A, with measure greater
than zero which are invariant under the flow. Intuitively, if the system is
‘just a little bit non-ergodic’, then the system is ergodic on B and λ(A) ≪
λ(B) (where, again, λ is the microcanonical measure). This motivates the
following definition: A dynamical system (X, λ, φ) is ε-ergodic iff the system’s
dynamics is ergodic on a subset Y of X with λ(Y ) = 1−ε.63 Strict ergodicity
then is the limiting case of ε = 0. Furthermore, given two small but finite
numbers ε1 and ε2, Vranas defines λ2 to be ‘ε1/ε2-continuous’ with λ1 iff for
every measurable set A: λ2(A) ≤ ε2 if λ1(A) ≤ ε1 (Vranas 1998, 695).
Vranas then proves an ‘ε-version’ of the uniqueness theorem, the ε-equivalence
theorem (ibid., 703-5): if λ1 is ε1-ergodic and λ2 is ε1/ε2-continuous with re-
spect to λ1 and invariant, then λ1 and λ2 are ε3-close with ε3 = 2ε2+ ε1(1−
ε1)
−1.
Given this, the Malament & Zabell argument can be rephrased as follows:
(P1’) (X, φ, λ) is ε-ergodic.
(P2) p( · ) is invariant in time because this is the defining feature of
equilibrium probabilities.
(P3’) ε-ACP: p( · ) is ε/ε2-continuous with respect to λ.
(P4’) The ε-equivalence theorem.
Conclusion’: p( · ) and λ are ε3-close with ε3 = 2ε2 + ε(1− ε)−1.
63Vranas (1998, 695) distinguishes between ‘ε-ergodic’ and ‘epsilon-ergodic’, where a
system is epsilon-ergodic if it is ε-ergodic with ε tiny or zero. In what follows I always
assume ε to be tiny and hence do not distinguish between the two.
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The assessment of this argument depends on what can be said in favour of
(P1’) and (P3’), since (P4’) is a mathematical theorem and (P2) has not been
altered. In support of (P1’) Vranas (ibid., 695-98) reviews computational evi-
dence showing that systems of interest are indeed ε-ergodic. In particluar, he
mentions the following cases. A one-dimensional system of n self-gravitating
plane parallel sheets of uniform density was found to be strictly ergodic as
n increases (it reaches strict ergodicity for n = 11). The Fermi-Pasta-Ulam
system (a one dimensional chain of n particles with weakly nonlinear nearest-
neighbor interaction) is ε-ergodic for large n. There is good evidence that a
Lennard-Jones gas is ε-ergodic for large n and in the relevant energy range,
i.e. for energies large enough so that quantum effects do not matter. From
these Vranas draws the tentative conclusion that the dynamical systems of
interest in SM are indeed ε-ergodic. But he is clear about the fact that this is
only a tentative conclusion and that it would be desirable to have theoretical
results.
The justification of (P3’) is more difficult. This does not come as a
surprise because Malament & Zabell did not present a justification for ACP
either. Vranas (ibid., 700-2) presents some arguments based on the limited
precision of measurement but admits that this argument invokes premises
that he cannot justify.
To sum up, this argument enjoys the advantage over previous arguments
that it does not have to invoke strict ergodicity. However, it is still based on
the assumption that equilibrium is characterised by a stationary distribution,
which, as we have seen, is an obstacle when it comes to formulating a work-
able Gibbsian non-equilibrium theory. In sum, it is still an open question
whether the ergodic programme can eventally explain in a satisfactory way
why Gibbsian SM works.
3.3.2 Khinchin’s Programme and the Thermodynamic Limit
Ergodic theory works at a general level in that it makes no assumptions
about the number of degrees of freedom of the system under study and does
not restrict the allowable phase functions beyond the requirement that they
be integrable. Khinchin (1949) points out that this generality is not only
unnecessary; actually it is the source of the problems that this programme
encounters. Rather than studying dynamical systems at a general level, we
should focus on those cases that are relevant in statistical mechanics. This
involves two restrictions. First, we only have to consider systems with a large
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number of degrees of freedom; second, we only need to take into account a
special class of phase function, so-called sum functions. A function is a sum
function if it can be written as a sum over one-particle functions:
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), (31)
where xi is the vector containing the position and momentum coordinates of
particle i (that is, xi ∈ R6 while x ∈ R6n) Under the assumption that the
Hamiltonian of the system is a sum function as well, Khinchin can prove the
following theorem:
Khinchin’s Theorem. For all sum functions f there are positive
constants k1 and k2 such that
λ
( {
x ∈ ΓE :
∣∣∣f ∗(x)− f¯
f¯
∣∣∣ ≥ k1 n−1/4} ) ≤ k2 n−1/4, (32)
where λ is the microcanonical measure.
This theorem is sometimes also referred to as ‘Khinchin’s ergodic theorem’;
let us say that a system satisfying the condition specified in Khinchin’s theo-
rem is ‘K-ergodic’.64 For a summary and a discussion of the proof see Batter-
man (1998, 190-198), van Lith (2001b, 83-90) and Badino (2006). Basically
the theorem says that as n becomes larger, the measure of those regions on
the energy hypersurface where the time and the space means differ by more
than a small amount tends towards zero. For any finite n, K-ergodicity is
weaker than ergodicity in the sense that the region where time and phase
average do not coincide can have a finite measure, while it is of measure zero
if the system is ergodic; this discrepancy vanishes for n→∞. However, even
in the limit for n → ∞ there is an important difference between ergodicity
and K-ergodicity: if K-ergodicity holds, it only holds for a very special class
of phase functions, namely sum-functions; ergodicity, by contrast, holds for
any λ-integrable function.
A number of problems facing an explanation of equilibrium SM based
on K-ergodicity need to be mentioned. First, like the afore-mentioned ap-
proaches based on ergodicity, Khinchin’s programme associates the outcomes
64K-ergodicity should not be conflated with the property of being a K-system; i.e. being
a system having the Kolmogorov property.
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of measurements with infinite time averages and is therefore vulnerable to
the same objections. Second, ergodicity’s measure zero problem turns into
a ‘measure k2 n
−1/4 problem’, which is worse because now we have to justify
that a part of the energy hypersurface of finite measure (rather than measure
zero) can be disregarded. Third, the main motivation for focussing attention
on sum-functions is the claim that all relevant functions, i.e. the ones that
correspond to thermodynamic quantities, are of that kind. Batterman (1998,
191) points out that this is too narrow as there are functions of interest that
do not have this form.
A further serious difficulty is what Khinchin himself called the ‘method-
ological paradox’ (Khinchin 1949, 41-43). The proof of the above theorem
assumes the Hamiltonian to be a sum function (and this assumption plays
a crucial roˆle in the derivation of the theorem). However, for an equilib-
rium state to arise to begin with, the particles have to interact (collide),
which cannot happen if the Hamiltonian is a sum function. Khinchin’s re-
sponse is to assume that there are only short range interactions between the
molecules (which is the case, for instance, in a hard ball gas). If this is the
case, Khinchin argues, the interactions are effective only on a tiny part of
the phase space and hence have no significant effect on averages.
This response has struck many as unsatisfactory and ad hoc, and so
the methodological paradox became the starting point for a research pro-
gramme now known as the ‘thermodynamic limit’, investigating the question
of whether one can still prove ‘Khinchin-like’ results in the case of Hamiltoni-
ans with interaction terms. Results of this kind can be proven in the limit for
n→∞, if also the volume V of the system tends towards infinity in such a
way that the numberdensity n/V remains constant. This programme, cham-
pioned among others by Lanford, Mazur, Ruelle, and van der Linden, has
reached a tremendous degree of mathematical sophistication and defies sum-
mary in simple terms. Classic statements are Ruelle (1969, 2004); surveys
and further references can be found in Compagner (1989), van Lith (2001b,
93-101) and Uffink (2007, 1020-28).
A further problem is that for finite n K-ergodic systems need not be
metrically transitive. This calls into question the ability of an approach
based on K-ergodicity to provide an answer to the question of why measured
values coincide with microcanonical averages. Suppose there is some global
constant of motion other than H , and as a result the motion of the system
remains confined to some part of the energy hypersurface. In this case there
is no reason to assume that microcanonical averages with respect to the entire
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energy hypersurface coincide with measured values. Faced with this problem
one could argue that each system of that kind has a decomposition of its
energy hypersurface into different regions of non-zero measure, some ergodic
and others not, and that, as n and V get large, the average values of relevant
phase functions get insensitive towards the non-ergodic parts.
Earman & Re´dei (1996, 72) argue against this strategy on the grounds
that it is straightforward to construct an infinity of normalised invariant
measures that assign different weights to these regions than does the mi-
crocanonical measure. However, phase averages with respect to these other
measures can deviate substantially form microcanonical averages, and it is
to be expected that these predictions turn out wrong. But why? In a non-
ergodic system there is no reason to grant the microcanonical measure a
special status and Khinchin’s approach does not provide a reason to expect
microcanonical averages rather than any other average value to correspond
to measurable quantities.
Batterman (1998) grants this point but argues that there is another reason
to expect correspondence with observed values; but this reason comes from a
careful analysis of renormalisation group techniques and their application to
the case at hand, rather than any feature of either Khinchin’s approach or the
thermodynamic limit. A discussion of these techniques is beyond the scope
of this review; the details of the case at hand are considered in Batterman
(1998), and a general discussion of renormalisation and its relation to issues
in connection with reductionism and explanation can be found in Batterman
(2002).
3.4 Ontic Probabilities in Gibbs’ Theory
Two ontic interpretations of Gibbsian probabilities have been suggested in
the literature: frequentism and time averages. Let us discuss them in turn.
3.4.1 Frequentism
A common way of looking at ensembles is to think about them in analogy
with urns, but rather than containing balls of different colours they contain
systems in different micro-states. This way of thinking about ρ was first sug-
gested in a notorious remark by Gibbs (1902, 163), in which he observes that
‘[w]hat we know about a body can generally be described most accurately
and most simply by saying that it is one taken at random from a great num-
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ber (ensemble) of bodies which are completely described’. Although Gibbs
himself remained non-committal as regards an interpretation of probability,
this point of view naturally lends itself to a frequentist analysis of probabili-
ties. In this vein Malament & Zabell (1980, 345) observe that one can regard
Gibbsian probabilities as representing limiting relative frequencies within an
infinite ensemble of identical systems.
First appearances notwithstanding, this is problematic. The strength of
frequentism is that it grounds probabilities in facts about the world. There
are some legitimate questions for those who associate probabilities with in-
finite limiting frequencies, as these are not experimental facts. However,
frequentists of any stripe agree that one single outcome is not enough to
ground a probability claim. But this is the best we can ever get in Gibbsian
SM. The ensemble is a fictitious entity; what is real is only the one system
in the laboratory and so we can make at most one draw from this ensem-
ble. All the other draws would be hypothetical. But on what grounds do
we decide what the result of these draws would be? It is obvious that these
hypothetical draws do not provide a basis for a frequentist interpretation of
probabilities.
Another way of trying to ground a frequency interpretation is to under-
stand frequencies as given by consecutive measurements made on the actual
system. This move successfully avoids the appeal to hypothetical draws. Un-
fortunately this comes at the price of another serious problem. Von Mises’
theory requires that successive trials whose outcomes make up the sequence
on which the relative frequencies are defined (the collective) be independent.
This, as von Mises himself pointed out, is generally not the case if the se-
quence is generated by one and the same system.65 So making successive
measurements on the same system does not give us the kind of sequences
needed to define frequentist probabilities.
3.4.2 Time Averages
Another interpretation regards Gibbsian probabilities as time averages of the
same kind as the ones we discussed in Subsection 2.4. On this view, p
t
(R)
in Equation (23) is the average time that the system spends in region R. As
65Von Mises discussed this problem in connection with diffusion processes and suggested
getting around this difficulty by reconstructing the sequence in question, which is not a
collective, as a combination of two sequences that are collectives (von Mises 1939, Ch. 6).
Whether this is a viable solution in the context at hand is an open question.
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in the case of Boltzmannian probabilities, this is in need of qualification as a
relevant interval over which the time average is taken has to be specified and
the dependence on initial conditions has to vanish. If, again, we assume that
the system is ergodic on the energy hypersurface we obtain neat answers to
these questions (just as in the Boltzmann case).
Assuming the system to be ergodic solves two problems at once. For
one, it puts the time average interpretation on solid grounds (for the reasons
discussed in Subsection 2.4.2 in the context of the Boltzmannian approach).
For another, it offers an explanation of why the microcanonical distribution
is indeed the right distribution; i.e. it solves the uniqueness problem. This
is important because even if all interpretative issues were settled, we would
still be left with the question of which among the infinitely many possible
distribution would be the correct one to work with. The uniqueness theorem
of ergodic theory answers this question in an elegant way by stating that the
microcanonical distribution is the only distribution absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure (although some argument still would
have to be provided to establish that every acceptable distribution has to be
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure).
However, this proposal suffers from all the difficulties mentioned in Sub-
section 2.4.3, which, as we saw, are not easily overcome. A further problem is
that it undercuts an extension of the approach to non-equilibrium situations.
Interpreting probabilities as infinite time averages yields stationary proba-
bilities. As a result, phase averages are constant. This is what we expect
in equilibrium, but it is at odds with the fact that we witness change and
observe systems approaching equilibrium departing from a non-equilibrium
state. This evolution has to be reflected in a change of the probability dis-
tribution, which is impossible if it is stationary by definition. Hence the
time average interpretation of probability together with the assumption that
the system is ergodic make it impossible to account for non-equilibrium be-
haviour (Sklar 1973, 211; Jaynes 1983, 106; Dougherty 1993, 846; van Lith
2001a, 586).
One could try to circumvent this problem by giving up the assumption
that the system is ergodic and define p
t
(R) as a finite time average. How-
ever, the problem with this suggestion is that it is not clear what the rel-
evant time interval should be, and the dependence of the time average on
the initial condition would persist. These problems make this suggestion
rather unattractive. Another suggestion is to be a pluralist about the inter-
pretation of probability and hold that probabilities in equilibrium have to
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be interpreted differently than probabilities in non-equilibrium. Whatever
support one might muster for pluralism about the interpretation of proba-
bility in other contexts, it seems out of place when the equilibrium versus
non-equilibrium distinction is at stake. At least in this case one needs an
interpretation that applies to both cases alike (van Lith 2001a, 588).
3.5 The Approach to Equilibrium
The main challenge for Gibbsian non-equilibrium theory is to find a way
to get the Gibbs entropy moving. Before discussing different solutions to
this problem, let me again illustrate what the problem is. Consider the
by now familiar gas that is confined to the left half of a container (Vleft).
Then remove the separating wall. As a result the gas will spread and soon
evenly fill the entire volume (Vtotal). From a Gibbsian point of view, what
seems to happen is that the equilibrium distribution with respect to the
left half evolves into the equilibrium distribution with respect to the entire
container; more specifically, what seems to happen is that the microcanonical
distribution over all micro-states compatible with the gas being in Vleft, Γleft,
evolves into the microcanonical distribution over all states compatible with
the gas being in Vtotal, Γtotal. The problem is, that this development is ruled
out by the laws of mechanics for an isolated system. The time evolution of an
ensemble density is subject to Liouville’s equation (27), according to which
the density moves in phase space like an incompressible liquid, and therefore
it is not possible that a density that was uniform over Γleft at some time can
be uniform over Γtotal at some later point. Hence, as it stands, the Gibbs
approach cannot explain the approach to equilibrium.
3.5.1 Coarse-Graining
The ‘official’ Gibbsian proposal is that this problem is best addressed by
coarse-graining the phase space; the idea is introduced in Chapter XII of
Gibbs (1902) and has since been endorsed, among others, by Penrose (1970),
Farquhar (1964), and all supporters of the programme of stochastic dynamics
discussed below. The procedure is exactly the same as in the Boltzmann case
(Subsection 2.2), with the exception that we now coarse-grain the system’s
γ-space rather than its µ-space.
The so-called coarse-grained density ρ¯ is defined as the density that is
uniform within each cell, taking as its value the average value in this cell of
74
the original continuous density ρ:
ρ¯ω(q, p, t) :=
1
δω
∫
ω(q,p)
ρ(q′, p′, t)dΓ′, (33)
where ω(q, p) is the cell in which the point (q, p) lies and δω is the Lebesgue
measure of a cell. Whether we work with ρ¯ω or ρ is of little importance to
the practitioner because for any phase function that does not fluctuate on
the scale of δω (which is true of most physically relevant phase functions)
the phase average with respect to ρ¯ω and ρ are approximately the same.
We can now define the coarse-grained entropy Sω:
Sω(ρ) := SG(ρ¯ω) = −kB
∫
Γ
ρ¯ω log(ρ¯ω)dΓ (34)
One can prove that the coarse-grained entropy is always greater or equal
to the fine-grained entropy: Sω(ρ) ≥ SG(ρ); the equality holds only if the
fine grained distribution is uniform over the cells of the coarse-graining (see
Uffink 1995b, 155; Wehrl 1978, 229; Lavis 2004, 672).
What do we gain by working with ρ¯ω rather than with ρ? The main point
is that the coarse-grained density ρ¯ω is not governed by Liouville’s equation
and hence is not subject to the restrictions mentioned above. So it is, at least
in principle, possible for ρ¯ω to evolve in such a way that it will be uniform
over the portion of the phase space available to the system in equilibrium.
This state is referred to as ‘coarse-grained equilibrium’ (Ridderbos 2002, 69).
The approach to coarse-grained equilibrium happens if under the dynamics
of the system ρ becomes so scrambled that an equal portion of it is located
in every cell of the partition. Because the averaged density is ‘blind’ to
differences within each cell, the spread out states of the initial equilibrium
condition will, on the averaged level, look like a homogenous distribution.
This is illustrated in Figure 8 for the example mentioned at the beginning
of this subsection, where the initial density is constant over Γleft while the
final density is expected to be constant over Γtotal (this figure is adapted from
Uffink 1995b, 154).
[Insert Figure 8 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 8: Evolution into a quasi-equilibrium distribution.
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A fine-grained distribution which has evolved in this way, i.e. which appears
to be uniform at the coarse-grained level, is said to be in a quasi-equilibrium
(Blatt 1959, 749; Ridderbos 2002, 73). On the coarse-graining view, then, all
that is required to explain the approach to equilibrium in the Gibbs approach
is a demonstration that an arbitrary initial distribution indeed evolves into
a quasi-equilibrium distribution (Ridderbos 2002, 73).
The question then is under what circumstances this happens. The stan-
dard answer is that the system has to be mixing (see Subsection 2.4.1 for a
discussion of mixing). This suggestion has some intuitive plausibility given
the geometrical interpretation of mixing, and it receives further support from
the convergence theorem (Equation (20)). In sum, the proposal is that we
coarse-grain the system’s phase space and then consider the coarse-grained
entropy, which indeed increases if the system is mixing.
What can be said in support of this point of view? The main thrust of
arguments in favour of coarse-graining is that even if there are differences
between the fine-grained and the coarse-grained density, we cannot empiri-
cally distinguish between them and hence there is no reason to prefer one to
the other. There are various facets to this claim; these are discussed but not
endorsed in Ridderbos (2002, 73). First, measurements have finite precision
and if δω is chosen so that it is below that precision, no measurement that
we can perform on the system will ever be able to tell us whether the true
distribution is ρ or ρ¯ω.
Second, as already observed above, the values of macroscopic variables
calculated using the coarse-grained density coincide with those calculated us-
ing the fine-grained density (if the relevant phase function does not fluctuate
so violently as to fluctuate on the scale of δω). This is all we need because
thermodynamic equilibrium is defined in terms of the values of macroscopic
parameters and as long as these coincide there is no reason to prefer the
fine-grained to a coarse-grained density.
This programme faces several serious difficulties. To begin with, there is
the problem that mixing is only defined, and so only achieved, for t → ∞,
but thermodynamic systems seem to reach equilibrium in finite time. One
might try to mitigate the force of this objection by saying that it is enough
for a system to reach an ‘almost mixed’ state in the relevant finite time.
The problem with this suggestion is that from the fact that a system is
mixing nothing follows about how fast it reaches a mixed state and hence it
is not clear whether it becomes ‘almost mixed’ over the relevant observation
times (see Berkovitz et al. 2006, 687). Moreover, mixing is too stringent
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a requirement for many realistic systems. Mixing implies ergodicity and, a
fortiori, if a system is not ergodic it cannot be mixing (see Subsection 2.4.1).
But there are relevant systems that fail to be ergodic, and hence also fail
to be mixing (as we have seen in Unit 2.4.3). This is a serious difficulty
and unless it can be argued—as Vranas did with regards to ergodicity—that
systems which fail to be mixing are ‘almost mixing’ in some relevant sense
and reach some ‘almost mixed state’ in some finite time, an explanation of
the approach to equilibrium based on mixing is not viable.
Second, there is a consistency problem, because we now seem to have two
different definitions of equilibrium (Ridderbos 2002, 73). One is based on
the requirement that the equilibrium distribution be stationary; the other on
apparent uniformity. These two concepts of equilibrium are not co-extensive
and so we face the question of which one we regard as the constitutive one.
Similarly, we have two notions of entropy for the same system. Which one
really is the system’s entropy? However, it seems that this objection need
not really trouble the proponent of coarse-graining. There is nothing sacro-
sanct about the formalism as first introduced above and, in keeping with
the revisionary spirit of the coarse-graining approach, one can simply declare
that equilibrium is defined by uniformity relative to a partition and that Sω
is the ‘real’ entropy of the system.
Third, as in the case of Boltzmannian coarse-graining, there is a question
about the justification of the introduction of a partition. The main justifica-
tion is based on the finite accuracy of observations, which can never reveal the
precise location of a system’s micro-state in its γ-space. As the approach to
equilibrium only takes place on the coarse-grained level, we have to conclude
that the emergence of thermodynamic behaviour depends on there being
limits to the observer’s measurement resolution. This, so the objection con-
tinues, is misguided because thermodynamics does not appeal to observers
of any sort and thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium irrespective of
what those witnessing this process can know about the system’s micro-state.
This objection can be challenged on two grounds. First, one can miti-
gate the force of this argument by pointing out that micro-states have no
counterpart in thermodynamics at all and hence grouping some of them to-
gether on the basis of experimental indistinguishability cannot possibly lead
to a contradiction with thermodynamics. All that matters from a thermody-
namic point of view is that the macroscopic quantities come out right, and
this is the case in the coarse-graining approach (Ridderbos 2002, 71). Sec-
ond, the above suggestion does not rely on there being actual observers, or
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actual observations taking place. The claim simply is that the fine-grained
distribution has to reach quasi-equilibrium. The concept is defined relative
to a partition, but there is nothing subjective about that. Whether or not a
system reaches quasi-equilibrium is an objective matter of fact that depends
on the dynamics of the system, but has nothing to do with the existence of
observers.
Those opposed to coarse-graining reply that this is besides the point
because the very justification for introducing a partition to begin with is
an appeal to limited observational capacities so that whether or not quasi-
equilibrium is an objective property given a particular partition is simply a
non-issue. So, at bottom, the disagreement seems to be over the question
of whether the notion of equilibrium is essentially a macroscopic one. That
is, does the notion of equilibrium make sense to creatures with unlimited
observational powers? Or less radically: do they need this notion? It is
at least conceivable that for them the gas indeed does not approach equilib-
rium but moves around in some very complicated but ever changing patterns,
which only look stable and unchanging to those who cannot (or simply do
not) look too closely. Whether or not one finds convincing a justification of
coarse-graining by appeal to limited observational powers depends on how
one regards this possibility.
Fourth, one can question the central premise of the argument for regarding
ρ¯ω as the relevant equilibrium distribution, namely that ρ¯ω and ρ are empiri-
cally indistinguishable. Blatt (1959) and Ridderbos & Redhead (1998) argue
that this is wrong because the spin-echo experiment (Hahn 1950) makes it
possible to empirically discriminate between ρ or ρ¯, even if the size of the
cells is chosen to be so small that no direct measurement could distinguish
between states within a cell. For this reason, they conclude, replacing ρ with
ρ¯ω is illegitimate and an appeal to coarse-graining to explain the approach
to equilibrium has to be renounced.
In the spin-echo experiment, a collection of spins is placed in a magnetic
field ~B pointing along the z-axis and the spins are initially aligned with this
field (Figure 9.1).
[Insert Figure 9.1 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 9.1: Spins aligned with a magnetic field.
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Then the spins are subjected to a radio frequency pulse, as a result of which
they are tilted by 90 degrees so that they now point in the x-direction (Figure
9.2).
[Insert Figure 9.2 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 9.2: Spins shifted 90◦ by a pulse.
Due to the presence of the magnetic field ~B, the spins start precessing around
the z-axis and in doing so emit an oscillating electromagnetic pulse, the ‘free
induction decay signal’ (Figure 9.3; the curved dotted arrows indicate the
direction of rotation).
[Insert Figure 9.3 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 9.3: Precession of spins.
This signal is the macroscopic evidence for the fact that all spins are aligned
and precess around the same axis. After some time this signal decays, in-
dicating that the spins are now no longer aligned and point in ‘random’
directions (Figure 9.4).
[Insert Figure 9.4 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 9.4: Signal decays and spins point in random directions.
The reason for this is that the precession speed is a function of the field
strength of ~B and it is not possible to create an exactly homogeneous mag-
netic field. Therefore the precession frequencies of the spins differ slightly,
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resulting in the spins pointing in different directions after some time t = τ
has elapsed. At that point a second pulse is applied to the system, tilting
the spins in the x − z plane by 180 degrees (Figure 9.5; the straight dotted
arrows indicate the direction of the spins before the pulse).
[Insert Figure 9.5 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 9.5: Spins after a second pulse.
The result of this is a reversial of the order of the spins in the sense that the
faster spins that were ahead of the slower ones are now behind the slower
ones (Figure 9.6; s1 and s2 are two spins, s
′
1 and s
′
2 their ‘tilted versions’).
However, those that were precessing faster before the second pulse keep
doing so after the pulse and hence ‘catch up’ with the slower ones. After time
t = 2τ all spins are aligned again and the free induction decay signal reap-
pears (the ‘echo pulse’). This is the macroscopic evidence that the original
order has been restored.66
[Insert Figure 9.6 (appended at the end of the document).]
Figure 9.6: Order of spins (in terms of speed) is reversed.
At time t = τ , when all spins point in random directions, ρ¯ is uniform and the
system has reached its coarse-grained equilibrium. From a coarse-grainer’s
point of view this is sufficient to assert that the system is in equilibrium, as
66It is often said that this experiment is the empirical realisation of a Loschmidt velocity
reversal (in which a ‘Loschmidt demon’ instantaneously transforms the velocities ~vi of all
particles in the system into −~vi). This is incorrect. The directions of precession (and
hence the particles’ velocities) are not reversed in the experiment. The reflection of the
spins in the x− z plane results in a reversal of their ordering while leaving their velocities
unaltered. The grain of truth in the standard story is that a reversal of the ordering with
unaltered velocities is in a sense ‘isomorphic’ to a velocity reversal with unaltered ordering.
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we cannot distinguish between true and coarse-grained equilibrium. So ac-
cording to Blatt and Redhead & Ridderbos the spin-echo experiment shows
that this rationale is wrong because we actually can distinguish between
true and coarse-grained equilibrium. If the system was in true equilibrium at
t = τ the second radio pulse flipping the spins by 180 degrees would not have
the effect of aligning the spins again at t = 2τ ; this only happens because
the system is merely in a coarse-grained equilibrium. Hence equilibrium and
quasi-equilibrium distributions can be shown to display radically different be-
haviour. Moreover, this difference is such that we can experimentally detect
it without measuring microdynamical variables: we simply check whether
there is an echo-pulse at t = 2τ . This pulls the rug from under the feet of
the coarse-grainer and we have to conclude that it is therefore not permissible
to base fundamental arguments in statistical mechanics on coarse-graining
(Blatt 1959, 746).
What is the weight of this argument? Ridderbos (2002, 75) thinks that
the fact that we can, after all, experimentally distinguish between ρ¯ and ρ,
and hence between ‘real’ equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium, is by itself a suf-
ficient reason to dismiss the coarse-graining approach. Others are more hesi-
tant. Ainsworth (2005, 626-7) points out that, although valid, this argument
fails to establish its conclusion because it assumes that for coarse-graining
approach to be acceptable ρ¯ and ρ must be are empirically indistinguishable.
Instead, he suggests appealing to the fact, proffered by some in support of
Boltzmannian coarse-graining, that there is an objective separation of the
micro and macro scales (see Subsection 2.7). He accepts this point of view
as essentially correct and submits that the same response is available to the
Gibbsian: coarse-graining can be justified by an appeal to the separation of
scales rather than by pointing to limitations of what we can observe. As
the notion of equilibrium is one that inherently belongs to the realm of the
macroscopic, coarse-grained equilibrium is the correct notion of equilibrium,
irrespective of what happens at the micro scale. However, as I have indi-
cated above, the premise of this argument is controversial since it is not clear
whether there is indeed an objective separation of micro and macro scales.
Ridderbos & Redhead make their case against coarse-graining by putting
forward two essentially independent arguments. Their first argument is based
on theoretical results. They introduce a mathematical model of the exper-
iment and then show that the coarse-grained distribution behaves in a way
that leads to false predictions. They show that the system reaches a uniform
coarse-grained distribution over the entire phase space at t = τ (as one would
81
expect), but then fails to evolve back into a non-equilibrium distribution un-
der reversal, so that, in coarse-grained terms, the system is still described
by a uniform distribution at t = 2τ (1998, 1250). Accordingly, the coarse-
grained entropy reaches its maximum at t = τ and does not decrease as the
spins evolve back to their initial positions. Hence, the coarse-grained entropy
is still maximal when the echo pulse occurs and therefore the occurrence of
the echo is, from a coarse-grained perspective, completely miraculous (1998,
1251).
Their second argument is based on the assumption that we can, somehow,
experimentally observe the coarse-grained entropy (as opposed to calculating
it in the model). Then we face the problem that observational results seem
to tell us that the system has reached equilibrium at time t = τ and that
after the application of the second pulse at that time evolves away from
equilibrium; that is, we are led to believe that the system behaves anti-
thermodynamically. This, Ridderbos and Redhead (1998, 1251) conclude, is
wrong because the experiments do not actually contradict the Second Law.
So the experimental results would stand in contradiction both with the
theoretical results predicting that the coarse-grained entropy assumes its
maximum value at t = 2τ and with the second law of thermodynamics, which
forbids high to low entropy transitions in isolated systems (and the spin echo
system is isolated after the second pulse). This, according to Ridderbos &
Redhead, is a reductio of the coarse-graining approach.67
These arguments have not gone unchallenged. The first argument has
been criticised by Lavis (2004) on the grounds that the behaviour of ρ¯ and
the coarse-grained entropy predicted by Ridderbos & Redhead is an artifact
of the way in which they calculated these quantities. There are two methods
for calculating ρ¯. The first involves a coarse-graining of the fine-grained dis-
tribution at each instant of time; i.e. the coarse-grained distribution at time
t is determined by first calculating the fine-grained distribution at time t (on
the basis of the time evolution of the system and the initial distribution) and
then coarse-graining it. The second method is based on re-coarse-graining
as time progresses; i.e. the coarse-grained distribution at time t is calculated
by evolving the coarse-grained distribution at an earlier time and then re-
67Their own view is that the fine grained entropy is the correct entropy and that we were
wrong to believe that the entropy ever increased. Despite appearances, the thermodynamic
entropy does not increase between t = 0 and t = τ and hence there is no need for it to
decrease after t = τ in order to resume its initial value at t = 2τ ; it is simply constant
throughout the experiment. However, this view is not uncontroversial (Sklar 1993, 253-4).
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coarse-graining. Lavis points out that Ridderbos & Redhead use the second
method: they calculate ρ¯ at time t = 2τ by evolving ρ¯ at time t = τ forward
in time. For this reason, the fact that they fail to find ρ¯ returning to its
initial distribution is just a manifestion of the impossibility of ‘un-coarse-
graining’ a coarse-grained distribution. Lavis then suggests that we should
determine that coarse-grained distribution at some time t by using the first
method, which, as he shows, yields the correct behaviour: the distribution
returns to its initial form and the entropy decreases in the second half of the
experiment, assuming its initial value at t = 2τ . Hence the echo-pulse does
not come as a surprise after all.
The question now is which of the two coarse-graining methods one should
use. Although he does not put it quite this way, Lavis’ conclusion seems to
be that given that there are no physical laws that favour one method over
the other, the principle of charity should lead us to choose the one that yields
the correct results. Hence Ridderbos & Redhead’s result has no force against
the coarse-graining.
As regards the second argument, both Lavis (2004) and Ainsworth (2005)
point out that the decrease in entropy during the second half of the exper-
iment need not trouble us too much. Ever since the work of Maxwell and
Boltzmann ‘entropy increase in an isolated system is taken to be highly prob-
able but not certain, and the spin-echo model, along with simulations of other
simple models, is a nice example of the working of the law’ (Lavis 2004, 686).
On this view, the spin-echo experiment simply affords us one of these rare
examples in which, due to skilful engineering, we can prepare a system in
one of these exceptional states which evolve from high to low entropy.
3.5.2 Interventionism
One of the crucial assumptions, made more or less tacitly so far, is that the
systems under consideration are isolated. This, needless to say, is an idealis-
ing assumption that can never be realised in practice. Real systems cannot
be perfectly isolated from their environment and are always subject to in-
teractions; for instance, it is impossible to shield a system from gravitation.
Blatt (1959) suggested that taking systems to be isolated not only fails to be
the harmless idealisation that it is generally believed to be; it actually is the
source of the problem. This recognition is the starting point for the inter-
ventionist programme, at the heart of which lies the idea that real systems
are open in that they are constantly subject to outside perturbations, and
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that it is exactly these perturbations that drive the system into equilibrium.
In more detail, the leading idea is that every system interacts with its en-
vironment (the gas, for instance, collides with the wall of the container and
the walls interact in many different ways with their surroundings), and that
these interactions are ‘in principle not amenable to a causal description, and
must of necessity be described in statistical terms’ (Blatt 1959, 751, original
emphasis). The perturbations from outside serve as a kind of ‘stirring mech-
anism’ or ‘source of randomness’ that drives the system around randomly in
the phase space, in much the same way as it would be the case if the sys-
tem was mixing. As a consequence, the observable macroscopic quantities
are soon driven towards their equilibrium values. This includes the Gibbs
entropy; in an open system Liouville’s theorem no longer holds and there is
nothing to prevent the Gibbs entropy from increasing.68
Of course, from the fact that the Gibbs entropy can increase it does not
follow that it actually does increase; whether or not this is the case depends
on the system as well as the properties of the outside perturbations. Blatt
(1959) and Ridderbos & Redhead (1998) assure us that in realistic model
systems one can prove this to be the case. Granting this, we have an elegant
explanation of why and how systems approach equilibrium, which also enjoys
the advantage that no revision of the classical laws is needed.69
A common objection against this suggestion points out that we are always
free to consider a larger system, consisting of our ‘original’ system and its
environment. For instance, we can consider the ‘gas cum box’ system, which,
provided that classical mechanics is a universal theory, is also governed by
classical mechanics. So we are back to where we started. Interventionism,
then, seems wrong because it treats the environment as a kind of deus ex
machina that is somehow ‘outside physics’; but the environment is governed
by the fundamental laws of physics just as the system itself is and so it cannot
do the job that the interventionist has singled out for it to do.
The interventionist might now reply that the ‘gas cum box’ system has
68It is a curious fact about the literature on the subject that interventionism is always
discussed within the Gibbs framework. However, it is obvious that interventionism, if
true, would also explain the approach to equilibrium in the Boltzmannian framework as
it would explain why the state of the system wanders around randomly on the energy
surface, which is needed for it to ultimately end up in the equilibrium region (see Unit
2.3.1).
69For a discussion of interventionism and time-reversal see Ridderbos & Redhead (1998,
1259-62) and references therein.
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an environment as well and it is this environment that effects the desired
perturbations. This answer does not resolve the problems, of course. We can
now consider an even larger system that also encompasses the environment
of the ‘gas cum box’ system. And we can keep expanding our system until
the relevant system is the entire universe, which, by assumption, has no
environment any more that might serve as a source of random perturbations.
Whether this constitutes a reductio of the interventionist programme de-
pends on one’s philosophical commitments. The above argument relies on the
premise that classical mechanics (or quantum mechanics, if we are working
within quantum SM) is a universal theory, i.e. one that applies to everything
that there is without restrictions. This assumption, although widely held
among scientists and philosophers alike, is not uncontroversial. Some have
argued that we cannot legitimately claim that laws apply universally. In fact,
laws are always tested in highly artificial laboratory situations and claiming
that they equally apply outside the laboratory setting involves an inductive
leap that is problematic. Hence we have no reason to believe that classical
mechanics applies to the universe as a whole; see for instance Reichenbach
(1956) and Cartwright (1999) for a discussion of this view. This, if true,
successfully undercuts the above argument against interventionism.70
There is a way around the above objection even for those who do be-
lieve in the generality of laws, namely to deny Blatt’s assumption that the
environment needs to be genuinely stochastic. Pace Blatt, that the environ-
ment be genuinely stochastic (i.e. as governed by indeterministic laws rather
than classical mechanics) is not an indispensable part of the interventionist
programme. As Ridderbos & Redhead (1998, 1257) point out, all that is
required is that the system loses coherence, which can be achieved by dissi-
pating correlations into the environment. For observations restricted to the
actual system, this means that correlational information is not available. But
the information is not lost; it has just been ‘dislocated’ into the degrees of
freedom pertaining to the environment.
The question then becomes whether the universe as a whole is expected to
approach equilibrium, or whether thermodynamic behaviour is only required
70Interventionists are sometimes charged with being committed to an instrumentalist
take on laws, which, the critics continue, is an unacceptable point of view. This is mistaken.
Whatever one’s assessment of the pros and cons of instrumentalism, all the interventionist
needs is the denial that the laws (or more specifically, the laws of mechanics) are uni-
versal laws. This is compatible with realism about laws understood as providing ‘local’
descriptions of ‘parts’ of the universe (a position sometime referred to as ‘local realism’).
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to hold for a subsystem of the universe. Those who hold that the ‘dissipa-
tion’ of correlational information into environmental degrees of freedom is
enough to explain the approach to equilibrium are committed to this view.
Ridderbos & Redhead are explicit about this (1998, 1261-2). They hold that
the fine-grained Gibbs entropy of the universe is indeed constant since the
universe as a whole has no outside, and that there is no approach to equilib-
rium at the level of the universe. Moreover, this does not stand in conflict
with the fact that cosmology informs us that the entropy of the universe
is increasing; cosmological entropies are coarse-grained entropies and, as we
have seen above, there is no conflict between an increase in coarse-grained
entropy and the constancy of the fine-grained Gibbs entropy. Ridderbos &
Redhead acknowledge that the question now is whether the claim that the
Gibbs entropy of the universe is constant is true, which is an issue that has
to be settled empirically.
3.5.3 Changing the notion of Equilibrium
One of the main problems facing Gibbsian non-equilibrium theory is that
under a Hamiltonian time evolution a non-stationary distribution cannot
evolve into a stationary one (see Unit 3.2.4). Hence strict stationarity is
too stringent a requirement for equilibrium. Nevertheless, it seems plausible
to assume that an equilibrium distribution has to approximate a stationary
distribution in some relevant sense. What is this relevant sense?
Van Lith suggested turning the desired result into a definition and replac-
ing strict stationarity with the requirement that the distribution be such that
the phase average of every function in a physically relevant set of functions
only fluctuates mildly around its average value (van Lith 1999, 114). More
precisely, let Ω be a class of phase functions f(x) corresponding to macro-
scopically relevant quantities. Then the system is in equilibrium from time
τ onwards iff for every function f(x) ∈ Ω there is a constant cf such that:
|
∫
f(x)ρt(x)dΓ− cf | ≤ εf , (35)
where εf is a small number (which can be different for every f). This defini-
tion of equilibrium seems to have the advantage of preserving all the desirable
features of equilibrium while no longer running into the problem that equi-
librium can never be reached.
However, from the fact that an arbitrary non-equilibrium distribution
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can reach equilibrium thus defined it does not follow that it actually does.
What conditions does the dynamics of a system have to meet in order for
the approach to equilibrium to take place? Van Lith points out that being
mixing is a sufficient condition (van Lith 1999, 114) because the Convergence
Theorem (see Subsection 2.4.1) states that in the limit all time averages
converge to the microcanonical averages, and hence they satisfy the above
definition.
But this proposal suffers from various problems. First, as van Lith herself
points out (1999, 115), the proposal does not contain a recipe to get the (fine-
grained) Gibbs entropy moving; hence the approach to equilibrium need not
be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the Gibbs entropy.
Second, as we have seen above, mixing is too stringent a condition: it is
not met by many systems of interest. Remedy for this might be found in
the realisation that less than full-fledged mixing is needed to make the above
suggestion work. In fact, all we need is a condition that guarantees that the
Convergence Theorem holds (Earman & Redei 1996, 74; van Lith 1999, 115).
One condition of that sort is that the system has to be mixing for all f ∈ Ω.
The question then is, what this involves. This question is difficult, if not
impossible to answer, before Ω is precisely specified. And even then there is
the question of whether the convergence is sufficiently rapid to account for
the fact that thermodynamic systems reach equilibrium rather quickly.71
3.5.4 Alternative Approaches
Before turning to the epistemic approach, I would like to briefly mention
three other approaches to non-equilibrium SM; lack of space prevents me
from discussing them in more detail.
Stochastic Dynamics. The leading idea of this approach is to replace the
Hamiltonian dynamics of the system with an explicity probabilistic law of
evolution. Characteristically this is done by coarse-graining the phase space
and then postulating a probabilistic law describing the transition from one
cell of the partition to another one. Liouville’s theorem is in general not
true for such a dynamics and hence the problem of the constancy of the
Gibbs entropy does not arise. Brief introductions can be found in Kreuzer
(1981, Ch. 10), Reif (1985, Ch. 15) and Honerkamp (1998, Ch. 5); detailed
71Another alternative definition of equilibrium, which also applies to open systems, has
been suggested by Pitowsky (2001, 2006), but for a lack of space I cannot further discuss
this suggestion here.
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expositions of the approach include Penrose (1970; 1979), Mackey (1989;
1992), and Streater (1995).
The main problem with this approach is that its probabilistic laws are
put in ‘by hand’ and are not derived from the underlying dynamics of the
system; that is, it is usually not possible to derive the probabilistic laws from
the underlying deterministic evolution and hence the probabilistic laws are
introduced as independent postulates. However, unless one can show how the
transition probabilities postulated in this approach can be derived from the
Hamiltonian equations of motion governing the system, this approach does
not shed light on how thermodynamical behaviour emerges from the funda-
mental laws governing a system’s constituents. For critical discussions of the
stochastic dynamics programme see Sklar (1993, Chs. 6 and 7), Callender
(1999, 358-364) and Uffink (2007, 1038-1063).
The Brussels School (sometimes also ‘Brussels-Austin School’). An ap-
proach closely related to the Stochastic Dynamics programme has been put
forward by the so-called Brussels School, led by Ilya Prigogine. The central
contention of this programme is that if the system exhibits sensitive depen-
dence on initial conditions (and most systems do) the very idea of a precise
micro-state given by a point in phase space ceases to be meaningful and
should be replaced by an explicitly probabilistic description of the system in
terms of open regions of the phase space, i.e. by a Gibbs distribution func-
tion. This programme, if successful, can be seen as providing the sought after
justification for the above-mentioned shift from a Hamiltonian micro dynam-
ics to an explicitly probabilistic scheme. These claims have been challenged
on different grounds; for presentations and critical discussions of the ideas
of the Brussels School see Batterman (1991), Bricmont (1996), Karakostas
(1996), Lombardi (1999, 2000), Edens (2001) and Bishop (2004).
An approach that is similar to the programm of the Brussels School in
that it denies that the conceptual framework of classical mechanics, in par-
ticular the classical notion of a state, is adequate to understand SM, has
been suggested by Krylov. Unfortunately he died before he could bring his
programme to completion, and so it not clear what form his ideas would
have taken in the end. For philosophical discussions Krylov’s programme see
Batterman (1990), Re´dei (1992) and Sklar (1993, 262-69).
The BBGKY Hierarchy. The main idea of the BBGKY (after Bogolyubov,
Born, Green, Kirkwood, and Yvon) approach is to describe the evolution of
an ensemble by dint of a reduced probability density and then derive (some-
thing like) a Boltzmann equation for this density, which yields the approach
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to equilibrium. The problem with the approach is that, just as in the case
of the Boltzmann’s (early) theory, the irreversibility is a result of (something
like) the Stosszahlansatz, and hence all its difficulties surface again at this
point. For a discussion of this approach see Uffink (2007, 1034-1038).
3.6 The Epistemic Approach
The approaches discussed so far are based on the assumption that SM prob-
abilities are ontic (see Unit 2.3.2). It is this assumption that those who argue
for an epistemic interpretation deny. They argue that SM probabilities are
an expression of what we know about a system, rather than a feature of a
system itself. This view can be traced back to Tolman (1938) and has been
developed into an all-encompassing approach to SM by Jaynes in a series
of papers published (roughly) between 1955 and 1980, some of which are
gathered in Jaynes (1983).72
At the heart of Jaynes’ approach to SM lies a radical reconceptualisation
of what SM is. On his view, SM is about our knowledge of the world, not
about the world itself. The probability distribution represents our state of
knowledge about the system at hand and not some matter of fact about
the system itself. More specifically, the distribution represents our lack of
knowledge about a system’s micro-state given its macro condition; and, in
particular, entropy becomes a measure of how much knowledge we lack. As a
consequence, Jaynes regards SM as a part of general statistics, or ‘statistical
inference’, as he puts it:
‘Indeed, I do not see Predictive Statistical Mechanics and Sta-
tistical Inference as different subjects at all; the former is only a
particular realization of the latter [...] Today, not only do Sta-
tistical Mechanics and Statistical Inference not appear to be two
different fields, even the term ‘statistical’ is not entirely appro-
priate. Both are special cases of a simple and general procedure
that ought to be called, simply, “inference”.’ (Jayenes 1983, 2 -
3)
The questions then are: in what way a probability distribution encodes a
lack of knowledge; according to what principles the correct distribution is
72In this subsection I focus on Jaynes’ approach. Tolman’s view is introduced in his
(1938, 59-70); for a discussion of Tolman’s interpretation of probability see Uffink (1995b,
166-7).
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determined; and how this way of thinking about probabilities sheds any light
on the foundation of SM. The first and the second of these questions are
addressed in Unit 3.6.1; the third is discussed in 3.6.2.
3.6.1 The Shannon Entropy
Consider a random variable x which can take any of the m discrete values in
X = {x1, ..., xm} with probabilities p(xi); for instance, x can be the number of
spots showing on the next roll of a die, in which case X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and
the probability for each even is 1/6. The Shannon entropy of the probability
distribution p(xi) is defined (Shannon 1949) as:
S
S
(p) := −
m∑
i=1
p(xi) log(p(xi)), (36)
which is a quantitative measure for the uncertainty of the outcome. If the
probability for one particular outcome is one while the probabilities for all
other outcomes are zero, then there is no uncertainty and S
S
equals zero;
S
S
reaches its maximum for a uniform probability distribution, i.e. p(xi) =
1/m for all i, in which case we are maximally uncertain about the outcome;
an accessible discussion of the relation between the Shannon entropy and
uncertainty can be found Jaynes (1994, Ch. 11); see Cover and Thomas
(1991) for a detailed treatment.
Sometimes we are given X but fail to know the p(xi). In this case Jaynes’s
maximum entropy principle (MEP) instructs us to choose that distribu-
tion p(xi) for which the Shannon entropy is maximal (under the constraint∑m
i=1 p(xi) = 1). For instance, from this principle it follows immediately that
we should assign p = 1/6 to each number of spots when rolling the die. If
there are constraints that need to be taken into account then MEP instructs
us to choose that distribution for which S
S
is maximal under the given con-
straints. The most common type of constraint is that the expectation value
for a particular function f has a given value c:
〈f〉 :=
m∑
i=1
f(xi)p(xi) = c. (37)
This can be generalised to the case of a continuous variable, i.e. X =
(a, b), where (a, b) is an interval of real numbers (the boundaries of this
interval can be finite or infinite). The continuous Shannon entropy is
90
S
S
(p) := −
∫ b
a
p(x) log[p(x)]dx, (38)
where p(x) is a probability density over (a, b).73 So for a continuous variable
the most common type of constraint is
〈f〉 :=
∫ b
a
f(x)p(x)dx = c, (39)
and MEP tells us to choose p(x) such that it maximises S
S
(p) under the
given constraints.
Why is MEP compelling? The intuitive idea is that we should always
choose the distribution that corresponds to a maximal amount of uncertainty,
i.e. is maximally non-committal with respect to the missing information. But
why is this a sound rule? In fact MEP is fraught with controversy; and, to
date, no consensus on its significance, or even cogency, has been reached.
However, debates over the validity of MEP belong to the foundations of
statistical inference in general and as such they are beyond the scope of this
review; for discussions see, for instance, Lavis (1977), Denbigh and Denbigh
(1985), Lavis and Milligan (1985, Sec. 5), Shimony (1985), Seidenfeld (1986),
Uffink (1995a; 1996a), Howson and Urbach (2006, 276-288).
In what follows let us, for the sake of argument, assume that MEP can
be justified satisfactorily and discuss what it has to offer for the foundations
of SM. But before moving on, a remark about the epistemic probabilities
here employed is in place. On the current view, epistemic probabilities are
not subjective, i.e. they do not reduce to the personal opinion of individual
observers, as would be the case in a personalist Bayesian theory (such as de
Finetti’s). On the contrary Jaynes advocates an ‘impersonalism’ that bases
probability assignments solely on the available data and MEP; anybody’s
personal opinions do not enter the scene at any point. Hence, referring to
Jaynes’ position as ‘subjectivism’ is a—frequently used—misnomer.
73This generalisation is problematic in many respects; and for the continuum limit to
be taken properly, a background measure and the relative entropy need to be introduced.
In the simplest case where the background measure is the Lebesgue measure we retrieve
Equation (38). For a discussion of this issue see Uffink (1995a, 235-239).
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3.6.2 MEP and SM
The appeal of MEP for equilibrium SM lies in the fact that the continuous
Shannon entropy is equivalent to the Gibbs entropy (28) up to the multi-
plicative constant k
B
if in Equation (38) we take X to be the phase space
and ρ the probability distribution. Gibbsian equilibrium distributions are
required to maximise S
G
under certain constraints and hence, trivially, they
also satisfy MEP. For an isolated system, for instance, the maximum entropy
distribution is the microcanonical distribution. In fact, even more has been
achieved: MEP not only coincides with the Gibbsian maximum entropy prin-
ciple introduced in Subsection 3.1; on the current view, this principle, which
above has been postulated without further explanation, is justified because
it can be understood as a version of MEP.
As we have seen at the beginning of this subsection, Jaynes sees the aim
of SM as making predictions, as drawing inferences. This opens a new per-
spective on non-equilibrium SM, which, according to Jaynes, should refrain
from trying to explain the approach to equilibrium by appeal to dynamical
or other features of the system and only aim to make predictions about the
system’s future behaviour (1983, 2). Once this is understood, the puzzle
of the approach to equilibrium has a straightforward two-step answer. In
Sklar’s (1993, 255-257) reconstruction, the argument runs as follows.
The first step consists in choosing the initial distribution. Characteristic
non-equilibrium situations usually arise from the removing of a constraint
(e.g. the opening of a shutter) in a particular equilibrium situation. Hence
the initial distribution is chosen in the same way as an equilibrium distribu-
tion, namely by maximising the Shannon entropy S
S
relative to the known
macroscopic constraints. Let ρ0(q, p, t0) be that distribution, where t0 is the
instant of time at which the constraint in question is removed. Assume now
that the experimental set-up is such that a set of macroscopic parameters
corresponding to the phase functions fi, i = 1, ..., k, are measured. At time
t0 these have as expected values
f¯i(t0) =
∫
fi(q, p) ρ0(q, p, t0)dΓ, i = 1, ..., k. (40)
Furthermore we assume that the entropy which we determine in an actual
experiment, the experimental entropy S
e
, at time t0 is equal to the Gibbs
entropy: S
e
(t0) = SS(ρ0(t0)).
The second step consists in determining the distribution and the entropy
of a system at some time t1 > t0. To this end we first use Liouville’s equation
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to determine the image of the initial distribution under the dynamics of the
system, ρ0(t1), and then calculate the expectation values of the observable
parameters at time t1:
f¯i(t1) =
∫
fi(q, p) ρ0(q, p, t1)dΓ, i = 1, ..., k. (41)
Now we calculate a new density ρ1(q, p, t1), which maximises the Shannon
entropy under the constraints that∫
fi(q, p) ρ1(q, p, t1)dΓ = f¯i(t1), i = 1, ..., k. (42)
The experimental entropy of the system at t1 then is Se(t1) = SS(ρ1(t1)).
This entropy is greater than or equal to S
e
(t0) for the following reason.
By Liouville’s theorem we have S
S
(ρ0(t0)) = SS(ρ0(t1)). Both SS(ρ0(t1))
and S
S
(ρ1(t1)) satisfy the constraints in Equation (42). By construction,
S
S
(ρ1(t1)) is maximal relative to these constraints; this need not be the case
for S
S
(ρ0(t1)). Therefore Se(t0) ≤ Se(t1). This is Jaynes’ justification of the
Second Law.
Jaynes’ epistemic approach to SM has several interesting features. Unlike
the approaches that we have discussed so far, it offers a clear and cogent in-
terpretation of SM probabilities, which it views as rational degrees of belief.
This interpretation enjoys the further advantage over its ontic competitors
that it can dispense with ensembles. On Jaynes’ approach there is only one
system, the one on which we are performing our experiments, and viewing
probabilities as reflecting our lack of knowledge about this system rather
than some sort of frequency renders ensembles superfluous. And most im-
portantly, the problems so far that beset non-equilibrium theory no longer
arise: the constancy of the Gibbs entropy becomes irrelevant because of the
‘re-maximising’ at time t1, and the stationarity of the equilibrium distribu-
tion is no longer an issue because the dynamics of the probability distribution
is now a function of both our epistemic situation and the dynamics of the sys-
tem, rather than only Liouville’s equation. And last but not least—and this
is a point that Jaynes himself often emphasised—all this is achieved without
appealing to complex mathematical properties like ergodicity or even mixing.
3.6.3 Problems
Let us discuss Jaynes’ approach to non-equilibrium SM first. Consider a
sequence t0 < t1 < t2 < ... of increasing instants of time and consider the
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entropy S
e
(tj), j = 0, 1, ... at these instants; all the Se(tj), j ≥ 2 are calcu-
lated with Equation (42) after substituting ρj for ρ1. Conformity with the
Second Law would require that S
e
(t0) ≤ Se(t1) ≤ Se(t2) ≤ .... However, this
is generally not the case (Lavis and Milligan 1985, 204; Sklar 1993, 257-258)
because the experimental entropy S
e
is not necessarily a monotonically in-
creasing function. Jaynes’ algorithm to calculate the S
e
(tj) can only establish
that S
e
(t0) ≤ Se(tj), for all j > 0 but it fails to show that Se(ti) ≤ Se(tj),
for all 0 < i < j; in fact, it is indeed possible that S
e
(ti) > Se(tj) for some
i < j.
A way around this difficulty would be to use ρj−1(tj−1) to calculate ρj(tj),
rather than ρ0(t0). This would result in the sequence becoming monotonic,
but it would have the disadvantage that the entropy curve would become
dependent on the sequence of instants of time chosen (Lavis and Milligan
ibid.). This seems odd even from a radically subjectivist point of view: why
should the value of S
e
at a particular instant of time, depend on earlier
instants of time at which we chose to make predictions, or worse, why should
it depend on us having made any predictions at all?
In equilibrium theory, a problem similar to the one we discussed in con-
nection with the ergodic approach (Subsection 3.3) arises. As we have seen in
Equation (40), Jaynes also assumes that experimental outcomes correspond
to phase averages as given in Equation (25). But why should this be the
case? It is correct that we should rationally expect the mean value of a se-
quence of measurements to coincide with the phase average, but prima facie
this does not imply anything about individual measurements. For instance,
when throwing a die we expect the mean of a sequence of events to be 3.5;
but we surely don’t expect the die to show 3.5 spots after any throw! So
why should we expect the outcome of a measurement of a thermodynamic
parameter to coincide with the phase average? For this to be the case a fur-
ther assumption seems to be needed, for instance (something like) Khinchin’s
assumption that the relevant phase functions assume almost the same value
for almost all points of phase space (see Subsection 3.3.2)
A further problem is that the dynamics of the system does not play any
roˆle in Jaynes’ derivation of the microcanonical distribution (or any other
equilibrium distribution that can be derived using MEP). This seems odd
because even if probability distributions are eventually about our (lack of)
knowledge, it seems that what we can and cannot know must have some-
thing to do with how the system behaves. This point becomes particularly
clear from the following considerations (Sklar 1993, 193-194). Jaynes repeat-
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edly emphasised that ergodicity—or the failure thereof—does not play any
roˆle in his account. This cannot be quite true. If a system is not ergodic
then the phase space decomposes into two (or more) invariant sets (see Unit
2.4.1). Depending on what the initial conditions are, the system’s state may
be confined to some particular invariant set, where the relevant phase func-
tions have values that differ from the phase average; as a consequence MEP
leads to wrong predictions. This problem can be solved by searching for the
‘overlooked’ constants of motion and then controlling for them, which yields
the correct results.74 However, the fact remains that our original probability
assignment was wrong, and this was because we have ignored certain impor-
tant dynamical features of the system. Hence the correct application of MEP
depends, after all, on dynamical features of the system. More specifically,
the micro canonical distribution seems to be correct only if there are no such
invariant subsets, i.e. if the system is ergodic.
A final family of objections has to do with the epistemic interpretation of
probabilities itself (rather than with ‘technical’ problems in connection with
the application of the MEP formalism). First, the Gibbs entropy is defined in
terms of the distribution ρ, and if ρ pertains to our epistemic situation rather
than to (aspects of) the system, it, strictly speaking, does not make any sense
to say that entropy is a property of the system; rather, entropy is a property
of our knowledge of the system. Second, in the Gibbs approach equilibrium is
defined in terms of specific properties that the distribution ρ must possess at
equilibrium (see Subsection 3.1). Now the same problem arises: if ρ reflects
our epistemic situation rather than facts about the system, then it does
not make sense to say that the system is in equilibrium; if anything, it is
our knowledge that is in equilibrium. This carries over the non-equilibrium
case. If ρ is interpreted epistemically, then the approach to equilibrium also
pertains to our knowledge and not to the system. This has struck many
commentators as outright wrong, if not nonsensical. Surely, the boiling of
kettles or the spreading of gases has something to do with how the molecules
constituting these systems behave and not with what we happen (or fail) to
know about them (Redhead 1995, 27-28; Albert 2000, 64; Goldstein 2001,
48; Loewer 2001, 611). Of course, nothing is sacred, but further explanation
is needed if such a radical conceptual shift is to appear plausible.
Against the first point Jaynes argues that entropy is indeed epistemic
even in TD (1983, 85-86) because here is no such thing as the entropy of a
74Quay (1978, 53-54) discusses this point in the context of ergodic theory.
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physical system. In fact, the entropy is relative to what variables one chooses
to describe the system; depending on how we describe the system, we ob-
tain different entropy values. From this Ben-Menahem (2001, Sec. 3) draws
the conclusion that, Jaynes’ insistence on knowledge notwithstanding, one
should say that entropy is relative to descriptions rather than to knowledge,
which would mitigate considerably the force of the objection. This ties in
with the fact (mentioned in Sklar 1999, 195) that entropy is only defined by
its function in the theory (both in TD and in SM); we neither have a phenom-
enal access to it nor are there measurement instruments to directly measure
entropy. These points do, to some extent, render an epistemic (or descrip-
tive) understanding of entropy more plausible, but whether they in anyway
mitigate the implausibility that attaches to an epistemic understanding of
equilibrium and the approach to equilibrium remains an open question.
3.7 Reductionism
How does the Gibbsian approach fare with reducing TD to SM? The aim
of a reduction is the same as in the Boltzmannian case: deduce a revised
version of the laws of TD from SM (see Subsection 2.8). The differences lie
in the kind of revisions that are made. I first discuss those approaches that
proffer an ontic understanding of probabilities and then briefly discuss how
reduction could be construed.
Boltzmann took over from TD the notion that entropy and equilibrium
are properties of an individual system and sacrificed the idea that equilibrium
(and the associated entropy values) are stationary. Gibbs, on the contrary,
retains the stationarity of equilibrium, but at the price of making entropy and
equilibrium properties of an ensemble rather than an individual system. This
is because both equilibrium and entropy are defined in terms of the proba-
bility distribution ρ, which is a distribution over an ensemble and not over
an individual system. Since a particular system can be a member of many
different ensembles one can no longer assert that an individual system is in
equilibrium. This ‘ensemble character’ carries over to other physical quan-
tities, most notably temperature, which are also properties of an ensemble
and not of an individual system.
This is problematic because the state of an individual system can change
considerably as time evolves while the ensemble average does not change at
all; so we cannot infer from the behaviour of an ensemble to the behaviour
of an individual system. However, what we are dealing with in experimen-
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tal contexts are individual systems; and so the shift to ensembles has been
deemed inadequate by some. Maudlin (1995, 147) calls it a ‘Pyrrhic victory’
and Callender (1999) argues that this and related problems disqualify the
Gibbs approach as a serious contender for a reduction of TD.
It is worth observing that Gibbs himself never claimed to have reduced
TD to SM and only spoke about ‘thermodynamic analogies’ when discussing
the relation between TD and SM; see Uffink (2007, 994-996) for a discussion.
The notion of analogy is weaker than that of reduction, but it is at least an
open question whether this is an advantage. If the analogy is based on purely
algebraic properties of certain variables then it is not clear what, if anything,
SM contributes to our understanding of thermal phenomena; if the analogy
is more than a merely formal one, then at least some of the problems that
we have been discussing in connection with reduction are bound to surface
again.
4 Conclusion
Before drawing some general conclusions from the discussion in Sections 2
and 3, I would like to briefly mention some of the issues, which, for lack of
space, I could not discuss.
4.1 Sins of Omission
SM and the Direction of Time. The discussion of irreversibility so far has
focussed on the problem of the directionality of change in time. One can take
this one step further and claim that this directionality in fact constitutes the
direction of time itself (the ‘arrow of time’). Attempts to underwrite the
arrow of time by an appeal to the asymmetries of thermodynamics and SM
can be traced back to Boltzmann, and have been taken up by many since.
The literature on the problem of the direction of time is immense and it is
impossible to give a comprehensive bibliography here; instead I mention just
some approaches that are closely related to SM. The modern locus classicus
for a view that seeks to ground the arrow of time on the flow of entropy is
Reichenbach (1956). Earman (1974) offers a sceptical take on this approach
and provides a categorisation of the different issues at stake. These are
further discussed in Sklar (1981; 1993, Ch. 10), Price (1996; 2002a; 2002b),
Horwich (1987), Callender (1998), Albert (2000, Ch. 6), Brown (2000), North
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(2002), Castagnino & Lombardi (2005), Hagar (2005) and Frisch (2006).
The Gibbs paradox. Consider a container that is split in two halves by
a barrier in the middle. The left half is filled with gas G1, the right half
with a different gas G2; both gases have the same temperature. Now remove
the shutter. As a result both gases start to spread and get mixed. We
then calculate the entropy of the initial and the final state and find that the
entropy of the mixture is greater than the entropy of the gases in their initial
compartments. This is the result that we would expect. The paradox arises
from the fact that the calculations do not depend on the fact that the gases
are different; that is, if we assume that we have air of the same temperature
on both sides of the barrier the calculations still yield an increase in entropy
when the barrier is removed. This seems wrong since it would imply that
the entropy of a gas depends on its history and cannot be a function of its
thermodynamic state alone (as thermodynamics requires).
What has gone wrong? The standard ‘textbook solution’ of this problem
is that classical SM gets the entropy wrong because it makes a mistake when
counting states (see for instance Huang 1963, 153-4; Greiner et al. 1993,
206-8). The alleged mistake is that we count states that differ only by a
permutation of two indistinguishable particles as distinct, while we should
not do this. Hence the culprit is a flawed notion of individuality, which is
seen as inherent to classical mechanics. The solution, so the argument goes,
is provided by quantum mechanics, which treats indistinguishable particles
in the right way.
This argument raises a plethora of questions concerning the nature of
individuality in classical and quantum mechanics, the way of counting states
in both the Boltzmann and the Gibbs approach, and the relation of SM to
thermodynamics. These issues are discussed in Rosen (1964), Lande (1965),
van Kampen (1984), Denbigh and Denbigh (1985, Ch. 4), Denbigh and
Redhead (1989), Jaynes (1992), Redhead and Teller (1992), Mosini (1995),
Costantini & Garibaldi (1997, 1998), Huggett (1999), Gordon (2002) and
Saunders (2006).
Maxwell’s Demon. Imagine the following scenario, originating in a letter
of Maxwell’s written in 1867. Take two gases of different temperature that
are separated from one another only by a wall. This wall contains a shutter,
which is operated by a demon who carefully observes all molecules. Whenever
a particle moves towards the shutter from the colder side and the particle’s
velocity is greater than the mean velocity of the particles in the hotter gas,
then the demon opens the shutter, and so lets the particle pass through.
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Similarly, when a particle heads for the shutter from within the hotter gas
and the particle’s velocity is lower than the mean velocity of the particles of
the colder gas, then the demon lets the particle pass through the shutter. The
net effect of this is that the hotter gas becomes even hotter and the colder
one even colder. So we have a heat transfer from the cooler to the hotter gas,
and this without doing any work; it is only the skill and intelligence of the
demon, who is able to sort molecules, that brings about the heat transfer.
But this sort of heat transfer is not allowed according to the Second Law
of thermodynamics. So the conclusion is that the demon has produced a
violation of the second law of thermodynamics.
In Maxwell’s own interpretation, this thought experiment shows that the
second law is not an exceptionless law; it rather describes a general tendency
for systems to behave in a certain way, or, as he also puts it, it shows that the
second law has only ‘statistical certainty’. Since Maxwell. the demon had a
colourful history. In particular, in the wake of Szilard’s work, much attention
has been paid to the entropy costs of processing and storing information.
These issues are discussed in Daub (1970), Klein (1970), Leff & Rex (1990;
2003), Shenker (1997; 1999), Earman & Norton (1998, 1999), Albert (2000,
Ch. 5), Bub (2001), Bennett (2003), Norton (2005), Maroney (2005) and
Ladyman et al. (2007).
Entropy. There are a number of related but not equivalent concepts
denoted by the umbrella term ‘entropy’: thermodynamic entropy, Shannon
entropy, Boltzmann entropy (fine-grained and coarse-grained), Gibbs entropy
(fine-grained and coarse-grained), Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy, von Neumann
entropy and fractal entropy, to mention just the most important ones. It
is not always clear how these relate to one another as well as to other im-
portant concepts such as algorithmic complexity and informational content.
Depending on how these relations are construed and on how the probabilities
occurring in most definitions of entropy are interpreted, different pictures
emerge. Discussions of these issues can be found in Grad (1961), Jaynes
(1983), Wehrl (1978), Denbigh & Denbigh (1985), Denbigh (1989b), Bar-
rett & Sober (1992; 1994; 1995), Smith et al. (1992), Denbigh (1994), Frigg
(2004), Balian (2005), and with a particular focus on entropy in quantum
mechanics in Shenker (1999), Henderson (2003), Timpson (2003), Campisi
(2005, 2008), Sorkin (2005) and Hemmo & Shenker (2006). The relation
between entropy and counterfactuals is discussed in Elga (2001) and Kutach
(2002).
Quantum Mechanics and Irreversibility. This review was concerned with
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the problem of somehow ‘extracting’ time-asymmetric macro laws from time-
symmetric classical micro laws. How does this project change if we focus on
quantum rather than classical mechanics? Prima facie we are faced with the
same problems because the Schro¨dinger equation is time reversal invariant (if
we allow replacing the wave function by its complex conjugate when evolving
it backwards in time). However, in response to the many conceptual problems
of quantum mechanics new interpretations of quantum mechanics or even
alternative quantum theories have been suggested, some of which are not time
reversal invariant. Dynamical reduction theories (such as GRW theory) build
state collapses into the fundamental equation, which thereby becomes non
time-reversal invariant. Albert (1994a; 1994b; 2000, Ch. 7) has suggested
that this time asymmetry can be exploited to underwrite thermodynamic
irreversibility; this approach is discussed in Uffink (2002). Another approach
has been suggested by Hemmo and Shenker who, in a series of papers, develop
the idea that we can explain the approach to equilibrium by environmental
decoherence (2001; 2003; 2005).
Phase Transitions. Most substances, for instance water, can exist in
different phases (liquid, solid, gas). Under suitable conditions, so-called phase
transitions can occur, meaning that the substance changes from, say, the
liquid to the solid phase. How can the phenomenon of phase transitions be
understood from a microscopic point of view? This question is discussed in
Sewell (1986, Chs. 5-7), Lebowitz (1999), Liu (2001) and Emch & Liu (2002,
Chs. 11-14).
SM methods outside physics. Can the methods of SM be used to deal
with problems outside physics? In some cases it seems that this is the case.
Constantini & Garibaldi (2004) present a generalised version of the Ehrenfest
flea model and show that it can be used to describe a wide class of stochastic
processes, including problems in population genetics and macroeconomics.
The methods of SM have also been applied to markets, a discipline now
known as ‘econophysics’; see Voit (2005) and Rickles (2008).
4.2 Summing Up
The foremost problem of the foundation of SM is the lack of a generally ac-
cepted and universally used formalism, which leads to a kind of schizophrenia
in the field. The Gibbs formalism has a wider range of application and is
mathematically superior to the Boltzmannian approach and is therefore the
practitioner’s workhorse. In fact, virtually all practical applications of SM
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are based on the Gibbsian machinery. The weight of successful applications
notwithstanding, a consensus has emerged over the last decade and a half that
the Gibbs formalism cannot explain why SM works and that when it comes to
foundational issues the Boltzmannian approach is the only viable option (see
Lavis (2005) and references therein). Hence, whenever the question arises of
why SM is so successful, an explanation is given in Boltzmannian terms .
This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, at least in its current
form, the Boltzmann formalism has a very limited range of applicability. The
Boltzmann formalism only applies to non (or very weakly) interacting parti-
cles and at the same time it is generally accepted that the Past Hypothesis,
an assumption about the universe as a whole, is needed to make it work. But
the universe as a whole is not an a collection of weakly interacting system,
not even approximately.
Second, even if the internal problems of the Boltzmann approach can be
solved, we are left with the fact that what delivers the goodies in ‘normal
science’ is the Gibbs rather than the Boltzmann approach. This would not
be particularly worrisome if the two formalisms were intertranslatable or
equivalent in some other sense (like, for instance, the Schro¨dinger and the
Heisenberg picture in quantum mechanics). However, as we have seen above,
this is not the case. The two frameworks disagree fundamentally over what
the object of study is, the definition of equilibrium, and the nature of entropy.
So even if all the internal difficulties of either of these approaches were to
find a satisfactory solution, we would still be left with the question of how
the two relate.
A suggestion of how these two frameworks could be reconciled has recently
been presented by Lavis (2005). His approach involves the radical suggestion
to give up the notion of equilibrium, which is binary in that systems either
are or not in equilibrium, and to replace it by the continuous property of
‘commonmess’. Whether this move is justified and whether it solves the
problem is a question that needs to be discussed in the future.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jeremy Butterfield, Craig Callender, Adam Caulton,
Jose´ Dı´ez, Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Isabel Guerra Bobo, Stephan Hartmann,
Carl Hoefer, David Lavis, Olimpia Lombardi, Wolfgang Pietsch, Jos Uffink,
and Charlotte Werndl, for invaluable discussions and comments on earlier
101
drafts. Thanks to Dean Rickles for all the hard editorial work, and for his
angelic patience with my ever changing drafts. I would also like to acknowl-
edge financial support from two project grants of the Spanish Ministry of
Science and Education (SB2005-0167 and HUM2005-04369).
Appendix
A. Classical Mechanics
CM can be presented in various more or less but not entirely equivalent
formulations: Newtonian mechanics, Lagrangean mechanics, Hamiltonian
mechanics and Hamiltion-Jacobi theory; for comprehensive presentations of
these see Arnold (1978), Goldstein (1980), Abraham & Marsden (1980) and
Jose´ & Saletan (1998). Hamiltonian Mechanics (HM) is best suited to the
purposes of SM; hence this appendix focuses entirely on HM.
CM describes the world as consisting of point-particles, which are located
at a particular point in space and have a particular momentum. A system’s
state is fully determined by a specification of each particle’s position and
momentum. Conjoining the space and momentum dimension of all parti-
cles of a system in one vector space yields the so-called phase space Γ of the
system. The phase space of a system with m degrees of freedom is 2m dimen-
sional; for instance, the phase space of a system consisting of n particles in
three-dimensional space has 6n dimensions. Hence, the state of a mechanical
system is given by the 2m-tuple x := (q, p) := (q
1
, . . . , q
m
, p
1
, . . . , p
m
) ∈ Γ.
The phase space Γ is endowed with a Lebesgue measure µ
L
, which, in the
context of SM, is also referred to as the ‘standard measure’ or the ‘natural
measure’.
The time evolution of the system is governed by Hamilton’s equation of
motion:75
q˙
i
=
∂H
∂p
i
and p˙
i
= −∂H
∂q
i
, i = 1, . . . , m, (43)
where H(q, p, t) is the so-called ‘Hamiltonian’ of the system. Under most
circumstances the Hamiltonian is the energy of the system (this is not true
in systems with time dependent boundary conditions, but these do not play
a roˆle in the present discussion).
75The dot stands for the total time derivative: f˙ := df/dt.
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If the Hamiltonian satisfies certain conditions (see Arnold (2006) for a
discussion of these) CM is deterministic in the sense that the state x0 of the
system at some particular instant of time t0 (the so-called ‘initial condition’)
uniquely determines the state of the system at any other time t. Hence,
each point in Γ lies on exactly one trajectory (i.e. no two trajectories in
phase space can ever cross) and H(q, p, t) defines a one parameter group of
transformations φt, usually referred to as ‘phase flow’, mapping the phase
space onto itself: x→ φt(x) for all x ∈ Γ and all t.
A quantity f of the system is a function of the coordinates and (possibly)
time: f(q, p, t). The time evolution of f is given by
f˙ = {f,H}+ ∂f
∂t
, (44)
where { , } is the so-called Poisson bracket:
{g, h} := ∑
i
[
∂g
∂qi
∂h
∂pi
− ∂h
∂qi
∂g
∂pi
]
, (45)
for any two differentiable functions g and h on Γ.
From this it follows thatH is a conserved quantity iff it does not explicitly
depend on time. In this case we say that the motion is stationary, meaning
that the phase flow depends only on the time interval between the beginning
of the motion and ‘now’ but not on the choice of the initial time. If H
is a conserved quantity, the motion is confined to a 2m − 1 dimensional
hypersurface ΓE , the so-called ‘energy hypersurface’, defined by the condition
H(q, p) = E, where E is the value of the total energy of the system.
Hamiltonian dynamics has three distinctive features, which we will now
discuss.
Liouville’s theorem asserts that the Lebesgue measure (in this context
also referred to as ‘phase volume’) is invariant under the Hamiltonian flow:
For any Lebesgue measurable region R ⊆ Γ and for any time t:
R and the image of R under the Hamiltonian flow, φt(R), have
the same Lebesgue measure; i.e. µ
L
(R) = µ
L
(φt(R)).
In geometrical terms, a region R can (and usually will) change its shape but
not its volume under the Hamiltonian time evolution.
This also holds true if we restrict the motion of the system to the energy
hypersurface ΓE , provided we choose the ‘right’ measure on ΓE. We obtain
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this measure, µ
L, E
, by restricting µ
L
to ΓE so that the 6n − 1 dimensional
hypervolume of regions in ΓE is conserved under the dynamics. This can be
achieved by dividing the surface element dσ
E
on ΓE by the gradient of H
(Kac 1959, 63):
µ
L, E
(RE) :=
∫
RE
dσ
E
‖gradH‖ (46)
for any RE ⊆ ΓE, where
‖gradH‖ :=
[
n∑
k=1
(∂H
∂pk
)2
+
(∂H
∂qk
)2]1/2
. (47)
We then have µ
L, E
(RE) = µL, E(φt(RE)) for all RE ⊆ ΓE and for all t.
Poincare´’s recurrence theorem: Roughly speaking, Poincare´’s recurrence
theorem says that any system that has finite energy and is confined to a
finite region of space must, at some point, return arbitrarily close to its
initial state, and does so infinitely many times. The time that it takes the
system to return close to its initial condition is called ‘Poincare´ recurrence
time’. Using the abstract definition of a dynamical system introduced in
Unit 2.4.1, the theorem can be stated as follows:
Consider an area-preserving mapping of the phase space X of
a system onto itself, φt(X) = X, and suppose that its measure
is finite, µ(X) < ∞. Then, for any measurable subset A with
µ
L
(A) > 0 of X, almost every point x in A returns to A in-
finitely often; that is, for all finite times τ the set B := {x|x ∈
A and for all times t ≥ τ : φtx /∈ A} has measure zero.
The Hamiltonian systems that are of interest in SM satisfy the requirements
of the theorem if we associate X with the accessible region of the energy
hypersurface.
Time reversal invariance. Consider, say, a ball moving from left to right
and record this process on videotape. Intuitively, time reversal amounts to
playing the tape backwards, which makes us see a ball moving from right to
left. Two ingredients are needed to render this idea precise, a transformation
reversing the direction of time, t → −t, and the reversal of a system’s in-
stantaneous state. In some contexts it is not obvious what the instantaneous
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state of a system is and what should be regarded as its reverse.76 In the case
of HM, however, the ball example provides a lead. The instantaneous state
of a system is given by (q, p), and in the instant in which the time is reversed
the ball suddenly ‘turns around’ and moves from right to left. This suggests
the sought-after reversal of the instantaneous state amounts to changing the
sign of the momentum: R(q, p) := (q,−p), where R is the reversal operator
acting on instantaneous states.
Now consider a system in the initial state (q
i
, p
i
) at time t
i
that evolves,
under the system’s dynamics, into the final state (q
f
, p
f
) at some later time
t
f
. The entire process (‘history’) is a parametrised curve containing all inter-
mediates states: h := {(q(t), p(t))|t ∈ [t
i
, t
f
]}, where (q(t
i
), p(t
i
)) = (q
i
, p
i
)
and (q(t
f
), p(t
f
)) = (q
f
, p
f
). We can now define the time-reversed process of
h as follows: Th := {R(q(−t), p(−t))|t ∈ [−t
f
,−t
i
]}, where T is the time-
reversal operator acting on histories. Introducing the variable τ := −t and
applying R we have Th = {(q(τ),−p(τ))| τ ∈ [t
i
, t
f
]}. Hence, Th is a process
in which the system evolves from state R(q
f
, p
f
) to state R(q
i
, p
i
) when τ
ranges over [t
i
, t
f
].
Call the class of processes h that are allowed by a theory A; in the case
of HM A contains all trajectories that are solutions of Hamilton’s equation
of motion. A theory is time reversal invariant (TRI) iff for every h: if h ∈ A
then Th ∈ A (that is, if A is closed under time reversal). Coming back to the
analogy with videotapes, a theory is TRI iff a censor who has to ban films
containing scenes which violate the law of the theory issues a verdict which
is the same for either direction of playing the film (Uffink 2001, 314). This,
however, does not imply that the processes allowed by a TRI theory are all
palindromic in the sense that the processes themselves look the same when
played backwards; this can but need not be the case.
HM is TRI in this sense. This can be seen by time-reversing the Hamilto-
nian equations: carry out the transformations t→ τ and (q, p)→ R(q, p) and
after some elementary algebraic manipulations you find dqi/dτ = ∂H/∂pi and
dpi/dτ = −∂H/∂pi, i = 1, ..., m. Hence the equations have the same form
in either direction of time, and therefore what is allowed in one direction of
76A recent controversy revolves around this issue. Albert (2000, Ch. 1) claims that,
common physics textbook wisdom notwithstanding, neither electrodynamics, nor quantum
mechanics nor general relativity nor any other fundamental theory turns out to be time
reversal invariant once the instantaneous states and their reversals are defined correctly.
This point of view has been challenged by Earman (2002), Uffink (2002) and Malament
(2004), who defend common wisdom; for a further discussion see Leeds (2006).
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time is also allowed in the other.77
The upshot of this is that if a theory is TRI then the following holds: if
a transition from state (q
i
, p
i
) to state (q
f
, p
f
) in time span ∆ := t
f
− t
i
is
allowed by the lights of the theory, then the transition from state R(q
f
, p
f
)
to state R(q
i
, p
i
) in time span ∆ is allowed as well, and vice versa. This is
the crucial ingredient of Loschmitd’s reversibility objection (see Subsection
2.3.3).
B. Thermodynamics
Thermodynamics is a theory about macroscopic quantities such as pressure,
volume and temperature and it is formulated solely in terms of these; no
reference to unobservable microscopic entities is made. At its heart lie two
laws, the First Law and Second Law of TD. Classical presentations of TD
include Fermi (1936), Callen (1960), Giles (1964) and Pippard (1966).
The first law of thermodynamics. The first law says that there are two
ways of exchanging energy with a system, putting heat into it and doing
work on it, and that energy is a conserved quantity:
∆U = ∆Q+∆W, (48)
where ∆U is the energy put into the system, and ∆Q and ∆W are, respec-
tively, the heat and work that went into the system. Hence, put simply,
the first law, says that one cannot create energy and thereby rules out the
possibility of a perpetual motion machine.
The second law of thermodynamics. The First Law does not constrain
the ways in which one form of energy can be transformed into another one
and how energy can be exchanged between systems or parts of a system. For
instance, according to the first law it is in principle possible to transform
heat into work or work into heat according to one’s will, provided the total
amount of heat is equivalent to the total amount of work. However, it turns
out that although one can always transform work in to heat, there are severe
77There was some controversy over the question of whether classical mechanics really is
TRI; see Hutchison (1993, 1995a, 1995b), Savitt (1994) and Callender (1995). However,
the moot point in this debate was the status of frictional forces, which, unlike in Newtonian
Mechanics, are not allowed in HM. So this debate has no implications for the question of
whether HM is TRI.
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limitations on the ways in which heat can be transformed into work. These
limitations are specified by the Second Law.
Following the presentation in Fermi (1936, 48-55), the main tenets of the
Second Law can be summarised as follows. Let A and B be two equilibrium
states of the system. Then consider a quasi-static transformation (i.e. one
that is infinitely gentle in the sense that it proceeds only through equilibrium
states), which takes the system from A to B . Now consider the integral
∫ B
A
dQ
T
, (49)
where T is the temperature of the system and dQ is the amount of heat
quasi-statically absorbed by the system. One can then prove that the value
of this integral does not depend on the sequence by which one gets from A
to B; it only depends on A and B themselves.
Now choose an arbitrary equilibrium state E of the system and call it the
standard state. Then we can define the entropy of the state A as
S(A) =
∫ A
E
dQ
T
, (50)
where the integral is taken over a quasi-static transformation.
With this at hand we can formulate the Second Law of thermodynamics:
∫ B
A
dQ
T
≤ S(B)− S(A). (51)
For a totally isolated system we have dQ = 0. In this case the second law
takes the particularly intuitive form:
S(A) ≤ S(B). (52)
That is, for any transformation in an isolated system, the entropy of the final
state can never be less than that of the initial state. The equality sign holds
if, and only if, the transformation is quasi-static.
Thermodynamics is not free of foundational problems. The status of
the Second Law is discussed in Popper (1957), Lieb & Yngvason (1999)
and Uffink (2001); Cooper (1967), Boyling (1972), Moulines (1975, 2000),
Day (1977) and Garrido (1986) examine the formalism of TD and possible
axiomatisations. The nature of time in TD is considered in Denbigh (1953)
and Brown and Uffink (2001); Rosen (1959), Roberts and Luce (1968) and
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Liu (1994) discuss the compatibility of TD and relativity theory. Wickens
(1981) addresses the issue of causation in TD.
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